The Cultural Politics of Otherness: Arab Americans at Crossroads of U.S.-Arab Imagery by Mahdi, Waleed
  
The Cultural Politics of Otherness 
Arab Americans at Crossroads of U.S.-Arab Imagery 
 
A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
 
 
By 
 
Waleed Farea Mahdi 
 
B.A. in English, Taiz University, 2003 
M.A. in Cultural Studies, University of New Mexico, 2008 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Dissertation directed by 
 
Roderick Ferguson 
Professor of American Studies and Critical Race Theory, University of Minnesota 
Professor of African American and Gender and Women’s Studies, University of Illinois 
 
 
 
October 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by Waleed Farea Mahdi 2015 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This dissertation would have not been possible without support I have received 
from many people and institutions. I would like to acknowledge the dedication of my 
adviser, Roderick Ferguson, in guiding me throughout the process of research and writing 
of this project. His belief in my proposed area of inquiry and continued supervision of my 
intellectual development instilled in me the confidence I very much needed to proceed. I 
would also like to recognize my dissertation reviewing committee members – Donna 
Gabaccia, Evelyn Alsultany, and Bianet Castellanos – for their insightful feedback. Duly 
credit goes to University of Minnesota faculty: Lary May, David Noble, Patricia Lorcin, 
Cawo Abdi, Kevin Murphy, Erika Lee, Karen Brown, Jennifer Pierce, Riv-Ellen Prell, 
David Karjanen, Elaine May, and Shaden Tageldin. My research has been enriched 
through a direct conversation with scholars in other institutions; namely, Jack Shaheen, 
Melani McAlister, Louis Cainkar, Amal Amireh, Alex Lubin, Jaap Kooijman, Eid 
Mohamed, and John Mowitt. A word of thanks goes to scholars attending my research-
related conference presentations at the Middle East Studies Association, the American 
Studies Association, the Arab American Studies Association, and the American 
Comparative Literature Association for their valuable interaction. 
I am grateful for the diverse institutional support that has provided me with the 
space and time necessary for the completion of this project. I would like to thank the 
University of Minnesota for facilitating a productive environment for my growth. I am 
particularly indebted to the Department of American Studies, the Interdisciplinary Center 
for the Study of Global Change, the Immigration History Research Center, the 
Community of Scholars Program, and the Graduate School for sponsoring my research 
through a number of fellowships including but not limited to the ICGC-MacArthur 
fellowship, the Doctoral Dissertation fellowship, and the Francis Maria Graduate 
Fellowship in Arab American Studies. I would like to thank Taiz University (Yemen), 
particularly the Department of English (College of Arts), for their support of my project. I 
would also like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Scientific 
Studies Society ILEM (Turkey), the American Studies Association, and the Center for 
Mahdi ii 
 
 
American Studies & Research (American University of Beirut) for sponsoring my travel 
to share my research with the scholarly community.  
Finally yet importantly, I sincerely appreciate the personal support I continue to 
receive from my relatives and friends in the United States and Yemen. I would not have 
been able to commit to research and writing without the sacrifice of my parents and 
siblings in Yemen. My achievement as a first generation doctoral student is in fact a 
realization of my parents’ conviction in the important role of education in my personal 
and professional fulfillment. A similar token of appreciation goes to my wife and in-laws 
in Minnesota for their love and care. The social support I have received from the Yemeni 
American community in the state has also been personally rewarding. I am equally 
grateful for the enriching role of my American family friends – David and Lucinda 
Williams as well as Randy and Debbie Torpen – in my spiritual well-being. The totality 
of the personal support I have gained throughout my educational experience in the United 
States has empowered me through my struggle as a first generation migrant. My final 
word of thanks goes to the Arab American and American Muslim communities that have 
offered me a sense of allegiance and belonging in the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mahdi iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, friends, and folks fighting prejudice, discrimination, and exclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mahdi iv 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Important studies on Arab American identity and anti-Arab sentiment have proliferated 
since September 11, 2011, but to date there have been few comparative studies on how 
the Arab American subjectivity is narrated as a transnational dialogue between East and 
West. There is also a lack of scholarly research related to simultaneous articulations of 
Arab Americans’ cultural citizenship in both U.S. and Arab popular culture. Towards that 
end, this dissertation proposes a comparative case study of U.S.-Arab cultural 
productions, i.e. Hollywood and Egyptian cinemas, to draw attention to the role of 
cultural politics in mediating a multi-layered process of Arab American Otherness to 
American and Arab audiences. While Hollywood filmmakers have promoted post-
Orientalist and racialized imagery of Arab Americans since the 1970s, the Egyptian 
filmmakers have explicitly engaged with the Arab American image through an 
overlapping Arabist, Islamist, and state nationalist critique of the United States since the 
1990s. Moving beyond current concerns with questions of stereotype, the project 
addresses broader issues of identity and belonging, and takes into consideration post-9/11 
emerging efforts in Arab, American, and Arab American films, which seek to reclaim the 
Arab American diasporic agency through interstitial activism and self-representation. The 
significance of this project lies in its response to recent scholarly calls in the area study 
field of American Studies and the ethnic study field of Arab American studies to locate 
the United States in a transnational space and define the experience of its immigrants 
beyond the restraints of the nation-state. It thereby unsettles the “national” as a theoretical 
category of analysis and proposes the “transnational” as an alternative category that 
forges a space for deeper understanding of the Arab American image at crossroads of 
U.S.-Arab sociocultural and geopolitical encounters. 
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Transliteration 
 
In transliterating the Arabic terms in this project, I have adopted the system approved by 
the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). In its first appearance, each 
Arabic word is italicized, and then followed by an English translation placed within 
brackets. Arabic words signifying personal names, e.g. Layla, require no translation. 
Whenever possible, Arabic words are prioritized over translations to preserve their 
authentic cultural connotations. In subsequent appearances, each word loses italicization 
except if it refers to an Arab work, book or film. In the case of Arab films, the translation 
is accompanied by the release date, separated by a comma. In rendering Arabic names 
with no known preferred spelling, I have exercised discretion in using the most common 
spelling format. When mentioning fictional characters in a particular work, I make sure to 
include the full name of the actors in brackets. 
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Introduction 
   [A] reconstructed American Studies needs to acknowledge how interdisciplinary perspectives 
involve a blurring of definitions, a collapsing of frontiers, not a nationalistic synthesis. By 
shifting the focus of American Studies from contextualism to comparativism, from studying 
objects within their natural or national arena to an analysis of how such an arena is constructed, 
we position ourselves on the theoretical boundaries of the subject, boundaries that enable us to 
see what is allowed into this particular field as well as what is kept out. 
—   Paul Giles, “Reconstructing American Studies” 
 
Scope 
 
September 11, 2012 marks not only the eleventh anniversary of the tragic attacks 
of September 11, 2001, but also serves as a manifestation of the U.S. war on terror’s 
tactics in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Motivated by a mixed sense of frustration and 
anger, hundreds of Egyptians, Libyans, Yemenis, and Tunisians – to only name protesters 
in Arab Spring revolutionary spaces – swarmed U.S. embassies in an attempt to register 
their outcry against a sensational film carrying the title Innocence of Muslims (2012).1 
The satirical, if not cynical, saturated imagery in the film advances a set of denigrating 
conceptions of the prophet of Islam along the lines of perversion and sadism. Considered 
a violation of Muslims’ reservation against the pictorial depiction of the prophet, let alone 
vilifying his spiritual message, the U.S.-based cast and production has rendered 
associating America with islamophobia personal to the protestors.2 The totality of post-
9/11 encounters with Muslims in the United States and elsewhere has popularized a 
critique of the United States as a neocolonial entity bent on, what president Bush once 
called, a “crusade” against terrorism, thereby, resurrecting a trauma in Islamic collective 
                                                 
1 The film was written and produced by Nakoula Basseley Nakoula. Short trailers were released in youtube 
two months prior to the embassy attacks. 
2 The cast members categorically denounced their previous knowledge of the film’s religious content. 
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memory of a western Christian aggression most readily available through operations 
conducted via the U.S. Military Industrial Complex, Central Intelligence Agency, and 
domestic law enforcement agencies. The protesters turned violent and erected banners 
glorifying Islam in place of the burned American flags in a move that transcended the 
politics of grievances against a specific poorly composed Islamophobic film.3 The attacks 
constitute a post-Arab Spring critical moment that calls for a serious interrogation of the 
politics surrounding Arabs’ and Muslims’ anti-U.S. grievances.4 Meanwhile, this reaction 
speaks of the power of film as a popular culture text in spurring cultural politics.  
It is this instrumentality of the visual image that accounts for my selection of the 
film medium as a critical site of inquiry in this dissertation. Scholarly works such as Lary 
May’s Screening out the Past, Norman Denzin’s Reading Race, Fatimah Rony’s The 
Third Eye, Lester Friedman’s Unspeakable Images, and Karla Fuller’s Hollywood Goes 
Oriental illustrate the role of films in unveiling the interplay between identity and 
cultural production. In addition to the accessibility of their mass-oriented messages to 
national and international audiences, the subjective and fictional nature of films 
necessitates a reliance on existing cultural codes and frames of references, especially 
regarding cultural Others, which are critical for interrogation in this project. For decades, 
Hollywood has played a major role in mediating a popular sense of American collective 
imagination and manufacturing sensational conceptions of cultural Otherness. Scholars 
like Peter Rollins, Alfred Richard, Robert Lee, Gina Marchetti, Alan Casty, Ed Guerrero, 
and Friedman have offered valid critiques of the cinema’s history of alienating minorities 
                                                 
3 The most notorious of the attacks was the “Benghazi attacks,” which claimed the lives of the American 
ambassador in Libya, J. Christopher Stevens and the Foreign Service officer Sean Smith, and sparked the 
Benghazi controversy. 
4 For more about the postcoloniality of the Arab revolutions, read Dabashi, The Arab Spring, 2012. 
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from the U.S. mainstream cultural scene as the titles of their respective works suggest, 
i.e., Hollywood's Indian, Contemporary Hollywood's Negative Hispanic Image, 
Orientals, Romance and the "Yellow Peril”, Communism in Hollywood, Framing 
Blackness, and The Jewish Image in American Film. Hollywood’s conflated articulation 
of Arabness and Islam operates on the similar premise of diminishing and enunciating 
their cultural difference through the Manichean paradigm of binary opposition. Jack 
Shaheen’s Reel Bad Arab and Guilty, Tim Semmerling’s ‘Evil’ Arabs in American 
Popular Film, Matthew Bernstein’s Visions of the East, and Laurence Michalak’s Cruel 
and Unusual investigate the history of the cinema’s reductive binary code, and criticize 
its repertoire of stereotypes and images a summary of which reads as follows: 
Americans have long been fascinated with the idea of the Arab – and nowhere more than in 
cinema. Over the past century, the movies have recorded changes, invariably for the worse, 
in an Arab image that was tinged with negative elements to begin with. For Americans, the 
Arab has long been the quintessential Other – fundamentally different from us, both 
fascinating and repugnant, enacting the taboos of our society. Brought to life on the screen 
from our collective imagination, the Arab does terrible deeds and receives appropriate 
terrible punishments.5 
 
Such contributions have laid a solid foundation for this project, which seeks to enrich 
their broader conversation by addressing the existing lack of emphasis in critiquing the 
cinema’s representation strategies of the Arab American image.  
Narrowing down the scope of my critique entails a reading of Hollywood’s image 
formations which have overlapped scholarship coverage of the industry’s engagement 
with Arabs as opposed to Arab Americans. For instance, analyses of the silent cinema’s 
constructions of the Arab image necessitate a theoretical consideration of early 
                                                 
5 Michalek, "The Arab in American Cinema,” 3. 
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Orientalist trends bearing European-influenced traits (i.e., harem, tents, sheiks, camels, 
etc.) in a film like The Sheikh (1921). This context still generated echoes during the 
1970s – the earliest decade traceable for the cinema’s portrayals of Arab Americans – 
when it was already being substituted by a post-Orientalist context characterized by an 
enhanced U.S. presence in the Middle East and its strong alliance with the state of Israel.6 
Another area of overlap in this context is the scholarly emphasis on the relevance of the 
U.S. racialized history in informing Hollywood’s dismissive portrayals of Arabs and 
Arab Americans.7 Limiting the scope of analysis to Arab Americans, therefore, 
foregrounds the necessity of theoretically engaging with a concept often understressed in 
the scholarship covering Hollywood’s representations of Arab Americans, namely, 
cultural citizenship.  
Examining the role of U.S. popular culture in dismissing the Arab American 
cultural citizenship requires a grounded reading of the Arab American minority 
experience in the United States. Towards that end, my analysis draws from the growing 
field of Arab American studies, which has contributed valuable works investigating the 
Arab American search for empowerment in an alienating milieu characterized by a sense 
of anti-Arabness, e.g., Alixa Naff’s Becoming American, Michale Suleiman’s Arabs in 
America, Nabeel Abraham’s and Andrew Shyrock’s Arab Detroit, Elizabeth Boosahda’s 
Arab-American Faces and Voices, Amaney Jamal’s and Nadine Naber’s Race and Arab 
Americans Before and After 9/11, Mustafa Bayoumi’s How Does it Feel to be a 
Problem?, and Louise Cainkar’s Homeland Insecurity.  The authors of such works have 
                                                 
6 Post-Orientalism, according to Melani McAlister, is a product of the post-WWII U.S. encounters in the 
Middle East; McAlister, Epic Encounter, Introduction. 
7 Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media, 2012. 
Mahdi 5 
 
 
theoretically imagined the Arab American identity to be primarily wrestling with such 
conceptions as assimilation, acculturation, alienation, and exclusion in a U.S. continuum 
projecting a cultural transition from an earlier emphasis on melting-pot as a means for 
inclusion to a new emerging sense of multiculturalism. The framework is further 
complicated as the contributors root the defined Arab American experience in U.S. 
Orientalist/post-Orientalist yearnings that render them as the racialized, gendered, and 
sexualized Other. 
This understanding of the Arab American Otherness, I contend, presents a 
theoretical limitation imposed by using nationalism as the primary category of analysis. 
What happens when this category is unsettled? Asking this question necessitates a shift 
from a focus on the national to that of the transnational in order to make sense of the 
diasporic nature of Arab American subjectivity. Interrogating the issue of Arab American 
belonging, therefore, requires a cross-cultural reading of their image alongside the U.S.-
Arab cultural industries. Important studies on Arab American identity and anti-Arab 
sentiment have proliferated since 9/11, but to date there have been few comparative 
studies on how Arab American subjectivity is being narrated as a transnational dialogue 
between East and West. Recent works like Rabab Abdulhadi’s Arab and Arab American 
Feminism, Nadine Naber’s Arab America, Carol Fadda-Conrey’s Contemporary Arab-
American Literature, and Jacob Berman’s American Arabesque highlight the diasporic 
nature of the Arab American experience and locate questions of identity and belonging of 
the Arab American community in a transnational context. There is, however, a lack of 
scholarly research related to simultaneous articulations of Arab American cultural 
citizenship in both U.S. and Arab popular culture.  
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This project proposes to fill this gap by initiating a conversation that offers a 
comparative case study of U.S.-Arab cultural productions, i.e. Hollywood and Egyptian 
cinema, to draw attention to the role of cultural politics in mediating a multi-layered 
process of Arab American Otherness in the American and the Arab collective 
imagination. While Hollywood filmmakers have promoted post-Orientalist and racialized 
imagery of Arab Americans since the 1970s, the Egyptian filmmakers have explicitly 
engaged with the Arab American image through an overlapping Arabist, Islamist, and 
state nationalist critique of the United States since the 1990s. Hence, in addition to 
studying Hollywood’s films, which are mainly engaged in circulating and reinforcing a 
U.S. perspective, I propose to balance that emphasis by identifying major films produced 
in Egyptian cinema that set forth sensational imagery essential to understanding the 
development of mainstream cross-cultural articulations of the Arab American image. 
Of all Arab cinemas, the popularity of the Egyptian cinema is historically rooted 
in the Arab psyche due to the grandeur of its rank as the capital of cinema in the Arab 
world. As early as 1896, Alexandria and Cairo hosted film screenings of short silent clips 
and most notably works of the French filmmakers, the Lumière Brothers.8 The year 1909 
instituted the earliest date for the cinema’s short film and newsreel productions. The full-
length feature films produced in the era preceding 1922 – the year marking the country’s 
independence form the British protectorate system – entertained a strong European 
influence, i.e. Italian and French, in the Egyptian filmmaking industry. Celui porte le 
masque (The One Wearing the Masque, 1917) was the first Egyptian funded feature film 
                                                 
8 Staff,” Egyptian Cinema-Industry,” MECFilm, 2011. 
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that retained French impact.9 Muhammad Karim was the first Egyptian to play a role in 
Italian produced films el-Zuhoor el-Qatila (Deadly Flowers, 1918) and Sharaf el-Badawi 
(Honor of the Bedouin, 1918).10 It was not until Talaat Harb, founder of Misr Bank, 
established Sharikat Misr li-l-Sinima wa-l-Tamthil (Egyptian Company for Cinema and 
Performance) in 1925 and Studio Misr (Egypt Studio) in 1935 that the cinema gained 
local resources for film production. Perhaps the full-length feature films Layla (1927) and 
Qubla fi Esaḥra (A Kiss in the Desert, 1927) are the most recognized attempts to 
articulate the cinema’s search for independence.11 Ever since then, the Egyptian cinema 
contributed more than four thousand films – constituting nearly three quarters of the Arab 
film repertoire; subsequently, dubbed as Hollywood of the East, Hollywood of the Nile, 
and Arab Hollywood.12  
This rich heritage has been unmatched by any other national cinema in the Arab 
world. During the Golden Age of the Egyptian cinema (between 1930 and 1960), 
hundreds of Egyptian films contributed to the genres of black and white comedies, 
melodramas, romances, and musicals while other Arab cinemas lingered behind.13 The 
period announced the rise of leading Egyptian and Arab entertainers that forged a space 
for Arabs to develop appreciation for Egyptian cinema and utilize it as a generating site 
of Arab collective imagination. Arab audiences were captivated by the musicals of 
Muhammad Abd el-Wahab, Umm Kulthum, Farid el-Atrash, Asmahan and Abd el-Halim 
Hafiz, dancing lures of Na’eema Akef and Tahiya Karioka, and comedic roles of Naguib 
                                                 
9 Thabet, Industrie du film Egptien, 2009; as quoted in Allagui and Najjar, “Framing Political Islam in 
Popular Egyptian Cinema,” 2011. 
10 Saad, Mūjaz tārīkh al-sīnimā al-Miṣrīyah, 1976.  
11 Shafik, Arab Cinema, 12 
12 Staff, “Rising Stars,” 2011. 
13 Staff, “Retro ‘Arab Hollywood,” 2013. 
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al-Rihani and Ismail Yasin. They developed a transnational appeal to actors like Yusef 
Wahbi, Anwar Wagdi, Omar el-Sherif and Rushdi Abaza, actresses like Amina Rizq, 
Layla Murad, Fatin Hamama and Suad Husni, and directors like Muhammad Karim, 
Ahmed Badrakhan, Henry Barakat, Salah Abu Sayf, Kamal al-Shaykh, Tawfik Saleh, 
Niyazi Moustafa, Hassan al-Imam and Youssef Chahine.14 The nationalization of the 
Egyptian film industry during the 1960s, which launched a decade of state-sponsored 
image monopoly, foregrounded the Egyptian cinema’s role in circulating pan-Arab 
nationalism. The growth in film commercial productions since the 1970s owed its success 
to increasing demand for entertainment in the Arab world, particularly in oil-rich 
countries. An important factor contributing to the cinema’s success is its overlapping 
sensational use of postcolonial resistance rhetoric that circulates Arabist, Islamist, and 
state nationalist critiques of the United States and its aggressive foreign policy in the 
region, which I argue, constitutes a viable ground for its mainstream representation 
strategies of Arab Americans.15 
In Arab Cinema, Viola Shafik traces production rates of other Arab filmmaking 
during the twentieth century: 
Productions in most Arab countries did not produce films before national independence. In 
Sudan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, production is even now [1998] 
confined to short films or television. Bahrain witnessed the production of its first and only 
full-length feature film in 1989. At the end of 1970s the Kuwaiti director Khalid Siddiq 
shot two full-length features, one of them a coproduction with the Sudan. In Jordan 
national production has barely exceeded half a dozen feature films. Algeria and Iraq have 
produced approximately 100 films each, Morocco around seventy, Tunisia around 130, and 
                                                 
14 Darwish, Dream Makers on the Nile, 1998. 
15 I build on Lina Khatib’s Filming the Modern Middle East (2006) and Shafik’s Popular Egyptian Cinema 
(2007) contributions by foregrounding postcoloniality as a disruptive filmic tool, which continues to project 
Arab American difference 
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Syria some 150. Lebanon, owing to an increased production during the 1950s and the 
1960s, has made some 180 feature films.16 
Since 2000, the Arab world witnessed unprecedented growth in film festivals including 
but not limited to the International Film Festival of Marrakech (2001), Beirut 
International Film Festival (2003), Jordan Short Film Festival (founded in 2004), Abu 
Dhabi Film Festival (2007), Muscat International Film Festival (2007), Gulf Film 
Festival (2008), Karama Human Rights Film Festival (2009), Doha Tribeca Film Festival 
(2009-2012), and Kuwait International Film Retreat (2013). The films presented in such 
venues, however, continue to face distribution challenges that restrict their access to the 
level of viewership and public consumption that Egyptian mainstream films retain. 
Contemporary Egyptian cinema currently faces several obstacles undercutting the 
quantity and quality of its production. Filmmakers are forced to embattle licensing 
bureaucracy, state censorship, celebrity wage hikes, and copyrights piracy. The country’s 
sociopolitical instability and the rewarding Ramadan annual competition for television 
shows and dramas have presented additional pressures for the cinema’s growth. Still, 
Egypt maintains unparalleled dominance in filmmaking as it continues to attract the flow 
of commercial production and invite state-regulated contributions from Arab actors, 
directors, and producers.17 It is this unique position of Egyptian cinema that accounts for 
selecting its visual products as representative of the Arab cinema in this work. 
In addition to investigating the representation strategies of Arab Americans in 
Hollywood and Egyptian cinema, this project addresses broader issues of identity and 
belonging that take into consideration post-9/11 emerging filmic efforts in Arab, 
                                                 
16 Shafik, Arab Cinema, 9. 
17 To read more about the primary issues circulating the Egyptian popular culture, see Armbrust’s Mass 
Culture and Modernism in Egypt, 1996. 
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American, and, for the first time, Arab American works invested in redefining Arab 
American subjectivity in film. This entails a reference to an Arab American diasporic 
agency that rejects sensational constructions of the citizen-traitor paradox in U.S. popular 
culture and postcolonial binaries in Arab popular culture. This agency rejects portrayals 
of Arab Americans as a source of security threat in the United States (Hollywood 
narrative), or as a community exclusively defined through allegiance to the Arab world 
(Egyptian filmmaking narrative). It spells out through contextualizing the Arab American 
transmigrant experience in navigating the U.S.-Arab sociocultural and geopolitical divide 
as a critical site for interstitial activism and self-representation.  
Although this project primarily focuses on Arab Americans, it is hard to neglect 
the popularized interchangeable use of Arabs and Muslims as one entity. Wherever 
appropriate, I will inscribe Muslim or Islamic to my analysis to demonstrate a purposeful 
separation between the Muslim and the Arab identities. Whenever possible, I use the term 
“American Muslims” to suggest the various ways in which American Islam presents a 
different way of knowing distinct from other versions of Islam (e.g. Arab Islam, Iranian 
Islam, South Asian Islam, South East Asian Islam, etc.). My definition of Arab 
Americans is not necessarily restricted to Muslim subjectivity. It rather encompasses a 
reading of Arab Americans with subscription to Christian, Jewish, and nonreligious 
identities. Similarly, my use of “U.S.” and “America,” though seemingly interchangeable, 
stresses my intended reference to the distinction in the narratives surrounding the "United 
States" as a nation-state operating within its own particular sociopolitical context and 
"America" as a cultural frame that pushes people to dream of securing values of liberty, 
social mobility, and success.  
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Framework 
 
This dissertation is structured to fulfill two main objectives. The first objective is 
to re-engage the current theoretical conceptualization of Arab American Otherness, and 
propose a reading that transcends the particularities of the U.S. citizenry parameters. I 
accomplish this while arguing that Arab Americans have been rather configured into a 
double-layered process of alienation that emerges out of the existing tension between the 
United States and the Arab world. An examination of the U.S. and Arab cultural 
productions, particularly in film, reveals a consistency in (1) casting Arab Americans as 
invaders seeking to undermine the national security of the United States (U.S. cultural 
trope), and (2) characterizing them as temporary migrants that ought to pledge their 
allegiance to and serve their Arab homelands (Arab postcolonial rhetoric). This, 
subsequently, helps to showcase that Arab American Otherness cannot be strictly viewed 
as merely a byproduct of the U.S. long Orientalist and racialized history, but as an 
outcome of the polarization that exists in the cultural imaginations of the Self and the 
Other both in the U.S. and Arab cultural memory.    
In this context, the project recognizes the overarching cultural templates of 
American Orientalism and Arab Occidentalism and their role in espousing a discursive 
proliferation of politicized knowledge of Arabs and Americans in light of imperialism.18 
Drawn from the Foucauldian understanding of knowledge as “political,” the Gramscian 
notion of “hegemony” as a controlling mechanism, and the Hegelian conception of the 
“Self” and the “Other,” American Orientalism – argues Edward Said, Milini Schueller, 
Douglas Little, Zachary Lockman, and Fawaz Gerges – has contributed to legitimizing 
                                                 
18 For works critical of the conflation of culture and power, refer to Said, Culture and Imperialism, 1993; 
Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of US Culture, 2002. 
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the U.S. liberal/imperial approach to the Arab world.19 Simultaneously, Arab 
Occidentalism, argues Rasheed el-Enany and Eid Mohamed, serves as a counter-
discursive response that offers Arabs the agency to voice their polarizing perceptions of 
America.20 Such a context has offered a fertile ground for the rise of Islamists (heavily 
influenced by the writings of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb), Arab nationalists (inspired by 
the leadership of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser), and state nationalists 
(embraced by Arab countries as an alternative to the failed Arab nationalist project). 
The two overarching discourses share three important elements. First, they have 
contributed to projecting two identity-based and morally defined spheres. One sphere is 
shaped by an imagined space that celebrates the uniqueness of the American experience 
in world history and stresses its global moral distinction (read, American 
Exceptionalism).21 This sphere prescribes a sense of universality, which Roderick 
Ferguson locates in the history of white heteropatriarchal normativity through excluding 
people of color from the U.S. cultural memory – and, I argue, subjects Arab Americans’ 
cultural citizenship to a process of alienation most explicitly defined through, what 
Charles Mills identifies as, the “racial contract.”22 The other sphere mediates an imagined 
space for Arabs that invokes nostalgic appeals to a distant history of a triumphant and 
unified Arab world as a means of anti-imperial contestations, and promotes its imagery of 
Arab Americans accordingly. Second, the two discourses have been instrumental in 
                                                 
19 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge; Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 1971; Hegel, The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, 1977; Lauer, A reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 1976; Said, 
Orientalism, 1979; Schueller, U.S. Orientalisms, 2004; Little, American Orientalism, 2002; Lockman, 
Contending Visions of the Middle East, 2004; Fawaz Gergez, America and Political Islam, 1999; to read 
about American Orientalism in the Asian context, read Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism, 2003. 
20 El-Enany, Arab Representations of the Occident, 2006; Mohamed, Arab Occidentalism, 2015. 
21 To read about American exceptionalism, see Nobel, Death of a Nation, 2002; Rodgers, "American 
Exceptionalism Revisited,” 2004; Kane, Between Virtue and Power, 2008; Hodgson, The Myth of American 
Exceptionalism, 2009; Nayak and Malone, “American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism,” 2009.  
22 Ferguson, Aberrations in Black, 2004; Mills, The Racial Contract, 1997. 
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shaping two culturally opposed conceptions of Arabs and Americans, codified through 
the narratives of Islamicism and Islamism. Islamicism, as Timothy Marr contends, yields 
an immediate realization of the U.S. one-dimensional portrayal of Islam as Arabs’ 
violence-generating anti-Western doctrine.23 On the contrary, Islamism has developed as 
a sociocultural and political alternative measure for Arab Muslims to draw the United 
States as another imperialist project invested in ruining the Arab world. Third, the 
mutually polarizing discourses have produced radical echoes that culminated in 
envisioning the post-Cold War U.S.-Arab tension as a prerequisite site for a looming 
clash of civilizations – maintained by Bernard Lewis and popularized by Samuel 
Huntington – primarily defined by spatially defined religions, i.e. Christendom and 
Islam.24 Drawing from such a broad theoretical reading of Otherness as critical site of 
inquiry in this research, I rely on those U.S.-Arab polarizing discourses as a beginning to 
comprehend the underpinnings of Arab American alienation. 
The second objective of this project is to theorize new emerging filmic efforts that 
challenge the restrictive representation strategies of Arab Americans in mainstream 
Hollywood and Egyptian productions. By moving beyond the premises of nationalist-
driven cultural politics, which have drawn Arabs and Americans apart and denied Arab 
Americans their own distinct space, there have emerged in the past decade works in the 
mainstream cinemas in addition to a burgeoning Arab American film industry with de-
nationalized representation strategies. These patterns locate Arab Americans in an 
interstitial space in which their diasporic agency is articulated as a cross-cultural medium 
that navigates the U.S.-Arab cultural politics beyond polarizations. They nuance the 
                                                 
23 Marr, The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism, 2006. 
24 Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” 1990; Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 1993. 
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imagined Arab American identity as a diverse entity that defies exclusionary mapping 
either through the “citizen-terrorist” construct (Hollywood) or resistance narratives 
(Egyptian cinema). They also challenge the U.S.-Arab dominant rhetoric of belonging 
that presupposes a chasm between Arab Americans and their American identity. 
In theorizing this disrupture, I resort to transnational migration theory, which has 
pioneered transnational inquiries of the migrant experience. Nations Unbound is the 
earliest work in which Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Blanc introduce the 
“transnational migrant’ concept, which proves useful to account for the interstitial nature 
of the migration experience in the age of globalization. Since then, anthropological and 
sociological works in this field have initiated critical concepts with immediate resonance 
to my inquiry.25 This includes but is not limited to such concepts as “transnational social 
spaces,” “migrant transnational flow,” and “transnational circuit” respectively advanced 
by Thomas Faist, Alejandro Portes, and Roger Rouse.26 The field has also contributed 
critical works that transnationalize the study of migration, e.g., Michael Burawoy’s 
Global Ethnography, José Saldívar’s Border Matters, Monisha Gupta’s Unruly 
Immigrants, Nadia Kim’s Imperial Citizens, Rosa Fregoso’s meXicana Encounters, 
Martin Manalansan’s Global Divas, and Gina Pérez’s The Near Southwest Side Story. 
Perhaps the most critical work from which this dissertation draws its transnational 
inquiry is Sunaina Maira’s Missing, which engages more directly with the issue of 
“transnational citizenship” in the post-9/11 South Asian migrant experience in the United 
States. This constitutes an important source of inspiration to my commitment to shedding 
                                                 
25 To consult literature reviews of such works, refer to Kivisto, “Theorizing Transnational Migration,” 
2001; Waldinger, and Fitzgerald, “Transnationalism in Question,” 2004. 
26 Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration, 2000; Portes, “Conclusion: Toward a New 
World,” 1999; Rouse, “Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism,” 1991. 
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light on the uniqueness of the Arab American transmigrant experience. Meanwhile, my 
interest in offering a new venue to engage with scholarship pertaining to the issues of 
Arab American belonging necessitates the utilization of postcolonial theory and world 
system theory. Homi Bhabha’s “third space” and “hybridity” and Arjun Appadurai’s 
“deterritorialization” and “diasporic public spheres” help contextualize my reading of the 
Arab American post-nationalist experience.27 Thus, I find the intersectionality of these 
areas of study instrumental for consolidating the theoretical framework encompassing my 
reading of the Arab American diasporic agency, which, I argue, advances in three main 
dimensions: disrupting the citizen-traitor paradox, maintaining a sense of interstitial 
activism, and investing in self-representation.  
In essence, this work responds to the call of scholars in the field of American 
Studies to move inquiry beyond the national paradigm and locate the United States in a 
transnational space.28 In her presidential speech at the American Studies Association 
annual convention (2004), Shelley Fisher Fishkin stresses: 
The complexity of our field of study as we understand it today…requires that we pay as 
much attention to the ways in which ideas, people, culture, and capital have circulated and 
continue to circulate physically, and virtually, throughout the world, both in ways we 
might expect, and unpredictably; it requires that we view America, as David Palumbo-Liu 
put it, as a place “always in process itself.” It requires that we see the inside and outside, 
domestic and foreign, national and international, as interpenetrating.29  
 
                                                 
27 Bhabha, “Cultural Diversity and Cultural Differences,” 2006; Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 1996. 
28 The call was officiated in the keynote address by the president of the American Studies Association 
President, Janice Radway, in which she questioned the politics of naming the field. The speech was 
delivered during the annual convention in 1998 bearing the theme “American Studies and the Question of 
Empire: Histories, Cultures, and Practices.” In the same year, the American Quarterly published a set of 
essays on “empire,” “internationalization,” “globalist discourse,” and “black transnationalism;” see, 
Radway, “What’s in a Name?,” 1999; Gross, “The Transnational Turn, 2000. 
29 Fishkin, “Crossroads of Cultures,” 21; Palumbo-Liu, Asian/American, 389. 
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Ever since then, American studies scholars have heavily invested in “transnationalism” as 
a promising category of analysis that yields valid contestations of nationalist-based 
identity constructions. Monographs like Inderpal Grewal’s Transnational America (2005) 
and Winfried Siemerling’s The New North American Studies (2005), and edited 
collections like Sandhya Shukla’s Imagining our Americas (2007), Brian Edwards’ 
Globalizing American Studies (2010), and Evelyn Alsultany’s and Ella Shohat’s Between 
the Middle East and the Americas (2013) have ushered a momentum that has become 
recognized as the “transnational turn” in the field, and constitutes a necessary background 
for this dissertation.  
My transnational approach foregrounds the role of comparison in uncovering sites 
of knowledge. The comparative framework employed in this project, therefore, defines 
the Arab American image beyond the nation-state restraints in an attempt to offer another 
example of how American studies as an interdisciplinary area of study is capable of 
producing a valuable insight into issues with promising intersectional contributions to 
ethnic studies, cultural studies, and migration studies. Throughout the dissertation, I 
utilize the “transnational” in making sense of the interlocutors defining the Arab 
American image across the U.S.-Arab cinematic terrains. The mutual production of 
discourses about Arabness in U.S. film and Americanness in Arab cinema necessitates 
interrogation of the transnational context defining the U.S.-Arab encounters. 
Hollywood’s deployment of the transnational consolidates U.S.-Israeli economic and 
political anxieties into a cultural sense of fear against Arabness. Alternatively, Egyptian 
filmmakers discipline the transnational nature of their market (Arab and Muslim nations) 
into the state national (Egyptian interests). In both cases, the two industries condition 
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their transnational formations to nationalist rhetoric that curtails complex articulations of 
the transnational nature of the Arab American image. Thus, the project intends to 
transcend this very limitation by capturing a rising filmmaking consciousness of Arab 
Americans’ diasporic agency through interstitial activism and self-representation.  
To do so, I plan to offer catalogue (part I) as well as exegetic (part II) readings of 
films produced in U.S., Arab, and Arab American cultural spheres. The primary selection 
criterion of films is relevance. Although my reflections are conscious of the range of 
Aristotle’s three representation styles (i.e., realistic, stereotypical, and idealistic) across 
the U.S.-Arab cinematic terrains, my guiding premise draws from Stuart Hall’s theory of 
ideology (1977), which assumes that cultural works produce socially constructed 
meanings that circulate a sense of consciousness defined by linguistic constraints, social 
formations, and power monopoly.30 My readings involve consulting established literature 
in each of the project’s themes. They promote considerations of appropriate spatial and 
temporal dimensions with particular attention to the history of production and public 
reception of the selected films. In addition to citing scholarly works, my reflections 
navigate the established links between the “real” and the “reel” through citing critical 
events, public works, and relevant references that offer material support to the arguments 
made throughout the analysis. 
 
Outline 
 
The dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part, “Arab American 
Otherness in Hollywood and Egyptian Cinema,” advances a call for a re-consideration of 
                                                 
30 Leitch, “Aristotle,” 2001. Hall, “Culture, Media and the ‘Ideological Effect,’” 1977; Hall, “Ideology and 
Communication Theory,” 1989; Makus, “Stuart Hall’s Theory of Ideology,” 1990; Hall, Representation, 
1997. 
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the existing theoretical understanding of Arab American Otherness, which restricts the 
process of Arab American alienation to the U.S. racialized and Orientalist history, and 
does not sufficiently address connections of Arab Americans to the Arab world. 
Positioning Arab Americans in their transnational context, I argue, necessarily broadens 
understanding of the alienation process of the Arab American community. It also 
elucidates the postcolonial narratives circulating the Arab world and plays a viable role in 
the formation of the Arab American collective sense of diasporic identity. This argument 
develops in the first two chapters of the dissertation in which I offer a comparative survey 
of the dominant patterns of Arab American representations in both Hollywood and 
Egyptian cinemas. Choosing to catalogue the two cinemas in this part is instrumental to 
uncovering the major factors behind the proliferation of prominent narratives in U.S.-
Arab mainstream cinemas. This particular method, therefore, proves the most appropriate 
in examining the role of U.S.-Arab filmmakers in mediating the American and Arab 
collective memory to their respective audiences while yielding sensational images of 
Arab Americans with a severely limited sense of belonging.  
The first chapter, “Hollywood’s Articulations of Arab American Cultural 
Citizenship,” delivers a macro reading of Hollywood’s enunciation of cultural citizenship 
and its limited projections of Arab Americans’ belonging to the American culture. It 
offers a survey of prominent representation patterns of Arab Americans in Hollywood’s 
cinematic productions since the 1970s. It advances a timely critique of the industry’s 
post-Orientalist and racialized formations of Arab American foreignness through three 
primary representation patterns, i.e., Arab-buying-America, the alien-terrorist, and the 
citizen-terrorist. The first pattern refurbishes early images of Arabia and imparts new 
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constructions dictated by the Arab-Israeli conflict. The second pattern borrows Israeli 
diasporic productions of “Arabs as terrorists” through stripping Arab Americans of their 
legal as well as cultural citizenship in the United States. The third pattern embraces the 
Arab American legal citizenship while questioning their cultural belonging.  
The guiding intervention in this chapter is its identification of the 1970s as a 
critical decade in Hollywood’s cinematic engagement with Arabness. This decade, I 
contend, signals a turning point in the cinema’s portrayal modes from early readings of 
Arabs as part of a distant Orient readily available for fetishized consumption to post-
Orientalist and racialized readings informed by echoes of the U.S. increasing presence in 
the Middle East, contributions by Israeli diasporic filmmakers in the United States to 
translate the Israeli vision of the Arab-Israeli conflict to American audiences, and post-
1965 solidifying presence of Arab and Muslim migrants with a deep commitment to their 
issues. The argument contextualizes my reading of the cinema’s evolution in its 
representation strategies of the Arab American image. This, in turn, emphasizes the 
necessity to delineate 9/11 as the turning point in projecting alienating images of Arab 
Americans while offering a critique of the cinema’s post-9/11 attempts to accommodate 
sympathetic portrayals of the Arab and the Muslim presence in the United States.  
To capture the nuance surrounding the articulations of Arab American cultural 
citizenship, the second chapter interrogates, as its title suggests, the “Postcolonial 
Projections of Arab Americans in Egyptian Cinema.” The chapter offers an original 
survey of Egyptian films produced since the 1990s in order to interrogate Arab 
mainstream representations of the Arab American image. Unlike Hollywood’s 
framework, the transnational framework employed in Egyptian cinema is more 
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complicated in its consolidation of overlapping Arabist, Islamist, and Egyptian 
postcolonial critiques of the United States. This consolidation speaks of the existing 
multi-layeredness of the Arab American subjectivity and subverts Hollywood’s 
homogenous portrayals of Arab Americans. The chapter investigates the premises of this 
consolidation process through a reading of its overlapping discursive grounds. It then 
turns to a reading of the cinema’s representation pattern of the Arab American image, 
which I locate at the intersection of the cinema’s postcolonial conceptions of nation, 
class, gender, and sexuality. The pattern features three primary dimensions that engage 
with as well as transcend the politics of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which 
usually receives the most attention in Egyptian cinema scholarship. In addition to 
consisting of films dedicated to critiquing the reiterations of U.S. hegemony, the pattern 
includes works invested in spelling out a sense of disillusionment in the American Dream 
and circulating the element of nostalgia as prerogative for the Arab Dream. Thus, it 
showcases how the Arab American characters wrestle with the articulations of their 
Arabness in terms of their resistance against issues of materialism, power, and nostalgia. 
The transnational framework enveloping this pattern, I conclude, fails to enunciate in full 
terms the interstitial nature of the Arab American citizenship and belonging. The cinema 
advances its imagery of the Arab American subjectivity as an embodiment of either 
Americanness or Arabness.  
The first part of this dissertation recognizes the current limitations of U.S.-Arab 
mainstream film industries in articulating the transnational narratives underwriting the 
Arab American subjectivity. The Arab American image is reduced to a playground for 
U.S.-Arab geopolitical and sociocultural encounters. It emerges at the center of this 
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divide as it undergoes a mutual process of vilification in the two industries, revealing a 
necessary critical site of inquiry pertaining to issues of cultural exclusion. An alternative 
narrative must develop, I propose, to better negotiate an appropriate transnational space 
for Arab Americans that go beyond such polarizations. The second part of this project, 
“Re-Narrating Arab American Subjectivity in Film,” looks for the possibility of reading 
the Arab American label as a solidifying tool that invokes both an appeal to a common 
Arab heritage increasingly fractured by an ever more divided Arab world and a sense of 
urgency to claim agency and self-representation as rudimentary measures to counter a 
rising sense of discrimination in the United States against Arabs, Muslims, and look-a-
likes. The part calls for the urgency to move beyond existing national/transnational 
limiting narratives in the mainstream productions of Hollywood and Egyptian cinema 
that render the Arab American image un(der)explored. Hence, it develops a framework in 
the subsequent two chapters through content analyses of American, Arab, and Arab 
American disruptive films that locate the Arab American subjectivity in a diasporic 
public sphere. The exegetic method proves appropriate in this part to uncover the 
prominent issues in the selected films.   
Thus, the third chapter, “Transcultural Constructions of Arab American 
Subjectivity,” offers an inter-textual analysis of the American film Traitor (2008) and the 
Egyptian film Laylat el-Baby Doll (2008). The comparative analysis pays close attention 
to the articulations of the post-9/11 diasporic agency of the Arab American characters in 
the two films. It emphasizes their interstitial activism around issues rendered eminent for 
the Arab American community. In Traitor, Samir is an Arab American struggling to 
retain his agency in the U.S. citizen-traitor context, which constantly questions the 
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cultural citizenship of Arab Americans. It presents the possibility of imagining Islam as 
an inspiring source of patriotism, often interpolated through the U.S. nationalist rhetoric 
of fighting terrorism. In The Baby Doll Night, Layla and Housam are two Arab American 
characters whose sense of belonging engages more directly with the U.S.-Arab 
geopolitics, particularly through the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
The chapter proposes the necessity of foregrounding interstitial activism as a critical 
component of an imagined Arab American subjectivity. 
The pattern equally stresses the solidification of self-representations in post-9/11 
burgeoning Arab American filmmaking and its role in reclaiming hijacked portrayals of 
the Arab American image in U.S.-Arab mainstream cinemas. This focus underlines the 
last chapter, “Reclaiming Arab American Agency through Self-Representation,” which 
addresses one of this project’s critical objectives, i.e. problematizing the sensationalized, 
if not fictionalized, definition of Arab Americans, circulating in both the United States 
and the Arab world as aliens seeking or rejection assimilation to American culture. My 
reading of Arab American filmmaking identifies three primary dimensions. First, it 
highlights the role of films like Hesham Issawi’s AmericanEast (2008) in forging a space 
for Arab American actors to reenact their post-9/11 Arab American visibility through 
leading performances often denied in Hollywood and Egyptian cinema. Second, it 
underlines attempts to challenge the homogenous characterization of the Arab American 
image in U.S.-Arab mainstream cinematic terrains through a reading of Cherien Dabis’ 
Amreeka (2009), which illustrates the complexity of the Arab American community 
through its emphasis on the particularities of nationality, religion, and generation. Third, 
it foregrounds efforts in Arab American filmmaking like Rola Nashef’s Detroit Unleaded 
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(2013) to project the Arab American image in storylines that transcend the restricting 
narrative of terrorism. The second part, therefore, provides an account of such disruptive 
filmmaking in imagining an autonomous and dynamic Arab American subjectivity. It 
complicates the temporal and the spatial sense of reference to Arab Americans without 
de-emphasizing the relevance of 9/11 to the Arab diaspora in the United States.  
The significance of this project lies in its embrace of the paradigmatic shift in the 
fields of American studies and Arab American studies. It corresponds with the urgency of 
the contemporary U.S.-Arab/Muslim tension and directly contributes to scholarship 
interrogating cross-cultural differences. It also registers an attempt to move beyond 
concerns with stereotyping, and utilizes film as a medium that addresses broader issues of 
identity and cultural belonging in an increasingly globalized world. Equally important, 
the transnational and interdisciplinary nature of the project advances the visibility of 
Arab-informed research and cultural production and their role in informing a multi-
layered reading of the Arab American identity. 
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Part I: Arab American Otherness in Hollywood and Egyptian Cinema 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mahdi 25 
 
 
Chapter I Hollywood’s Articulations of Arab American Cultural Citizenship 
    
    
 
   It seems barely an exaggeration to say that Arab and Muslim Americans are constantly talked 
about but almost never heard from. The problem is not that they lack representations but that 
they have too many. And these are all abstractions. Arabs and Muslims have become a foreign-
policy issue, an argument on the domestic agenda, a law-enforcement priority, and a point of 
well-meaning concern. They appear as shadowy characters on terror television shows, have 
become objects of sociological inquiry, and get paraded around as puppets for public 
diplomacy…They are floating everywhere in the virtual landscape of the national imagination, 
as either villains of Islam or victims of Arab culture. 
—   Moustafa Bayoumi, How Does it Feel to be a Problem 
 
 
   The constructed narratives of terrorism in popular culture suggest the ways in which dominant 
ideologies are structuring our interpretations of global conditions in which events occur, our 
senses of fear and blame for conflict, as well as our desire for heroic conquest as resolution. At 
essence the representation of power through mediated texts implicates a particular political 
perspective, reinscribing the dominance of U.S. forces, all the more pertinent when dealing with 
issues of global events and national security. 
—   Karin Gwin Wilkins, Home/Land/Security 
 
Introduction 
What is the relationship between Hollywood and cultural citizenship? How do U.S. 
filmmakers play a role in perpetuating narratives of belonging to the American culture? 
What is the relationship between media representation and collective memory? What is 
the marking line between Orientalist and Post-Orientalist articulations of Arabness? In 
what ways have the transnational configurations of U.S.-Arab and Arab-Israeli politics 
affected the image formations of Arab Americans in Hollywood? The following chapter 
catalogues the U.S. cinematic terrain in order to offer an insight into the stated questions 
with a particular interest in capturing the nuance surrounding the earliest trajectory for 
contemporary Arab American imagery in cinema. Choosing this method promises a 
Mahdi 26 
 
 
comprehensive navigation of the history of Hollywood’s engagement with Arab 
Americans than the “close analysis” method, which is reserved for the second part of the 
project.  
The issue of citizenship has attracted scholarly interests in examining the capacity 
of social contracts in western democracies to afford equal access to society members, 
including minorities, to a fair share of representation, upward mobility, and inclusion. 
Citizenship, according to the British sociologist Thomas Marshall, is “a status bestowed 
on those who are full members of a community,” endowing equality in respect to rights 
and duties in a given society.31 In qualifying the question of full membership in 
multicultural western societies, Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka stresses that the 
articulations of citizenship entail an active state role in accommodating minorities 
through a public recognition of their rights to self-advocacy, self-representation, and 
cultural practices to the extent allowed within the liberal tradition of individual 
fulfillment.32 This limited reading of citizenry reflects an inherent fault in 
multiculturalism as envisioned in a society like the United States. Vijay Prashad 
identifies this fault through the passive role played by multiculturalism in reifying the 
sense of disenfranchisement experienced by the Desi migrants and other ethnic 
communities: 
The problem with U.S. multiculturalism as it stands is that it pretends to be the solution to 
chauvinism rather than the means for a struggle against white supremacy. Whereas 
assimilation demands that each inhabitant of the United States to be transformed into the 
norm, U.S. multiculturalism asks that each immigrant group preserve its own heritage (as 
                                                 
31 Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, 18. 
32 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 1995. 
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long as it speaks English). The heritage, or “culture,” is not treated as a living set of social 
relations but as a timeless trait.33 
The early 1990s witnessed the emergence of an academic curiosity to measure the 
insufficiency of U.S. multiculturalism in enunciating full membership of its ethnic 
minorities and addressing their sociocultural complexities within a revived conservative 
trend (read, Reagan Republicanism) that advanced culture-based nostalgic notions of 
citizenship, codifying the rhetoric of patriotism in partisan, patriarchal, and racial terms.34 
Lauren Berlant attributes the failure of the U.S. multicultural project to the lack of an 
active and inclusive “public sphere” that fosters a common public culture to empower 
citizens with the necessary communicative tools to counter the expanding “mass-
mediated space of opinion formation that positions citizens as isolated spectators to the 
publicity that claims to represent them.”35 It is in this context that cultural citizenship has 
garnered conversations interrogating the issue of national belonging beyond the heavily 
explored political, economic, and social dimensions in citizenship studies.36 
The resonance of cultural citizenship as a conceptual framework has gained 
traction because it has provided meaning to citizenship as a “lived experience” in its 
engagement with the U.S. exclusion narrative.37 William Flores and Rina Benmayor’s 
collection Latino Cultural Citizenship and Mia Tuan’s Forever Foreigners or Honorary 
Whites? present two respective case studies of the Latino and the Asian utility of culture 
to mediate their struggle for agency and minority subjectivity within the U.S. alienating 
multicultural society. In their focus on media and cinema, contributors to Film, History 
                                                 
33 Prashad, The Karma of Brown Folk, 111-112. For more about multiculturalism, see Parekh, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism, 2000.  
34 Berlant, The Queen of American Goes to Washington City, 3. 
35 Ibid, 3. 
36 Maira, Missing, 10. 
37 Siu, “Diasporic Cultural Citizenship,” 9. 
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and Cultural Citizenship further suggest that cultural citizenship invokes a sociopolitical 
engagement that transcends the mere attempt to challenge dominant narratives and re-
narrate the cultural history of a particular community.38 Mobilizing culture in this 
direction presupposes a definition of cultural citizenship as both a state tool of hegemonic 
subjectification [in the Foucauldian sense] and a resistance tool for minority 
subjectivity.39 Thus, cultural citizenship is a “dual process of self-making and being-
made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society,” to echo 
anthropologist Aihwa Ong’s definition.40 It refers to “the cultural practices and beliefs 
produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state 
and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national 
population and territory.”41 
The U.S. popular culture, particularly in its sensational and ratings-based 
entertainment realm, functions as a hegemonic frame of reference prescribing a set of 
images that interpolates national belonging in the life of the cultural citizen – defined by 
Toby Miller as “the virtuous political participant who is taught how to scrutinize and 
improve her or his conduct through the work of cultural policy.”42 It serves as an 
ideological state apparatus [in the Althusserian sense] guiding the cultural citizens 
through an acculturation process that disrupts their own subjectivity.43 In his scholarly 
reviews of Hollywood’s history, May has emphasized the role of the cinema in 
                                                 
38 Chen and Churchill, Film, History and Cultural Citizenship, introduction. The contributors do not reject 
the national framework but collectively advocate for a radical rethinking of the national as an analytic, 7. 
39 Foucault, “Governmentality, 87-104. 
40 Ong, “Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making,” 738. 
41 Ibid, 738. 
42 Miller, The Well-Tempered Self, xxi. Examples of works shedding lights on this role of popular culture 
include Wexler, Tender Violence, 2000; Cameron, Looking for America, 2005; Rubin and Melnick, 
Immigration and American Popular Culture, 2007. 
43 See Althusser, “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses.” 85-126. 
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enunciating a sense of American cultural identity. Hollywood, he argues, has been a site 
of fury for debates around “good citizenship” because of its connection to “political 
power, cultural authority, and the very meaning of national identity.”44  
This chapter pays close attention to this site in order to capture the role of the 
cinema in manufacturing cultural citizenship with a particular emphasis on Arab 
Americans. It offers a case study that delineates the Arab American image in the U.S. 
popular culture without dismissing the importance of 9/11 in espousing a nationalist 
fervor, which has resurrected a deeply rooted stigma against Arabs, Muslims, and look-a-
likes in U.S. cultural memory. The discursive grounds sustaining this specific cultural 
memory, I argue, necessitate interrogating the interplay of Hollywood (as representative 
of the U.S. popular culture) and its imposed limitations on cultural citizenship (read, 
articulations of Arab American Otherness). Towards that end, the chapter investigates the 
predicament of U.S. nationalist projections of Arab Americans in light of Hollywood’s 
popularized perceptions of alienness and terrorism (foreign and homegrown), which I 
locate at the intersection of post-Orientalist and racialized underpinnings of Islamophobia 
and anti-Arab racism. To accomplish this, I trace three representation patterns since the 
1970s, a decade that constitutes a turning point in Hollywood’s nationalist projections of 
Arabness from an Orientalist trope for Arabia to a post-Orientalist notion influenced by 
U.S.-Arab and Arab-Israeli geopolitics.  
 
U.S. Repertoire of Arabness 
 
“I can’t trust Obama,” is how the seventy-five-year-old Gayle Quinnell expressed 
her suspicion of the 2008 Democrat presidential candidate, Barak Obama, in a tone of 
                                                 
44 May, The Big Tomorrow, 1. Also, see May, Recasting America, 1989. 
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anger and frustration. Stating the reason for her mistrust – amidst a town-hall crowd 
outraged by the polls’ receding numbers of support for the Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain – she proclaimed, “He is an Arab.” Realizing the problematic 
ramifications of such a claim, McCain snitched the microphone and, in an affirmative 
tone, addressed her, “No ma’am. No ma’am. He is a decent family man citizen that I just 
happened to have disagreement with on fundamental issues.”45 An insightful reading of 
this globally mediated unscripted scene reveals a polarizing rhetoric, which has 
dominated the U.S. cultural productions for decades, if not centuries, and rendered Arabs 
and Muslims as the cultural Other in the American cultural memory. Both Gayle’s 
sincere comments and McCain’s dismissal of Arabs’ compatibility with America’s 
cultural citizenship invite a necessary reflection on the history of U.S. popular 
constructions of American and of Arab, and Muslim as mutually exclusive identities.  
Counter to public perceptions, such constructions date back to the U.S. post-
Revolutionary War (1775–1783). The period 1785-1815 marks a prolonged process of 
negotiation for power and dominance between the United States and – what the European 
once called – the Barbary Coast.46 The Algerians’ capture of Boston-based ship Maria in 
July 1785 and the subsequent trend of subjecting American prisoners to slavery or 
ransom threats, argues Malini Schueller, initiated an interest in recycling European 
polarizing conceptualizations between the West and the East, and translating them in the 
U.S. cultural imagination into a struggle between American civility and Oriental 
primitivity. “Despots and slaves, taken as signifiers of the ‘Barbary’ Orient,” she 
                                                 
45 The sensational moment is captured in video, see: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-uptake/mccain-
responds-to-arab-a_b_133820.html  
46 The Barbary Coast referred the land of the Berbers, residing across North Africa. This includes today’s 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania. 
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contends, “generated an imperial narrative based on raced distinctions between Oriental 
tyranny and USAmerican freedom, a narrative that drew both on the immediate historical 
moment and on long-standing Western philosophical distinctions between European and 
Eastern forms of power.”47 Royall Tyler’s The Algerine Captive (1797), David Everett’s 
Slaves in Barbary (1797), Susanne Rowson’s Salves in Algiers (1794), James Ellison’s 
The American Captive (1812), and Jonathan Smith’s The Siege of Algiers (1823) are 
examples of early American literary works engaged in the production of this dichotomy; 
a dichotomy that would later solidify through Hollywood.  
Peter Markoe’s The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania (1787) is one of the earliest 
literary records that imagines triumphant American values underwriting the life of an 
Arab/Muslim living in the United States, the Algerian spy Mehemet. The work illustrates 
a process of disillusionment that Mehemet undergoes as he converts to Christianity, and 
renounces his commitment to “despotism” of the East. It resolves the U.S.-Orient 
dichotomy through enunciating the U.S. ultimate universal authority. The book – in the 
words of historian Timothy Marr –“symbolically enacts a multiple conversion through 
which Islam bows to Christian truths, despotism dissolves into democracy, and ethnic 
differences are assimilated into national character.”48  
The U.S. cultural imagination prior to the Civil War era mirrors a nationalist 
anxiety that transcends encounters with the Barbary and engages with religious power 
politics most vividly expressed against the Ottoman rule. Both Fuad Sha’ban’s Islam and 
Arabs in Early American Thought and Robert Allison’s The Crescent Obscured richly 
display a popular tendency in echoing sentimental depictions void of accuracy. 
                                                 
47 Schueller, U.S. Orientalisms, 47. 
48 Marr, The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism, 40. 
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“Americans who used the Muslim world as a reference point for their own society,” 
Allison points, “were not concerned with historical truth or with an accurate description 
of Islam, but rather with this description’s political convenience.”49 This tendency 
corresponds with Said’s criticism of Orientalism as a discourse empowering western 
politicization of knowledge.50  
The coincidence of Americans’ search to escape the pains of the Civil War and 
the booming steamboat industry prompted a fascination in tourism and exploration of the 
world beyond the U.S. shores. The Orient, particularly the Holy Land and Egypt, 
attracted flows of missionaries, pilgrims, Egyptologists, and adventure seekers. This 
ignited the spark of a trend in travel writings that reproduced sensational images of the 
Orient to re-assert Americans’ sense of their own national identity. John Davis and Lester 
Vogel locate the wide range of literature produced around, what Hilton Obenzinger calls, 
“Holy land Mania” in the Anglo Protestants’ identification of the United States as the 
“new Israel.”51 Meanwhile, Egyptomania, Scott Trafton argues, represented a site of 
inquiry for Egyptology and racialized science.52 The two trends intertwined in their 
manufacturing of the Orient’s Otherness in light of the U.S. newly defined cartographies 
of global power. The production and circulation of such imagery in this era has instituted 
a viable U.S. Orientalist heritage that served as a cultural frame of reference for 
generations to come.  
One of the most important reiterations of this heritage has advanced through the 
pictorial images distributed by a leading magazine like the National Geographic 
                                                 
49 Allison, The Crescent Obscured, 59; as quoted by Marr, The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism, 16. 
50 Said, Orientalism, 1979. 
51 Davis, The Landscape of Belief, 1996; Vogel, To See a Promised Land, 1993; Hilton Obenzinger, 
American Palestine, 1999. 
52 Trafton, Egypt Land, 2004. 
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(founded in 1888). In Veils and Daggers, Linda Steet catalogs the magazine’s first 100 
years and investigates its one-dimensional western-informed representations of the Arab 
man and the Arab woman, often mediated through its emphasis on playing an educational 
role in society. Despite claims of “absolute accuracy,” the magazine’s portrayals of the 
Arab world, she argues, reflect an investment in both depersonalization and essentializing 
processes shrouded in a Manichean paradigm of binary oppositions, i.e. East/West, 
Islam/Christianity, progress/backwardness, etc. 
The foundations of U.S. cinematic imagery lie in such a cultural history of 
representations from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The manifestations of the 
history emerged at the core of the U.S. moving image since 1893 when The Dance of the 
Seven Veils – one of the earliest films produced by Thomas Edison’s U.S. first film studio 
in West Orange, New Jersey – was available for public consumption through the early 
motion picture exhibition device of the kinetoscope.53 Hollywood’s productions, 
particularly during the age of silent cinema, entertained fetishized and exotic images of 
Arabs and registered the potency of the Orientalist discourse in U.S. culture, contributing 
to, what Abdelmajid Hajji identifies as, “the Oriental Genre.”54 The element of Arab 
foreignness in films like The Arab (1915), The Garden of Allah (1916), Intolerance 
(1916), Cleopatra (1917), Salome (1918), An Arabian Knight (1920), The Sheik (1921), A 
Son of the Sahara (1924), Son of the Sheik (1926), and A Son of the Desert (1928), states 
Melani McAlister, created a buffer zone or, as she puts it, a moral geography for 
Americans to both experience pleasures of the Orient (i.e. romance, exotic milieus, and 
harem sexual allure) while spatially and culturally distancing themselves from it (Figure 
                                                 
53 As traced by Michalek, “The Arab in American Cinema,” 3. 
54 Hajji, Arabs in American Cinema (1894-1930), 9. For a discussion about the rise of spectatorship for 
Hollywood’s consumption, refer to Hansen, Babel and Babylon, 1991.  
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1).55 In an era defined by mass consumption, the sheer volume of films produced – at 
least eight-seven films during 1920s – signifies the power of U.S. film industry in 
mediating this moral geography.56  
 
Figure 1 The Sheik (Rudolph Valentino) and Lady Diana (Agnes Ayres) 
are consuming the Orient – courtesy of The Sheik 
 
Hollywood’s engagement with the Arab image transcended this particular era and 
contributed more than 1300 films until today – the majority of which entertain superficial 
and denigrating images of Arabs and Muslims while promoting representation patterns 
that articulate Arabness in explicit nationalist terms. Author of the two most 
comprehensive surveys of this trend, Jack Shaheen, illustrates: 
From 1896 until today, filmmakers have collectively indicted all Arabs as Public Enemy # 
1 – brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural “others” bent 
on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews. Much has happened 
since 1896 – women’s suffrage, the Great Depression, the civil rights movement, two 
world wars, the Korean, Vietnam, and the Gulf wars, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Throughout it all, Hollywood’s caricature of the Arab has prowled the silver screen. He is 
there to this day – repulsive and unrepresentative as ever.57 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 McAlister. Epic Encounters, introduction. 
56 Michalek, “The Arab in American Cinema,” 3. 
57 Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs, 2. Shaheen, Guilty. These surveys are foundational to research conducted for 
this chapter.  
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Most of the films produced prior to the rise of the United States as a post-WWII super 
power (and its embrace of an interventionist foreign policy in the Middle East) 
reproduced Orientalist imagery within McAlister’s moral geography. Such films depict 
Arabs as primitive people living in tents in between sand dunes, or in underdeveloped 
cities full of dirt and chaos. Backwardness and violence are their innate characteristics. 
Arab women are often perceived as submissive, covered from top to toe and have no 
choice but to abide by certain patriarchal rules. At other times, they are viewed within the 
lenses of sensuality; they are either belly dancing seductively with their semi-naked 
bodies, or bathing in groups in the harems.  
The post WWII Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S.-Soviet Union ideological and 
cultural battles over the newly decolonized Arab countries have created wars and tension 
in the region that shaped a Hollywood’s post-Orientalist image of Arabs and Muslims, to 
echo McAlister’s reading.58 At the core of this post-Orientalist mode circulates an 
imagery of Arabs and Muslims as an existential threat to the U.S. national security. This 
imagery, though initiated during the Cold War era, emerged ever more visibly since the 
1990s, when the color “green”(standing for Islam) replaced the “red”(standing for 
communism) as a signifier of hyped threat against Americans. Said illustrates:  
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been an active, explicit search in the 
United States for new official enemies, a search that has now come to settle on “Islam” as a 
manufactured opponent….U.S. cultural institutions are trumpeting the “Islamic 
threat”…The word “Islamic” itself has acquired the bristling status of a frightening, 
irrational monster.59 
 
                                                 
58 McAlister, Epic Encounters, introduction.  
59 Said, “Declaring War on Islam,” 1996.  
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Examples of such a pattern include Legion of the Doomed (1958), Exodus (1960), Sands 
of Beersheba (1966), Children of Rage (1975), Rosebud (1975), Wrong is Right (1982), 
Wanted: Dead or Alive (1987), Terror in Beverly Hills (1988), Ministry of Vengeance 
(1989), Navy SEALs (1990), The Human Shield (1992), Ground Zero (1994), Freedom 
Strike (1998), Rules of Engagement (2000), Black Hawk Dawn (2001), The Kingdom 
(2007), and American Sniper (2014). 
Advancing this post-Orientalist mode of representation, which perpetuates the rise 
of Arabs and Muslims as the U.S. public enemy, is not exclusive to the film industry. 
Shaheen’s The TV Arab and Alsultany’s Arabs and Muslims in the Media emphasize the 
role of television in circulating this imagery. Said’ Covering Islam, Yaheya Kamalipour’s 
The U.S. Media in the Middle East, and Michael Hudson and Ronald Wolfe’s The 
American Media and the Arabs offer a critique of the news reporting industry practices in 
cultivating Americans’ fear of Arabs and Muslims. Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel 
Greenberg’s Islamophobia and Ronald Stockton’s “Ethnic Archetypes of the Arab 
Image” capture the sensational role of print media, comics, and cartoons. Suha Sabbagh’s 
Sex, Lies & Stereotypes penetrates the U.S. popular fiction. Ann Richards and Iraj 
Omidvar’s two-volume collection Muslims and American Popular Culture explores other 
cultural forms such as theater, poetry, and music.  
To understand the resonance of stereotype, I borrow Roland Barthes’ 
interpretation of the Saussurean sense of semiology that stresses the predominant role of 
cultural producers in informing, circulating, and naturalizing myths to withstand critical 
contestations.60 I also build on Marita Sturken’s definition of cultural memory as “a field 
of contested meanings in which Americans interact with cultural elements to produce 
                                                 
60 Read Barthes, Mythologies, 1972. 
Mahdi 37 
 
 
concepts of the nation, particularly in events of trauma, where both the structures and the 
fractures of a culture are exposed.”61 The process of stereotyping Arabs and Muslims, in 
turn, solidifies dominant cultural imagery and further ingrains it in the society’s 
collective imagination, especially in light of national traumatic incidents like the Iranian 
hostage crisis (1979), the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), and 9/11.62 The 9/11 
tragedy, in particular, has leveraged the solidification process of this myth in the U.S. 
collective memory and sustained a momentum for decision makers to promote an 
undefined global war on terror, which has subjected Arab/Muslim Americans and look-a-
likes to racial profiling, preventive detention, and physical as well as verbal harassment 
in their own home country. Thus, it is in this context that Quinnell’s association of 
Obama with the Arab/Muslim identity and McCain’s polarizing response operate. 
 
Hollywood Patterns of the Arab American Image 
 
Prior to the 1970s, Hollywood’s production of Arab images were almost 
exclusively spatial; Arabs were imagined as part of a distant Orient. The only traceable 
film featuring Arab Americans in the silent cinema era is Victor Fleming’s Anna Ascends 
(1922).63 As an adaptation of Henry Chapman Ford’s play bearing the same title, the film 
praises the correlation of acculturation and upward mobility in the life of a Syrian 
American waitress, Anna Ayyob (Alice Brady). The film’s assimilation narrative is 
somehow reflective of the priorities of the first wave of Arab immigrants (1880-1920). 
According to oral historian Naff, this wave – mostly based on the influx of nearly 
                                                 
61 Sturken, Tangled Memories, 2-3; also, Engle, “Putting Mourning to Work,” 2007. 
62 To learn more about stereotyping, read Rosello, Declining the Stereotype, 1998. 
63 Only six minutes of the full-feature film survived. The silent cinema entertained Orientalist images of 
Arab Americans in the short film Arabian Dagger (1908), which shows less interest in the peddler than his 
dagger, and The Syrian Immigrant (1920) documentary. For more about these works, see Hajji, Arabs in 
American Cinema (1894-1930), 11. 
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150,000 Arab Christians from Ottoman ruled Great Syria (now, Syria and Lebanon) – 
comprises hardworking peddlers with deep commitment to family and religion. Dow v. 
United States (1915) signifies a moment of triumph for this wave in declaring their 
whiteness, a racial resolution to naturalization-based citizenship at the time. The case 
unveils a deep-seated anxiety among early Arab Americans in pronouncing their U.S. 
citizenship. Parallel to the legal battle, argues Naff, is their other struggle for 
sociocultural inclusion through efforts to integrate and assimilate into the larger culture.64 
The failure of the U.S. filmmakers in capturing the nuance of this particular 
history was partly informed by the Orientalist representation mode at the time, a 
byproduct of a cultural trend in consuming the distant Orient. “The dearth of American 
silent films reflecting the Arab immigrants’ experience” argues Hajji, “is largely due to 
the fact that the Arab in these films is mostly a concept, a trope, a fabrication of the 
imagination of Westerners.”65 Other factors accounting for the industry’s lack of interest 
in the Arab immigrant/Arab American image could be attributed to the intertwinement of 
the nature of U.S. encounters with the Middle East and the restrictive national-origin 
quota system of Johnson–Reed Act (1924-1965). The U.S. investment in the region’s 
geopolitics did not fully unfold until the aftermath of World War II, translating into a 
more sensational deployment of national politics, particularly regarding Israel. 
Meanwhile, the Arab presence in the United States was significantly controlled by the 
Johnson-Reed Act cap of 523 annual flow per the following categories: Arabian 
peninsula (100), Egypt (100), Iraq (Mesopotamia) (100), Palestine (with Trans-Jordan) 
                                                 
64 Naff, Becoming American, 247-263 
65 Hajji, Arabs in American Cinema (1894-1930), 11-12. 
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(British mandate) (100), and Syria and the Lebanon (French mandate) (123).66 The 
accommodation of 2,924 post-1949 Palestinian refugees along with limited arrivals of 
Arab immigrants, which constituted the second wave of Arab immigrants, did not 
reverberate significant echoes for the film industry.67  
The liberalization of U.S. immigration law through Hart–Celler Act (1965), 
however, facilitated the arrival of the third wave of Arab immigrants culminating into a 
current estimate of 3.5 million Arab Americans; with more diversity in terms of religion 
and nationality.68 The correlation of U.S. neocolonial interference in the Arab and 
Muslim worlds since the 1950s and the active pronouncement of this wave in U.S.-Arab 
as well as Arab-Israeli politics has forged a space for Hollywood to devote some of its 
hundreds of films to mainstream constructions of the Arab American image; a trend that 
dates back to the 1970s. In the following sections, I identify three primary representation 
patterns underwriting the industry’s portrayals.  
 
The Arab-buying-America Pattern 
 
The U.S.-U.S.S.R rivalry during the initial stages of the Cold War translated into 
a polarized and divided Arab street. Rashid Khalidi draws a picture of the polarity: 
The pressure to join American-sponsored alliance systems…played a large role in the 
polarization in the Arab world that…developed into what Malcolm Kerr called the “Arab 
Cold War,” between a camp headed by Nasser’s Egypt and another headed by King Faisal 
and Saudi Arabia.69 
                                                 
66 Statistics reported in the “Proclamation by the President of the United States (March 22, 1929)” as 
published in Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 28-29.  
67 Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity, 79. 
68 Statistics provided by the Arab American Institute Foundation, “Quick Facts About Arab Americans,” 
http://b.3cdn.net/aai/fcc68db3efdd45f613_vim6ii3a7.pdf  
69 Khalidi, Sowing Crisis, 181; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1971. 
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The Egyptian-Saudi conflict, particularly during the 1960s, mostly mediated through their 
support of local conflicts such as the one between republican and kingdom governing 
structures in countries like Yemen and a global allegiance to socialism and capitalism 
respectively.70 However, a sense of common Arab grievance against the Israeli 
occupation of 1948 (aka Nakba Day) overshadowed the heated politics of the time.71 The 
grievance further solidified in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war (1967) (aka Naksa 
Day), which resulted in the defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian military alliance and 
the Israeli seizure of more territories including the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza 
Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights.72 The Arab popular support for 
Egyptian and Syrian use of force to regain parts of the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights 
during the October War (1973) accompanied oil embargo by the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) banning petroleum exports to the United States 
as a political statement against its support of the Israeli military during the war.73  
The embargo rendered naked the U.S. political investment in promoting Israeli 
interests as a major Cold War ally in the Middle East; an orientation in U.S. foreign 
policy that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt trace back to President Kennedy’s 
administration, which later augmented in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war (1967).74 
More importantly, the embargo created an energy crisis in the United States with 
immediate repercussions in the American street, ranging from fuel shortages to 
                                                 
70 See Ferris, Nasser's Gamble, 2013. 
71 Nakba is the Arabic word for “Catastrophe.” 
72 Naksa is the Arabic word for “setback.” 
73 OAPEC members included Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Qatar, and Syria. 
74 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2007. 
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skyrocketing prices and sensational media coverage.75 This socioeconomic context 
provided Hollywood with a rich source of images bearing a U.S. cultural conflation of 
Arabs as money-oriented, oil-rich and extravagant people whose wealth represents a 
threatening source that disrupts Americans’ values of liberty.  
A film like Richard Sarafian’s The Next Man (1976) (aka Arab Conspiracy) 
showcases this binary by dramatizing Arabs’ rejection of the fictional pro-peace Saudi 
Arabian minister of state, Khalil Abdul-Muhsen (Sean Connery), who aspires to 
recognize Israel and provide oil to third world nations.76 “I decided to take this role 
because it’s an unusual one,” Connery states, “I play an Arab statesman who tries to 
bring peace to the Mideast by some startling proposals. It’s an intelligent film about 
what’s happening now, and it has plenty of excitement.”77 Khalil presents a likeable and 
well-groomed character with an articulate and proper accent, a visual mark of distinction 
from Hollywood’s reel Arabs of the time.78 The appeal of the U.S. educated Arab 
minister draws from his American lifestyle and, more importantly, his subscription to a 
U.S. fantasized approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. He addresses the United 
Nations with a proposal for a “new global, social, [and] political contract” that allows 
Israel admission into OPEC as a non-producing member. He displays a sense of 
forcefulness in pursuing the resolution: 
Saudi Arabia is determined to back Israeli acceptance with all the power at its 
command…To those who would work with us towards peace, we embrace you. To those 
                                                 
75 For more about the impact of the 1967 war, read Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 1977. 
76 Next Man was later edited for television format as The Arab Conspiracy  
77 As quoted in Pfeiffer and Lisa, The Films of Sean Connery, 160. 
78 Shaheen uses the word “reel” to signify Hollywood’s stereotypical image of Arabs, see Reel Bad Arabs.  
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who would keep Arabs and Israelis enemies, we defy you. To those who would keep us 
apart, we shall overcome you.”79 
The tendency to polarize reactions to the proposal into us-versus-them binaries projects 
the Arab dissenting voices of Kuwaiti, Syrian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Egyptian delegates as 
well as Arab American protestors outside the U.N. compound as uncompromising and 
violent. Representations of voices rejecting Khalil’s agenda define Arabs and Arab 
Americans as irrational, impulsive, and simply anti-western. This transcends protesting 
banners such as “Arabia for the Arabians” and “No Deals, Khalil,” and leads to the 
bombing of the protesting scene and the ultimate assassination of the minister.  
Although the film does not identify the perpetrators of the bombing attacks, the 
negative portrayal of Arab Americans constitutes a sense of indictment informed by their 
will to silence the minister’s calls for peace. An angry rally in which Arab Americans 
express their sentiment against Khalil’s agenda, which they see as undercutting 
Palestinian rights, leads protestors to block his car. Having seen an Arab American 
passionate protestor yelling out his opposition, Khalil steps out of his car to convince the 
police officers to stop arresting him and talk some sense to him. He hugs him in a token 
of appreciation for his concern about Israeli aggressions while simultaneously calms him 
down by stating that peaceful resolution needs time. He also demands the unnamed 
protestor to trust him (Figure 2). This particular encounter does not necessarily address 
the protestor’s concern as much as it instructs the audiences to identify with Khalil and 
trust him to broker an Arab-Israeli peace the American way. It also reveals a sense of 
unrest in the Arab American street against Khalil’s proposal. In a subsequent protest, the 
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camera captures bombs circulating among protestors in a signal that suggests violence as 
the ultimate manifestation of the Arab American rejection of Khalil’s proposal. 
 
Figure 2 Khalil speaks to an unnamed Arab American 
protestor – courtesy of The Next Man 
 
The most iconic illustration of such U.S.-Arab polarity in this representation 
pattern is communicated in Sidney Lumet’s highly acclaimed satirical film Network 
(1976).80 The film is iconic in its critique of the U.S. television as a manipulative tool 
producing a generation that “cannot think, cannot feel, and which has learned everything 
it knows about life from Saturday morning cartoons,” to put it in Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s 
words.81 The anchor of a UPS television network, Howard Beale (Peter Finch), engenders 
this critique by inciting the public’s sense of patriotism. The interpellation of this 
sentiment becomes possible through spurring his audience to express their anger against a 
resonating threat of Arabs’ monopoly of neoliberal politics in an attempt to transform the 
American culture. In an iconic moment of active citizen empowerment in U.S. popular 
                                                 
80 The film received four Academy Awards and was praised for the originality of its screenplay. 
81 Fitzpatrick, “Network: The Other Cold War,” 36. 
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culture, Beale instructs each one of his viewers to get up out of his/her couch and yell out 
of window, “I am as mad as hell and I’m not gonna take this anymore.”82 
This call for public performance resonates with a mythic fear of Arabness, Meant 
in the Barthesian sense of mythology, a myth solidifies not because of its relevance to 
truth but rather its circulation without critical contestation. This myth comes as a 
response to a rising sense of public frustration due to economic challenges in the United 
States during the 1970s – in part shaped by the aforementioned OAPEC disruptive acts of 
boycott and OPEC’s frequent price-hikes of oil at the time. It materializes out of several 
passionate televised speeches in which Beale urges his audience to realize a looming 
danger that far outweighs the grim reality of the economy, i.e. the danger of Arabs 
“buying up America”: 
We all know that the Arabs control $16 billion dollars in this country. They own a chunk 
of Fifth Avenue, 20 downtown pieces of Boston, a part of the port of New Orleans, [and] 
an industrial park in Salt Lake City. They own big chunks of the Atlanta Hilton, the 
Arizona Land and Cattle Company, the Security National Bank  in California….They 
control ARAMCO, so that puts them in EXXON, Texaco, and Mobil Oil. They’re all over: 
New Jersey, Louisville, and St. Louis, Missouri. And that’s only what we know about 
them; there’s a hell of a lot more we don’t know about because all of those Arab 
petrodollars are washed through Switzerland and Canada and the biggest banks in the 
country… Right now the Arabs have screwed us out of enough American dollars to come 
right back and with our own money buy General Motors, IBM, IT&T, AT&T, DuPont, 
U.S. Steel, and twenty other companies. Hell! They already own half of England! So, listen 
to me, the Arabs are simply buying us. 
Dubbed the “mad prophet of the airwaves,” Beale vehemently asks his captivated 
audience to flood the White House with a million telegrams stating, “I don’t want banks 
                                                 
82 Perhaps 9/11 generated a very important moment for television to play a viable role in spurring such a 
sense of patriotism, see Spiegel, “Entertainment Wars,” 2004. 
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selling my country to the Arabs.” Six million telegrams are sent and the deal to buy 
Beale’s channel is disrupted. “The people spoke,” Beale addresses his audience, “The 
people won. It was a radiant eruption of democracy.”  
Reflecting on a dilemma regarding the cinematic discourse on television, i.e., 
“how to critique television as a medium without directly attacking viewers who are likely 
to also form the audience of the first itself,” Craig Hight applauds the film’s ability to 
challenge the viewers to associate themselves with the television audience depicted in the 
film.83 This possibility, I stress, is in conversation with the film’s provocative 
manipulation of the audience’s fears of the Arab monopoly of politics in the United 
States, a common element in this representation pattern that echoes a popular institutional 
anxiety during the 1970s. In the sting operation, dubbed Operation Abscam (1978), the 
FBI interrogated thirty politicians including seven congressional representatives on 
grounds of soliciting support from an Arab fake company named “Abscam,” standing for 
“Arab scam” or “Abdul scam.”84 The FBI agents dressed like rich Arabs and videotaped 
the politicians accepting bribes. Arab American scholar Naber reads this as an 
institutional attempt to “create the impression that Arabs are a threat to American 
politics.”85 The same institutional anxiety seems to prompt the Department of Energy to 
issue such bumper stickers as “The Faster You Drive, The Richer They Get,” and 
“Driving 75 is Sheikh; Driving 55 Is Chic.”86 
The injection of images proposing anti-Arab foreign influence on Americans’ 
political, social, and cultural life continued to prevail Hollywood’s production throughout 
                                                 
83 Hight, “’It isn’t always Shakespeare, but it’s genuine,’” 235-236. 
84 The operation was dramatized in American Hustler (2013).  
85 Naber, “Introduction: Arab Americans and U.S. Racial Formations,” 35. 
86 Ibid, 35. 
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the 1980s. In Herbert Ross’s Protocol (1984), an Arab emir agrees to allow the United 
States establish a military base in his unnamed strategic country only in return for 
marrying a waitress-turned-celebrity Sunny (Goldie Hawn), who saves him during his 
stay in the United States from an assassination attempt. In the film, the U.S. State 
Department allures Sunny to travel to the Middle East as part of a diplomatic mission 
offered to her. Once she arrives in the foreign land, she is welcomed as the new queen. 
The emir communicates his needs for a wife to reproduce kids for him. Sunny turns into a 
metaphoric embodiment of America’s purity and innocence while the State Department 
officers are presented as politicians corrupted by such emirs who are only invested in 
dictating U.S. foreign policy to advance their personal interests. The 1970s oil crisis 
trauma [Sturken sense] has already solidified a reference to a collective memory of Arabs 
as foreign disruptors of U.S. national politics. The film makes effective use of this 
reference, especially when rendering Sunny’s vulnerability as symbolic of Americans’ 
susceptibility to Arabs’ presumed “evil” plans.  
Perhaps a positive impact of Hollywood’s negative portrayals at the time was the 
rise of critical voices in the Arab American civil society. Groups such as the National 
Association of Arab Americans, the American-Arab University Graduates, the Arab 
American Institute, Najda [Women concerned about the Middle East], and the American 
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) publicized their concern about the 
dismissive connotations of such portrayals.87 Michalek registers this sense of activism, 
particularly in response to filming Protocol:  
                                                 
87 Arab American university students organized within OAS and AAUG were actively involved in 
establishing a transnational front for their critique of U.S. hegemony, particularly in light of the post-1967 
Arab-Israeli conflict; Feldman, A Shadow over Palestine, 2015; Pennock, "Third World Alliances.” 
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The American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee learned that the script was riddled 
with negative stereotypes of Arabs, and the Executive Director sent a complaint to the 
producer. “We do not suggest that Arabs should not be used,” he wrote, “nor that they 
cannot be funny, only that you do not perpetuate the negative and hurtful images employed 
in depicting our community.” There was an Arab-American protest march. The ADC 
suggested specific changes and, in a letter of reply, the producer promised that the Emir 
would be acted as a “true hero”: “Protocol will be a film that you will not be ashamed to 
take your children to.”88  
The promise, however, materialized into a work full of recycled imagery that 
further alienates the audience from balanced depictions of Arabness by 
resurrecting the cinema’s early Orientalist images.   
In 1986, director Lumet sustains the Arab-buying-America pattern in 
Power by depicting oil-rich Arabs as conspirators whose money undercuts 
America’s prosperity. The film’s Arabs – codified in an oil company named 
Ameriabia – hire a public relations expert, Arnold Billing (Denzel Washington), 
to support the election of a politician committed to the U.S. retrogress in solar 
energy. The plot unravels to unveil a conflict over the U.S. fight for independence 
from oil as its primary source of energy. The rejection of Arabs’ interference, 
therefore, becomes a metaphoric expression of the country’s progress. This 
reductive narrative registers another example of the role of the oil crisis in setting 
the terms for paranoia about Arab nations well after 1973.   
This representation trend best serves as a transition from Hollywood’s earlier 
depiction pattern of Arabs as desert dwelling and camel-riding sheikhs to a post-1970s 
pattern of Arabs-in-America as superficially material, often oil-rich, buffoons seeking to 
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corrupt Americans’ life. It often generates derision-based humor spelled out of 
exaggerated polarity between the American and the Arab cultural identities. The Arab 
American characters in this pattern are imagined as incapable of conversing with 
American codes and values. Films like The Happy Hooker Goes to Washington (1977), 
Cheech and Chong’s Next Movie (1980), Underground Aces (1980), The Cannonball Run 
(1981), Things Are Tough All Over (1982), Rollover (1982), The Cannonball Run 2 
(1984), St. Elom’s Five (1985), Father of the Bride Part II (1995), Kazaam (1996), 
Simpatico (1999), Two Degrees (2001), Dreamer: Inspired by a True Story (2005), and 
Click (2006) feature polarized images that caricature Arab Americans by highlighting 
one-dimensional and stereotypical images that dislocate them from any cultural affiliation 
with the American culture.  
Reel Arab Americans in these movies operate at the periphery of the American 
society and only exist to feed a solidifying process of Otherness that excludes real Arab 
Americans from their U.S. cultural citizenship. Their Orientalist-inspired dress code 
(often mixed with western clothing for comedic relief), impulsive rush to anger, fantasy 
about romancing blondes and camels, and commitment to subjugating Americans to their 
whims only encode their foreignness, thereby, rendering them ever more alienated. Thus, 
depicting Arab Americans in such films as the antithesis of U.S. codes, values, and even 
politics has enabled Hollywood’s writers, actors, and directors construct a new wave of 
imagery that projects Arab Americans as anonymous individuals, often cartoonish, if not 
evil, whose foreignness constitutes the primary ingredient of their un-Americanness. This 
wave has emerged in part as a nationalist response to make sense of the transnational 
impact of the oil crisis on Americans’ collective memory. 
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The Alien-Terrorist Pattern 
 
Parallel to Hollywood’s Arab-buying-America pattern that circulated during the 
1970s and the 1980s is another portrayal pattern of Arab Americans as alien terrorists 
fixated on undermining the U.S. national security. Although Hollywood’s constructions 
of foreign terrorism-related plots are rooted in World War II films – the earliest example 
is Alfred Hitchcock’s Saboteur (1942)89 – McAlister locates the industry’s engagement 
with Middle Eastern terrorism in the 1970s, particularly in correspondence with the 
Munich massacre (1972).90 Also known as Black September, when two Israeli athletes 
were killed and nine others taken as hostages by a self-declared Palestinian resistance 
group during the Olympic Games in Munich (West Germany then), the incident marked 
the beginning of an era of an Israeli embattlement with transnational forms of radical 
resistance mediated to Americans as a front of terrorism fighting. 
Prior to the rise of this trend, Hollywood had already circulated pro-Israeli films 
like Judith (1966), Cast of a Giant Shadow (1966), Survival (1968), and Journey to 
Jerusalem (1968), which promoted a glorified European-like image of the Israelis and a 
denigrated one of the Arabs.91 By the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the U.S. cultural industry 
became more engaged in a post-Orientalist mode of production marked by the 
politicization of Israel – a self-declared western state with a unique U.S. alliance – and 
the generation of pro-Israeli imagery to the American public.92 In “The Arab Portrayed,” 
Said examines the U.S. popular sentiment at the time: 
                                                 
89  Boggs and Pollard, “Hollywood and the spectacle of terrorism,” 337. 
90 McAlister, “A Cultural History,” 440. 
91 Michalek, “The Arab in American Cinema,” 5. 
92 Said, On Orientalism, DVD; Hussaini, “The Impact of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on Arab Communities in 
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During and after the June war [1967] few things could have been more depressing than the 
way in which the Arabs were portrayed. Press pictures of the Arabs were almost always of 
large numbers of people, mobs of hysterical, anonymous men, whereas photographs of the 
Israelis were almost always of stalwart individuals, the light of simple heroism shining 
from their eyes… What is extremely important here is how the official Israeli view of the 
Arab as a kind of troublesome none-person feeds the common and accepted view of the 
Arab that is currently held in America.93 
This polarization further developed in the 1970s through a representation pattern that 
drew an image of Arabs in the United States as anti-western and alien terrorists. 
Black Sunday (1977), produced and released by Paramount Pictures, is the earliest 
example of this pattern in which an Arab woman, Dalia Iyad (Marthe Keller), personifies 
a foreign threat of an “Arab-German extraction” – so characterized by U.S. intelligence 
agents. The threat targets eighty thousand Americans, including the president of the 
United States, attending the Super Bowl in Miami. The Arab presence in the United 
States, the film suggests, invokes a certainty of civilian massacres in the name of political 
grievances against the United States for its utmost support of Israel. The film’s theatrical 
trailer invites the audiences to watch the film by inciting fear of the Arab terrorists, who 
carry the potential to strike the American public with violence in the near future. “Black 
Sunday,” the narrator’s voice affirms, “It could be tomorrow!”  
Unlike Steven Spielberg’s contextualized portrayal of Black September in Munich 
(2005), John Frankenheimer’s Black Sunday sends a primary message to the spectators, 
i.e. that the United States and Israel are aligned in their war against the Arabs’ acts of 
“terror.” Throughout the film, the Mossad agent David Kabakov (Robert Shaw) and FBI 
agent Sam Corley (Fritz Weaver) succeed in tracking the terrorists affiliated with a Black 
                                                 
93 Said, “The Arab Portrayed,” 2 and 6. 
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September Movement, and emerge as saviors of U.S. security and order. Aligning Israel 
and the United States in a front against Arab terrorism in this film sets the precedence for 
the alien-terrorist pattern, which reaches its climax during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Nabeel Abraham documents echoes of this pattern in the U.S. public realm by 
capturing the rising atrocities against Arab/Muslim Americans during the 1980s. He 
accounts for three main sources feeding anti-Arab racism during this era: xenophobic 
nativism, jingoistic racism, and ideologically motivated violence. While the first two 
sources are by-products of “hyper ethnocentrism” in the U.S. racialized discourse, the last 
one invokes the aforementioned Israeli-U.S. alignment in popular culture. He illustrates: 
Anti-Arab attacks instigated, sponsored, and organized by the JDL [Jewish Defense 
League] and other Jewish extremist groups clearly fall under the category of political 
racism and violence. The extremists perceive their actions to be a part of the wider Arab-
Israeli conflict and the ongoing struggle against the “enemies of Israel” and the Jewish 
people as a whole. In this sense, their actions are ideologically motivated and premeditated, 
not merely spontaneous outbursts stemming from anger, fear, or ignorance.94  
The assassination of the west-coast regional director of the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (ADC), Alex Odeh (October 11, 1985) stands as an iconic 
reference to violence committed against the Arab American community at the time. 
 The possibility of circulating pro-Israeli and anti-Arab images in light of the 
narrative of terrorism in Hollywood is partially informed by the Israeli diasporic 
productions in the United States. In 1979, Israeli cousins Menahem Golan and Yoram 
Globus purchased Cannon Films and started producing low and medium budget works 
invested in alienating Arabs and Muslims from the American public. A film like The 
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Ambassador (1984), for instance, emphasizes the futility of an American ambassador’s 
attempt to brokering peace between Israelis and Palestinians; he faces an Israeli angry 
tone and Arab deadly terror. The Delta Force (1986) displays Arabs as hijackers of an 
airplane where they selectively identify Jews for prosecution.95 In a touching scene 
underscored by sad musical tones, the spectators are invited to identify with Israelis when 
the Arab terrorists select individual Jews for prosecution. The emphasis on the Israeli 
construction of the alien-terrorist theme is communicated in an objective set by an Arab 
terrorist: seeking help from Arabs in the United States to blow up the White House.  
In her critique of the Israeli filmmaking industry, Shohat draws a penetrating 
reading of the Israeli nationalist narrative, which, she argues, entangles with Euro-centric 
Orientalist geographies of East and West in its engagement with the image of Arabs and 
Arab-Jews/ Mizrahim (eastern Jews).96 As products of a diasporic Israeli cinema, the 
Golan-Globus films highlighted this narrative by foregrounding the U.S. (as a proxy for 
Israel) vulnerability and advocating surgical responses.  Films like Hell Squad (1985), 
Invasion U.S.A (1985), Appointment with Death (1988), The Hitman (1991), The Delta 
Force 3: The Killing Games (1991), American Ninja 4: The Annihilation (1991), 
American Samurai (1992), The Human Shield (1992), and Chain of Command (1993) 
staged an Israeli imagination of Arabs as permanent enemies of the Unite States. Other 
films like Firewalker (1986), Surrender (1987), Allan Quatermain and the Lost City of 
Gold (1987), Bloodsport (1988), and American Ninja 3: Blood Hunt (1989) injected anti-
Arab/Muslim stereotypical images and slurs in plots not related to Arabs or Muslims. The 
                                                 
95 The hijacking scene invokes references to the Athens-Beirut TWA hijacking (1985). Rather than 
capturing the real negotiation process leading to the release of hostages, the film’s hostages are rescued by 
the Delta Force in an Israeli token to the necessity of surgical response to terrorism; McAlister, “A Cultural 
History of the War without End,” 450. 
96 Shohat, Israeli Cinema, 1989. 
Mahdi 53 
 
 
process of vilification continued beyond the Golan-Globus orbit and was sustained by 
other Israeli-born producers in such films as Deadly Heroes (1994), Delta Force One 
(1999), Operation Delta Force V (1999), and The Order (2001). 
Air Marshall (2003) is one of the most offensive Israeli portrayals of the 
Arab/Muslim threat. The low-budget film – produced by Avi Lerner, Boaz Davidson, and 
Alain Jakubowicz – cheaply exploits the 9/11 tragedy. It narrates the story of a U.S. air 
marshal, Brett Prescott (Dean Cochran), who saves the day along with a cast of Israeli 
actors by eliminating the Arab/Muslim airplane hijacker. This airplane disaster movie, in 
the words of a reviewer, is “a DISASTER unto itself.” 97 Its interpolation of the post-9/11 
backlash against Arab/Muslim Americans reveals a sense of resistance among Israeli 
diasporic filmmakers and producers against the increasing semi-nuanced portrayals of 
Arab Americans in Hollywood’s post-9/11 films – to be discussed with more details in 
the next section. 
Plots in the alien-terrorist pattern are “not accidental, but propaganda disguised as 
entertainment,” to echo Shaheen’s criticism.98  It is critical, however, to situate the impact 
of this pattern without necessarily subscribing to or reproducing the popular myth that 
Hollywood is Jewish-controlled. The U.S. film industry is a heterogeneous site of popular 
culture production. My contextual reading of this pattern, therefore, emphasizes the role 
of post-Orientalist productions in capturing the manifestation of Israeli articulations of 
terrorism in Hollywood. This manifestation underlines a necessary frame of reference to 
the growth of American filmmakers’ one-dimensional imagination of the Arab/Muslim 
American in light of the U.S. encounters with such loaded incidents as the Iran hostage 
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crisis (1979-1981), U.S. intervention in Lebanon (1981-1983), the Iran-Iraq war (1980-
1988), striking Libya (1986), and the World Trade Center bombing (1993).  
 
Figure 3 An Unnamed Arab student activist turned 
suicidal in Times Square – courtesy of Wrong is Right 
 
This contextualization is instrumental to reading Hollywood’s trendy association 
of Arabs and Muslims in the United States with terrorism, particularly during the 1980s 
and the 1990s, which does not pronounce the legal and/or cultural citizenship of its Arab 
American characters. Columbia Pictures’ Wrong is Right (1982) depicts a terror group 
named “The eye of Gaza” bent on obliterating Tel Aviv and Jerusalem with atomic 
bombs. Arab American activists – projected in the image of unnamed Arab students 
wearing garbs and keffiyehs, further illustrate the anti-Israeli grievances in a series of 
suicidal bombings in the United States. The bombings strike New York City, Texas, 
Chicago, Detroit, and Washington DC. The film renders absent the humanity and 
rationality of Arab Americans; reducing them to mere reiterations of explosive 
emotionality under the slogans “Jews own the television,” “Death to America,” and 
“Death to Israel” (Figure 3). Despite the best intentions of director Richard Brooks to 
criticize the U.S. controversial foreign policy in the Middle East, captured in a reporter’s 
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inquiry about the reasons behind the deterioration of America’s image, the visual 
treatment of the Arab American image remains superficial. 
Hollywood’s alien-terrorist pattern mainstreams a public fear of the Arab/Muslim 
presence in the United States, which Susan Akram, Steven Salaita, and Naber locate 
within a history of anti-Arab racism in the United States.99 William Friedkin’s To Live 
and Die in L.A. (1985) perceives an Arab/Muslim threat of assassination against the U.S. 
president. Robert Zemeckis’ Back to the Future (1985) imagines the threat in the form of 
a moving van full of Libyans searching for nuclear weapons. William Riead’s Scorpion 
(1986) informs the audience of Palestinians targeting civilians, diplomats, servicemen, 
and military leaders. Gary Sherman’s Wanted: Dead or Alive (1986) displays UCLA 
Arab students behind a movie theater explosion killing at least 200 civilians including 
children, and planning to unleash poison gas on Los Angeles population. John Myhers’ 
made-in-Israel film Terror in Beverley Hills (1988) shows Arabs kidnaping the U.S. 
president’s daughter and other civilians to demand a pressure on Israel to release 
Palestinian prisoners. Lewis Teague’s Navy SEALs (1990) portrays the complicity of a 
Lebanese American journalist with terrorist groups overseas. James Cameron’s True Lies 
(1994) features a “Crimson Jihad” group in possession of six nuclear weapons set to 
cause havoc on U.S. soil. Peter Segal’s Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult (1994) 
reveals an Arab plot to blow the 66th annual academy awards. Stuart Baird’s Executive 
Decision (1996) dramatizes the threat in an airplane-hijacking scene with 406 passengers 
onboard including a U.S. senator. 
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This cinematic pattern, mostly concentrated in the action-adventure genre, 
reflects a systematic approach in conversation with the Israeli diasporic representation 
codes of the Arab/Muslim image around issues of home, land, and security. It resolves 
the issues of belonging through abstractions positing Arab/Muslim Americans as proxies 
of Arab/Muslim foreign interests and regional anxieties. Karin Wilkin’s and Juliana 
Gaipo-Marbet’s examinations of Arab and Arab American interpretations of and 
responses to this genre emphasizes its failure to recognize the nuance of the Arab 
American and American Muslim communities.100 I read this emphasis as an example of a 
post-Orientalist moral geography that utilizes Hollywood’s cultural site of production to 
mediate a nationalist codification of the Israeli-U.S. transnational anti-terrorism rhetoric. 
 
The Citizen-Terrorist Pattern 
 
 In her analysis of the U.S. television industry’s post-9/11 portrayal mode of 
Arabs/Muslims and Arab/Muslim Americans, Alsultany sheds lights on a Hollywood 
representation trend she refers to as “simplified complex representations.” The trend 
entails the process of adopting strategies to “offset the stereotype of the Arab/Muslim 
terrorist,” and create the impression of complexity in entertaining the imagery of Arabs 
and Muslims.101 The identified strategies include but are not limited to scattered 
references to patriotic Arab/Muslim Americans, sympathetic portrayals of post-9/11 
Arab/Muslim victims, humanizing depictions of the terrorists, and projections of the U.S. 
multicultural society. The strategies construct a new representational mode, which allows 
for the “reassurance that racial sensitivity is the norm in U.S. Society while 
                                                 
100 Wilkins, Home/Land/Security, 2009; Gaipo-Marbet, The Nature and Impact of Stereotyping of Arabs in 
American Society, 2001.  
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simultaneously perpetuating the dominant perception of Arabs and Muslims as threats to 
U.S. national security.”102 Tracing the U.S. film industry’s deployment of such simplified 
complex representations leads to the solidification of a new representation mode, which I 
shall refer to as the citizen-terrorist pattern.103 This pattern builds on Leti Volpp’s 
reflections on the citizen-terrorist construct that suggest a post-9/11 institutional tendency 
to identify Middle Easterners in the United States as terrorists and disidentify them as 
citizens.104 It navigates the contours of U.S. multiculturalism and draws boundaries for 
what constitutes grounds for nationalist-based readings of cultural citizenship. This 
results in works that appear to nuance the audience’s understanding of terrorism while re-
subjecting the Arab/Muslim American image to the industry’s binary codes that allocate 
them through the racialized underpinnings of patriotism.  
Edward Zwick’s The Siege (1998) initiates this particular pattern, which becomes 
more predominant in the post-9/11 context. Produced by 20th Century Fox, this thriller 
investigates a growing sense of terror in New York City invoked by a multi-layered 
terrorist cell comprising a number of Arabs, Muslims, and Arab/Muslim Americans. It 
presents a passionate and dedicated FBI agent Anthony Hubbard (Denzel Washington) 
wrestling with a maneuvering CIA agent Sharon Bridger (Annette Bening) and a self-
conceited military officer Major General William Devereaux (Bruce Willis). Regardless 
of their different approaches in fighting homegrown terrorism, the three figures – 
                                                 
102 Ibid, 29. 
103 There are a few post-9/11 films that humanize the Arab American image and do not present them in 
light of terrorism, e.g., The Kitchen (2001), Enough (2002), The Final Cut (2004), and A Day without a 
Mexican (2004). The Arab American characters in these films, however, function at the margins of 
mainstream portrayals. 
104 Volpp, “The Citizen and the Terrorist,” 1575-1600. 
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representing three various aspects of the U.S. government – are searching for ways to 
eradicate such terror and restore peace and security to the United States.    
The film deserves the credit for prophesizing the post-9/11 nationalist response, 
which has translated into increasing executive oversight, trumping Americans’ civil 
liberties, promoting the presumed effectiveness of torture techniques, and solidifying 
racial profiling in fighting terrorism. It also raises concerns about the use of CIA covert 
operations in advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives. The technology and resources 
awarded to the terrorists, the audiences are informed, have been provided by the CIA 
through its agent Bridger, who works as an undercover agent as part of a project aimed to 
empower Iraqis. This is an indirect criticism of the U.S. role in promoting jihad as a holy 
war for the Mujahideen to wage against the Soviet aggressions in Afghanistan during the 
1980s, which constitutes the earliest transnational organizing model for subsequent 
terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and IS.105 
The film, however, suggests that homegrown terrorism is a phenomenon 
exclusively advanced by Arab/Muslim Americans, who seek to secure their demands 
through targeting crowds of civilian Americans in public buses, movie theaters, 
elementary schools, and multicultural gatherings. The Arabic and Islamic identities are 
conflated to reinforce each other. Islamic signs and practices such as ablution, praying, 
wearing traditional clothing, and growing beard are packaged as signs of extremism. The 
terrorists’ cultural and religious affiliations are projected as significant marks of identity 
inherently opposed to America’s cultural norms. This prompts the military to racially 
profile Arab/Muslim Americans and round them behind barbed wires for further 
                                                 
105 For analysis of blowback theory and U.S. support of Mujahideen, see Johnson, “After 9/11,” 2004; 
Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 2004; Gerges, The Far Enemy, 2005. 
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investigation; a reference reminiscent of the rounding of Japanese Americans during 
WWII (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 Arab/Muslim Americans rounded up to military 
installed cages – courtesy of The Siege 
 
To offset this imagery, the film presents an Arab/Muslim American model that 
celebrates both a sense of American patriotism and pride in Arab/Islamic cultural 
heritage. FBI agent Frank Haddad (Tony Shalhoub) does not hesitate in embracing an 
inclusive multicultural notion of America, and in delivering a strong commitment to its 
security while preserving his Arab heritage. The film’s conclusion celebrates the triumph 
of multiculturalism as America’s promise to citizens like Haddad and his family. 
Americans of various creeds and ethnic backgrounds rush out to the streets to reject 
military control, demand an immediate restoration of law enforcement agencies role, and 
decry the sense of humiliation directed against Arab/Muslim Americans.  
Injecting the story of Haddad in the film presents an example of a simplified 
complex representation strategy that locates Arab/Muslim Americans within the rhetoric 
of, what Salaita calls, imperative patriotism,106 which draws strict boundaries for 
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Mahdi 60 
 
 
citizenship, belonging, and national interest.107 The film incurs sympathy towards the 
Arab American community only to the extent dictated by national security politics. 
Haddad is identified as a positive Arab American in respect of his ten-year duty as an FBI 
agent against hundreds of other Arab/Muslim Americans rounded up as potential alien-
terrorist suspects. In a moment of protest against the racial profiling and incarceration of 
his son as a potential suspect, he questions his own belonging. He decides to side with his 
Arab American community by giving up his FBI badge and stating, “I am one of them. 
I’m no longer your sand nigger.” This disruption is resolved once the promise of U.S. 
multiculturalism and civility is restored, which is made possible through Hadadd and his 
partner agent Hubbard when they kill the bad Arab-in-America terrorist. 
In this context, Hollywood’s citizen-terrorist pattern, which circulates in many of 
post-9/11 independent films, is replete with simplified complex representation strategies 
deployed to sustain the collision of this sense of patriotism with a post-9/11 means of 
racial profiling. Unlike the alien-Terrorist pattern that presents Arab/Muslim Americans 
as aliens seeking to terrorize America, the citizen-terrorist pattern articulates the 
Arab/Muslim Americans’ cultural belonging in the context of their disposition of the 
discourse of terrorism, which dictates an Arab/Muslim American struggle against the 
post-9/11 rise of the good Muslim-bad Muslim binary; thereby, confining them to the 
citizen-terrorist trap.  
                                                                                                                                                 
nonconformity to whatever at the time is considered to be “the national interest” is unpatriotic,” “Ethnic 
Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” 154. 
107 Perhaps the earliest film that utilizes this strategy is the one directed by Peter Hunt, i.e. Wild Geese II 
(1985). In this British action-thriller film – based on Daniel Carney’s novel The Square Circle (1982) – the 
Lebanese American protagonist John Haddad (Scott Glenn) wages war against Palestinian terror that 
claimed the lives of his own family. 
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Thus, this pattern advances in two primary dimensions. The first dimension 
conditions positive portrayals of Arab Americans to their subscription to the U.S. code of 
imperative patriotism. The appealing character of Layla Moore (Bridget Moynahan) in 
The Recruit (2003), though conflated as a Persian speaking Arab American, is rendered 
possible because of her dedication to her duty as a CIA agent. The Sentinel (2006) depicts 
Aziz Hassad (Raoul Bhaneja) as a hard working Arab/Muslim American patriot whose 
work as a Secret Service agent prompts him to risk his life to saving the U.S. president 
from a plotted assassination. The Arab-in-America character of Omar (Sam Golzari) and 
the Muslim American character of his teenage gay cousin Iqbal Riza (Tony Yalda) in 
American Dreamz (2006) win the audiences’ hearts and minds for their willingness to 
Americanize and adopt America’s celebrity culture through participating in a show 
similar to America’s Got Talent. The character of Ahmat (Laurence Fishburne) in Five 
Fingers (2006), though appears unconvincing for an agent torturing a terrorist, suddenly 
emerges as patriotic for his CIA duty in combatting terrorism. Identifying Samir Horn 
(Don Cheadle) in Traitor (2008) as the Arab/Muslim hero is stressed through his sacrifice 
as a U.S. anti-terrorism intelligence contractor. These films identity food Arab/Muslim 
Americans in relation to their active rejection of terrorism through their government 
service, which represents the pinnacle of patriotism. 
A film like Joseph Castelo’s The War Within (2005) best dramatizes this 
dimension through a conflict between the patriotic family of the good Muslim American 
Sayeed Choudhury (Firdous Bamji) and the bad Muslim-in-America Hassan (Ayad 
Akhtar). Hassan, affiliated with a New Jersey radical cell, intends to terrorize New York 
City, but encounters mounting pressure from Sayeed. “I am not saying things are perfect 
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here,” argues Sayeed, “[But] look around you in this restaurant: Jews, Muslims, [and] 
Christians are eating comfortably, safely, [and] peacefully. What’s wrong with that?” 
Hassan reads Sayeed’s continued efforts to dissuade him as unsophisticated and futile. In 
a pre-recorded message, he explains: “My friends! By the time you’d read this, I’ll be 
gone. You are Americans now and America has been good to you. It’s become your 
home. The country you love. I know you cannot understand why I have done what I will 
do – what I have to do – but ignorance is not innocence.” Ironically, the film ends with 
Sayeed detained as a terrorist suspect. 
Sayeed’s detention highlights the second dimension of the citizen-terrorist 
pattern, i.e. racial profiling. Perhaps the earliest film engaging with this dimension is 
Escape from L.A. (1996), which features a Muslim American Tasmila (Valeria Golino) 
being rounded along with other “undesirable and unfit” citizens into a post-apocalyptic 
Los Angeles Island. “I was a Muslim in South Dakota,” she states, “All of a sudden, they 
made it a crime.” Unlike Tasmila whose cultural difference constitutes a ground for her 
undesirability, Arab/Muslim Americans in the pos-9/11 pattern are racially profiled 
through the citizen-terrorist trope. Hadji Amerislani (Kal Penn) in Malibu’s Most Wanted 
(2003) is a nice fellow American with a Middle Eastern background who receives “a 
rocket grenade launcher” as Christmas gift from his uncle Ahmet. In Land of Plenty 
(2004), the Muslim American Hassan (Shaun Toub) and his educated brother Youssef 
(Bernard White) endure public racial profiling by a Vietnam vet who embarks in a one-
man mission to protect Los Angeles streets from terrorism; Hassan is shot dead by 
irresponsible, hooked-on-drugs white boys. An unnamed peaceful Middle Eastern airline 
passenger (Sayed Badreya) intimidates travelers with his sinister beard-and-turban looks 
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in Soul Plane (2004). Ahmed (Assaf Cohen) and his two Middle Eastern friends are 
accused of kidnapping a little girl in Flightplan (2005); the film concludes with a 
reference to the non-Arab kidnappers. The unnamed cabbie (Yousuf Azami) in Crank 
(2006) is carjacked with the convenience of screaming his association with Al Qaeda; a 
man and two women rush and beat him in the street.108 In Sorry, Haters (2006), the 
patriot Arab/Muslim American Ashade Mouhana (Abdellatif Kechiche) refuses pressures 
from a white woman to blow up government buildings; out of frustration, she harasses his 
family and pushes him under train tracks. In Pretty Persuasion (2004), Palestinian Randa 
(Adi Schnall) undergoes ridicule at high school, files alleged sexual assault accusations 
against her teacher, shames her family, and commits suicide. The Egyptian American 
Anwar El-Ibrahimi (Omar Metwally) in Rendition (2007) is a victim of the CIA 
extraordinary rendition program. The American Muslim Yusuf (Michael Sheen) wrestles 
against the question of torture in The Unthinkable (2010). Dr. Fahim Nasir (Metwally) 
transforms from a suspect of terror in an airplane hijack attempt in Non-Stop (2014) to 
someone whose medical profession becomes a valuable asset in the rescue mission.109  
Racial profiling is also presented through highlighting the issue of mistaken 
identity that conflates the Arab identity with other Middle Eastern looking groups. Crash 
(2004) captures public prejudice against a grocery store owner Iranian American 
mistaken for an Arab Farhad (Shaun Toub). “Osama” a sales man yells, “get out of here – 
plan a jihad on your own time!” Sikhs in films like Waterborne (2005), Inside Man 
                                                 
108 The earliest film depicting Arab Americans as taxi-drivers is Quick Change (1990).  The taxi driver in 
this film (Tony Shalhoub) does not speak English. His gibberish mumbles and strange actions emphasize 
the liminality of the Arab American space in the directors Bill Murray’s and Howard Franklin’s 
imagination. 
109 For a broader examination of Hollywood’s engagement with terrorism, see Dodds, “Screening Terror,” 
2008.  
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(2006), and The Gold Bracelet (2006) embattle a post-9/11 racialization momentum that 
has rendered Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism “theologically, modally, and socially 
illegitimate,” to reiterate Khyati Johsi’s critique.110 This conflation has materialized in 
moments of random public violence committed against Sikh Americans; 125 bias 
incidents in the five days following 9/11.111 
The tendency to using racial profiling in this pattern is best captured in Jeff 
Renfroe’s Civic Duty (2006). The film criticizes the damaging effects of anti-
Arab/Muslim American public racial profiling while maintaining a paradoxical reading of 
its importance to quarantine national security threats. The film’s protagonist, Terry Allen 
(Krause), grows suspicion of his Middle Eastern neighbor, Gabe Hassan (Naga). Gabe’s 
dark complexion, minimalist lifestyle, and connections to the Arab/Muslim community 
prompt Terry to search for indicting evidence. After failed attempts to secure the FBI’s 
attention, he decides to invade Gabe’s house and solicit forced confessions at gunpoint. 
Intolerant of Terry’s racist attitude, his wife reports him to authorities that eventually 
incarcerate him and set Gabe free. Despite its sympathetic portrayals of the Arab/Muslim 
American character, the film concludes with a projection of Gabe’s association with a 
terrorist group, and leads the audience to validate Terry’s actions. 
The two dimensions of imperative patriotism and racial profiling mutually enforce 
a post-9/11 investment in appropriating the Arab/Muslim American image to evade the 
critique laid against films circulating the alien-Terrorist pattern. Insensitive depictions of 
Arabs and Muslims in the United States as pure evil without humanizing them are losing 
traction in U.S. filmic productions. This is only effective in films dealing with Arab 
                                                 
110 Johsi, “The Racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in the United States,” 212.  
111 Falcone “Seeking Recognition,” 92. 
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Americans and American Muslims. Films promoting negative portrayals of Arabs and 
Muslims in in general are still rampant, e.g. Rules of Engagement (2000), Black Hawk 
Dawn (2002), Team America: World Police (2004), and The Kingdom (2007). The 
mainstream industry has also maintained its associations of apocalyptic scenarios and 
with some form of reference to the 9/11 tragedy, e.g. The Day after Tomorrow (2004), 
War of the Worlds (2005), 28 Weeks Later (2007), I am a Legend (2007), and Invasion 
(2007).112 References to caves and rugged hideouts in films such as The Cavern (2005), 
The Cave (2005), The Descent (2005), The Descent 2 (2009), and Catacombs (2007) have 
invited the audiences to connect fear with certain elements of Arab/Islamic culture.113 
Of the many films produced in the post-9/11 context, there are films like, Fatwa 
(2006), which still subscribe to the racially loaded portrayals of the alien-terrorist 
pattern. This low-budget film presents the story of a mentally unstable Arab/Muslim cab 
driver of a Libyan origin, Samir Al-Faied (Roger Guenveur Smith). He issues fanatic 
threatens to kill a Minnesotan senator for sponsoring anti-terrorist laws. His vengeance is 
unstoppable as he forces the senator’s daughter to a deadly dose of heroin. The film’s 
lack of simplified complex representation strategies, with the exception of a 
decontextualized reference to the loss of his son, serves as a testimony to the evolutionary 
process that Hollywood has undergone in its engagement with the Arab/Muslim 
American image. This process – though appears to be promising to researchers and 
activists interested in shattering Hollywood’s monopoly over grounds of Americanness – 
perpetuates in seemingly nuanced ways a post-Orientalist racialized imagery of 
Arab/Muslim Americans as entrenched in the unraveling politics of terrorism. Thus, the 
                                                 
112 Arjana, Muslims in the Western Imagination, 172-177. 
113 Ibid, 177. For more about post-9/11 works, see Riegler, “Mirroring Terror,” 2014.  
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industry continues to retain its denial of the Arab/Muslim American communities the 
right to define their sense of belonging beyond its drawn nationalist boundaries of what 
constitutes full articulations of American cultural citizenship. 
 
Conclusion 
In his post-9/11 congressional speech, President George W. Bush wondered: 
Americans are asking, “Why do they hate us?" In an attempt to provide an answer, he 
pondered: 
They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. 
Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our 
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other… 
These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With 
every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and 
forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.114 
The Bush administration’s prompt measures in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 utilized 
this profile in conducting racially informed strategies to counter the rising threat of 
homegrown terrorism. The preventive detention strategy resulted in the detention of 1200 
non-citizens of Arab/Muslim background with no rights to contact their families or seek 
legal representatives, let alone to protest their subjection to physical and verbal abuse 
while in custody.115 The subsequent “special interest” designation opened doors for more 
arbitrary detentions. Thousands of interviews of Arab/Muslim visitors arriving in the 
United States since 2000 were held through the Department of Justice while the FBI 
                                                 
114 Bush, “A Nation challenged,” September 21, 2001. 
115 Personal narratives provided in Bayoumi, How does it Feel to be a Problem? 
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conducted interviews reaching 200,000 by 2005.116 The Absconder Apprehension 
Initiative prioritized the removal proceedings of Arab/Muslims in a deportation list that 
reached 314,000. The Special Registration program required Arab/Muslim 
nonimmigrants to register with the Department of Homeland Security, further unveiling 
efforts to define the Arab/Muslim communities as the enemy within117 
The post-9/11 trend of racial profiling in the context of terrorism has also resulted 
in long-lasting strategies that continue to disfranchise the Arab/Muslim American 
community. The PATRIOT Act (2001) has granted U.S. law enforcement agencies the 
authority to intrude into the daily lives of Arab/Muslim Americans.118 Law enforcement 
officers have been allowed to search their telephone, e-mail communications, and records 
without any need for court orders. They have also undertaken sneak and peek searches of 
homes and businesses without a warrant or even the owner’s or the occupant’s 
permission or knowledge. The Transportation Security Administration (TSF) and the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have followed racially informed procedures 
that single Arab/Muslim immigrants and citizens for further investigation. Suspects have 
been sent to other countries, known for violating human rights, for further interrogation 
as part of the Rendition covert program. Prisoners of war, or as has been named enemy 
combatants, have been subjected to inhumane treatment in violation of the Geneva 
Convention accords.119  
                                                 
116 The estimate is provided by the director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, John Tirman in 
his piece “Security the Progressive Way, The Nation, April 11, 2005; quoted in Cainkar, Homeland 
Insecurity. 
117 Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity, chapter IV. 
118 An acronym for the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
119 For more about the Arab/Muslim American post-9/11 civil rights crisis, see Hagopian, Civil Rights in 
Peril, 2004. 
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Law enforcement agencies have been empowered with the authority to arrest 
American citizens who may be suspected of any terrorism-related connections; a strategy 
signed into law in the National Defense Act by President Obama on the eve of 2012 New 
Year. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) attempted to map the Arab/Muslim 
population and identify ways to quarantine the threat of homegrown terrorism. In New 
York, there were attempts to grant firefighters the right to inspect and search any 
apartment or housing unit occupied by any Arab American. A community facility in 
Irving, Illinois, was re-named the “Irving Mosque” for a drill in which thirty government 
agencies have participated. In this drill, officers from the Illinois Law Enforcement 
Alarm System (ILEAS) participated in an anti-terrorism operation. Storming the mosque 
with an armored car, the officers could rescue one hostage, who was tied to explosive 
devices, and killed the Muslim terrorist that happened to carry an Arab name.120 
The U.S. cultural industry has played a significant role in mediating this hyped 
conflation. Media coverage of Arab/Muslim Americans has been mostly constrained to 
issues related to terror incidents. Appeals to multicultural America as a ground of unity 
that underwrites the national identity while coping with grief have refrained from 
injecting images of Arabs and Muslims as part of the American cultural mosaic.121 
Liberal TV shows like Real Time with Bill Maher as well as conservative T.V. shows like 
The O’Reilly Factor, The Glenn Beck, Just in with Laura Ingraham, and Hannity’s 
America, and Radio talks shows like The Rush Limbaugh Show, and The Savage Nation 
are some of many shows that have expressed deep concern with the growth of Islam in 
the United States. Even fiction writers have used their imaginative power to depict Arab 
                                                 
120 Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity, 2009; Elaasar, Silent Victims, 2004. 
121 Alsultany, “Selling American Diversity,” 2007. 
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Americans as a source of real trouble for the United States. John Updike’s Terrorist 
(2004) and Robert Ferrigno’s Prayers for the Assassin (2006) offer examples of Islam as 
a source of threat to the U.S. national security.  
The conflation of Arabs and Muslims in the United States with terrorism (foreign 
or homegrown) has instilled fear in the public of Arab/Muslim presence, which has 
resulted in an alarming increase in the reported cases of violence, harassment, threat, and 
attack.122 Fighting terrorism has become, in fact, a contemporary phase of racial 
discrimination in the history of Arab immigration experience. Post-9/11 civil liberty 
reports by the ADC show a dramatic increase in anti-Arab racially driven attacks in the 
United States.123 The Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has issued annual 
civil rights reports that capture this sentiment.124 Targeted in their place of work, place of 
worship, and in the downtowns and suburbs of their cities and towns, Americans with 
Middle Eastern looks have faced an unavoidable bitter sense of post-9/11 visibility. 
Positive results of the backlash against the Arab/Muslim American communities 
have materialized in a slow growth of public disillusionment in the hype and a rising 
sense of activist dedication in the Arab/Muslim American civil society. These realizations 
have forged a space for Hollywood producers to propose a new representation mode that 
seems to be disconnected from the aforementioned cultural industry’s history of anti-
Arab racist and Islamophobic imagery. As highlighted above, Hollywood has promoted a 
representation pattern that may assume a sense of consciousness of such a backlash. The 
popularized imagery of Arab/Muslim Americans has, however, advanced a reading of 
                                                 
122 For a reading of the racial violence in the day following September 11, 200, see Ahmed, “Homeland 
Insecurities,” 2002. 
123 Ibish, Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against Arab Americans, 1998-2000 and 2001-2002. 
124 CAIR, Civil Rights Reports, https://www.cair.com/civil-rights/civil-rights-reports.html  
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American cultural citizenship that restricts the boundaries of belonging to docile 
patriotism. The citizen-terrorist pattern still sustains portrayal modes resurrecting earlier 
depictions of Arab/Muslim Americans within the lenses of terrorism. It maintains anti-
Arab/Muslim American reverberating hegemonic tendencies that constantly question the 
parameters of their cultural belonging to the American code of cultural citizenship. 
Through it all, Hollywood’s nationalist framework conserves a tradition that reduces 
U.S.-Arab and Arab-Israeli transnational politics into a simplified nationalist framework, 
which continues to contest the cultural citizenship of Arab Americans. The next chapter 
moves away from Hollywood to Egyptian cinema in search for the possibility of an 
alternative transnational framework that codifies the Arab American image.     
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Chapter II Postcolonial Projections of Arab Americans in Egyptian Cinema 
    
 
   Cinema is a powerful tool of cultural production. Whether in the United States or the Arab 
world, cinema functions within nationalist projects that narrate the American and the Arab 
nations, while also using their portrayal of Others in order to construct and strengthen their own 
identities. 
—   Lina Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East 
  
   Examining the new wave of Egyptian popular films that go global, and comparing them with 
other films that remain ‘local’…no recognizable shift or difference in the construction of the 
familiar and foreign space/time unit can be found. This convergence of inside and outside is 
underscored by other elements: not only are foreigners mostly played by Egyptian performers, 
but also most of the secondary characters themselves are not an integral part of the host land, 
but family members who emigrated long ago or characters who originate from other Arab 
countries. It is they who are made to represent the negative aspect of Western culture. 
—   Viola Shafik, Popular Egyptian Cinema 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter showcases how Hollywood’s nationalist constructions of 
Arab Americans – though exhibiting an evolution from a total rejection of acknowledging 
Arab Americans as both legally and culturally bound to the United States to portrayals 
conditioned by imperative patriotism and racial profiling sensitivity – underscore a 
manufacturing process of cultural citizenship at the intersection of the industry’s post-
Orientalist and racialized discourses. In her critique of cultural citizenship scholarship, 
Maira identifies a theoretical limitation in the U.S. nationalist engagement with the issue 
of migrant belonging and minority exclusion, i.e. the lack of emphasis on the 
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transnational context within which the migrant communities circulate.125 The 
transnational interrogations of Arab Americans in Hollywood, as the chapter showcases, 
are pronounced primarily through security lenses. A comprehensive interrogation of the 
transnational articulations of Arab Americans necessitates reflections on the role of the 
Arab popular culture in enunciating the complexity of their cultural citizenship.  
Examining the Arab American transnational domain requires a reading of the 
literature surrounding Arab postcoloniality and its role in challenging hegemonic trends 
of representation in U.S. cultural productions. This reading emphasizes the disruptive role 
of postcolonial criticism, which draws from Bhabha’s penetrating reflections: 
Postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural 
representation involved in the contest for political and social authority within the modern 
world order. Postcolonial perspectives emerge from the colonial testimony of Third World 
countries and the discourses of ‘minorities’ within the geopolitical divisions of East and 
West, North and South. They intervene in those ideological discourses of modernity that 
attempt to give a hegemonic ‘normality’ to the uneven development and the differential, 
often disadvantaged, histories of nations, races, communities, peoples. They formulate 
their critical revisions around issues of cultural difference, social authority, and political 
discrimination in order to reveal the antagonistic and ambivalent moments within the 
‘rationalizations’ of modernity.126 
This context serves at the backdrop of my interest in initiating a conversation around the 
Arab mainstream representations of the Arab American image. To do so, I identify the 
Egyptian filmmaking industry as a popular front, which simultaneously subverts 
Hollywood’s restricting pronouncement of Americanness/Arabness and circulates its 
alternative framework. The significance of this industry lies in its mediation of a 
                                                 
125 Maira, Missing, 84. 
126 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 245-246. 
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transnational framework that consolidates postcolonial narratives (read, Arabist and 
Islamist) with the sociocultural dictations of the Egyptian nationalist narrative.  
This framework crystalizes in a film representation pattern dating back to the 
1990s – a decade that witnessed the emergence of an Egyptian transnational interest in 
communicating popularized depictions of Arab Americans to heterogeneous Arab 
audiences. The purpose of this chapter is to address the serious lack of inquiry of this 
pattern in Egyptian cinema scholarship through surveying its major films in light of the 
stated transnational framework. Perhaps the only conceptualization of the cinema’s 
engagement with Arab Americans is provided by film scholar Viola Shafik in Popular 
Egyptian Cinema. As illustrated in the epigraph, she conceives this engagement as a 
filmmaking attempt to externalize Egypt’s domestic politics. This conceptualization 
constitutes a necessary foundation for this framework, but does not fully account for the 
industry’s codification of Arabist, Islamist, and state nationalist overlapping postcolonial 
rhetoric. Rather than reading the cinema’s Arab American image as a mere embodiment 
of “the negative aspect of Western culture,”127 I argue, the image has been pronounced 
through dichotomous renderings of Arab Americans as an embodiment of either a 
celebrated Egyptian/Arab/Muslim anti-imperialistic consciousness or a mere embodiment 
of western culture.128  
The pattern advances this imagery through the deployment of certain nationalist, 
class-based, gendered, and sexualized allegories in its foregrounded transnational 
framework. It also projects the Arab American characters through sensational 
                                                 
127 Shafik, Popular Egyptian Cinema, 87.  
128 For a glimpse of the broader dichotomies of Arabness and Americanness in Arab news, refer to Galal, 
Galander, and Auter, The Image of the United States Portrayed in the Arab World Online Journalism,” 
2008; Mohamed, “Media Matters,” 2007. 
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articulations of the U.S. corrupting materialism, interventionist foreign policy, and 
alienating culture. Thus, the chapter highlights the role of Egyptian filmmakers in 
subverting Hollywood’s nationalist constructions of Arab Americans through 
interrogating their polarizing critique of America, which subjects the image of Arab 
Americans to an overlapping Arabist and Islamist narratives of postcolonial cultural 
citizenship rooted in the Egyptian state nationalist context. It supplements the first 
chapter in foregrounding the impact of U.S.-Arab cultural politics on the circulation of 
Arab American Otherness to American and Arab audiences. 
 
The Transnational Framework in Egyptian Cinema 
 
To emphasize the importance of Egyptian cinema’s above-highlighted role, it is 
critical to contextualize the cinema’s engagement with the Arabist and Islamist 
narratives, which have competed, often collided, in promoting emancipatory postcolonial 
rescue narratives that transcend contested state nationalist boundaries in the Arab world. 
Since state nationalism has also contributed to developing the distinct sociopolitical 
character of every Arab country to the extent that concerns over the validity of the term 
Arab world are viable, it is critical to examine the cinema’s utilization of Egyptian 
nationalist rhetoric in defining its engagement with the Arabist/Islamist narratives.129 
Governments in Egypt have forged a space for nation-state nationalism to 
compete with Arabist and Islamist narratives, resulting in attempts to coerce and 
marginalize Islamists since the 1960s and Arabists since the 1970s. Both the regimes of 
Anwar el-Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) re-directed emphasis from 
                                                 
129 An insightful reading into this complexity is available in Khalaf and Khalaf, Arab Society and Culture, 
2009. 
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Arabist to state nationalist interests and maintained a lesser repressive anti-Islamist 
attitude than that of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s (1956-1970) and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s (2013-
present). President Sadat’s initiated infitah (Open Door Policy) culminated in 
normalizing relations with Israel and embracing neoliberal politics that encouraged 
privatization and created a widening chasm between the working class and the elites. On 
January 25, 2011, Egyptians poured into the streets to demand the ousting of Mubarak 
and elected Egypt’s first Islamist president Mohamed Morsi whose regime would be 
toppled a year later by an outraged military leadership dedicated to promoting an 
exclusionary state nationalist narrative.130  
Arabist Narrative 
 
Prior to the solidification of this state nationalist narrative in the 1970s, Egypt 
played a dynamic role in popularizing al-ʿuruba (Arabism), which Ernest Dawn defines 
as a rhetorical appeal to the ambition of Arab nationalism in unifying the Arab nation-
states into one single political entity.131 It was in Cairo where the League of Arab States 
was instituted as a post-WWII space to mediate a broad sense of al-ʿuruba as an 
imagined Arab collective identity – to borrow Benedict Anderson’s sense of the term – 
signifying common Arab beliefs, thoughts, attitudes, and values.132 In 1945, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia founded the Arab League. Later on, Arabian 
Peninsula countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), 
North African countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan), and 
Horn of Africa countries (Djibouti and Somalia) joined. The recognition-seeking state of 
                                                 
130 Cook, The Struggle for Egypt, 2012. Sowers and Toensing, The Journey to Tahrir, 2012. To examine 
the role of traditional and alternative media in echoing the protests globally, refer to Nanabhay and 
Farmanfarmaian, “From Spectacle to Spectacular,” 2011.  
131 Read Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 1973. 
132 See Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1983. 
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Palestine and the archipelago island of Comoros were two other members, leading to an 
Arab League of twenty-two countries.133 Despite contention over membership (i.e., 
whether membership is based on shared Arab heritage or a mere recognition of Arabic as 
a state official language), the league has operated as an institution fostering common 
political, economic, and cultural goals.  
The League has, however, failed to realize the Arab Dream of political unity 
among its nation-state members; a dream deeply rooted in the Arab collective memory of 
a glorious past.134 The nineteenth century literary movement of al-nahḍa (cultural 
awakening) mobilized the rhetoric of this dream in search for a consolidated Arab 
identity, which evolved into demands for sovereignty from the Ottoman Rule during 
WWI, but eventually coopted by the British and French mandates that resulted in more 
conquered and divided Arab nation-states.135 The charismatic appeal of President Nasser 
– rooted in his defiance of the West, particularly in re-claiming control of the Suez Canal, 
and eloquent pan-Arab speeches – resurrected hopes among Arabs in embracing al-
ʿuruba as part of their postcolonial search for autonomy and independence.136 
Unfortunately, concepts such as al-ʿuruba (Arabism), al-huwwiyya al-ʿarabiyya 
(Arab identity), and al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya (Arab nationalism) failed to unify all Arab 
countries. In 1958, Egypt and Syria united to become the United Arab Republic, but the 
union collapsed in 1961. In 1972, the attempt to create the Federation of Arab Republics 
                                                 
133 Arab League, http://www.arableagueonline.org. 
134 To learn about Arab history, refer to Hitti, History of the Arabs, 1937; Hourani, A History of the Arab 
Peoples, 1991. 
135 Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West, 1970; Choueiri, Arab Nationalism, 2000; Alangari, The 
Struggle for Power in Arabia, 1998; Khalidi, Anderson, et al, The Origins of Arab Nationalism, 1991. 
136 Ralph Coury locates Egyptian Arab nationalism in a history that pre-defined the Free Officer Movement 
(1952) and the subsequent rise of Nasser, see “Who ‘invented’ Egyptian Arab Nationalism?,” 1982. 
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– uniting Libya, Egypt and Syria – failed as well. Similarly, proposals for other unions 
like the 1958 Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan), the 1958 United Arab States (United 
Arab Republic and Kingdom of Yemen), and the 1972 Arab Islamic Republic (Libya and 
Tunisia) were met with failure.137 Meanwhile, the influence of Hizb al-Baʿth al-ʿArabi al-
Ishtiraki (Arab Baʿth Socialist Party), which peaked through its ruling of Syria and Iraq, 
receded due to the party’s failure in delivering its promised Arab unity and – similar to 
Nasser’s popular Arabism – its embrace of state nationalist military authoritarianism.138 
Still, the word Arab was incorporated into the official titles of several countries like the 
United Arab Emirates, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Yemen 
Arab Republic, and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.139 
The pan-Arab narrative suffered its major blow in the aftermath of the Arab-
Israeli War (1967) and the subsequent Israeli territorial expansion.140 This led to a mass 
disappointment with the political project of al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya as a viable 
postcolonial means of resistance against various forms of neocolonialism.141 
Notwithstanding this failure, the rhetoric of al-ʿuruba has sustained the Arab collective 
imagination with a rich repertoire of imagery reinvigorating their contemporary imagined 
sense of al-huwwiyya al-ʿarabiyya. This imagery is mostly articulated at the popular 
culture level. In Popular Culture in the Arab World, Andrew Hammond argues that today 
                                                 
137 For more about the history of Arab nationalism and unity attempts, see: Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in 
the Twentieth Century, 2003. 
138 Other factors behind the decline of the Baʿth party include the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) and Syrian 
Civil War (2011-Present).  
139 The word Arab was only official for a limited period in the Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1990), Libyan 
Arab Republic (post-revolution-1977), Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1977-1986), and the 
Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1986-2012). 
140 For a thorough reading of the post-1967 Arab intellectual history, read Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab 
Thought, 2004.  
141 Rubin, “Pan-Arab Nationalism,” 1991; Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs, 1998. 
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“pop culture has finally succeeded in bringing the peoples of the region together where 
fifty years of politics failed.” Reflecting on the significance of cultural productions in 
solidifying the Arab identity, he continues: 
Since independence [from European imperialism], a movement of cultural reaffirmation 
has enveloped the countries of the region and also grown between individual countries and 
the rest of the world, emphasizing similarity, homogeneity, and a greater sense of 
something, identified as Arabness or Arab identity (al-huwiya al-‘arabiya).142 
The foundation of Aljazeera (1994) ushered in an era when Arabs transcended state-
nationalist media and rallied around common transnational issues of concerns.143 This 
opened doors to the growth of satellite-based television networks with materials catered 
to the estimated 350 million Arab population.144 An establishment like the Saudi-funded 
Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC), for instance, has captivated the imagination of 
many Arabs and their diaspora in Europe and the Americas with such popular contest 
shows like Maḥbūb al-ʿArab (Arab Idol), Lil ʿArab Mawaheb (Arabs Got Talent), and 
Aḥla Ṣawt (The Voice). The shows reinforce the notion of “Arab homeland” in an 
attempt to vocalize the interconnectedness of the imagined Arab identity. Works like 
Anastasia Valassopoulos’ Arab Cultural Studies, Tarik Sabry’s Cultural Encounters in 
the Arab World, Walter Armbrust’s Mass Mediations, and Kai Hafez’s Arab Media, 
Walid Hamamsy’s and Mounira Soliman’s Popular Culture in the Middle East and North 
Africa investigate the interlocutors of this momentum through reflections on the 
heterogeneous Arab cultural studies. A similar emphasis underlines the analysis of 
specific forms of Arab popular culture such as music in Laura Lohman’s Umm Kulthum, 
                                                 
142 Hammond, Popular Culture in the Arab World, 2. 
143 Seib, The Aljazeera Effect, 2008. 
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poetry in Lila Abu-Lughod’s Veiled Sentiment, cartoons in Tarek Mahfouz’s Arab 
Culture, media in Marc Lynch's Voices of the New Arab Republic, television in Naomi 
Sakr’s Arab Television Today, posters in Khatib’s Image Politics in the Middle East, and 
film in Alia Arasoughly’s Screens of Life. Thus, Arab popular culture has become a rich 
site for Arabs to re-claim their dream in an increasingly divided Arab world. 
Despite serious linguistic challenges in the Arab world, often dictated by the 
complexity of its dialects, cultural works produced in the Egyptian dialect are often the 
easiest to access. While modern standard Arabic serves as Arabs’ lingua franca, the 
Egyptian dialect owes its popularity to the prominence of its music and cinema 
industries.145 The popular appreciation of el- Ḥilm el-ʿArabi (The Arab Dream, 1998) 
operetta, which featured the contribution of ninety-five artists twenty-five of whom are 
famous Arab singers, was in part a result of the fluidity of its Egyptian lyrics.146 Its 
popularity was also informed by its appeal to al-ʿuruba rhetoric, especially in light of a 
common grievance against the Israeli oppressions of Palestinians.147 Egyptian filmmakers 
have relied on these two elements, i.e., linguistic fluidity of the Egyptian dialect and 
emphasis on Arab identity via allegorical references to a common Arab critique of 
western imperialism.148  
In The Arab National Project in Youssef Chahine’s Cinema, Malek Khouri 
conducts analysis of the distinguished Egyptian director’s repertoire of forty-four films, 
                                                 
145 Read Suleiman, Arabic, Self and Identity, 2011 for more in-depth reading of the power of Arabic as an 
identity marker.  
146 Mastered by the Palestinian-Egyptian prolific director Ahmed el-ʿErian, the operetta follows the music 
style of Michael Jackson’s We Are the World (1985). The Arab Dream theme was later sustained in 2008 
through a follow-up operetta el- Ḍamir el-ʿArabi (The Arab Conscience). 
147 The operetta received much attention by Arab television channels, particularly in the aftermath of the 
second Palestinian intifaḍa (uprising) in the period 2000-2005. 
148 Culhane, East/West, an Ambiguous State of Being, 1995. 
Mahdi 80 
 
 
which, as the author emphasizes, “embodies a rich and critical survey of the social, 
political, and cultural history of Egypt and the Arab world in the twentieth century.”149 
Chahine’s film el-Naṣer Salah-e-Din (Saladin the Victorious, 1963) is an iconic example 
of the cinema’s appeal to the unrealized Arab Dream. In this film, the director resurrects 
the inspirational story of the Kurdish/Muslim warrior, Saladin, and his struggle to 
emancipate the Holy Land from the Crusaders’ atrocities in an attempt to draw a 
glorifying image of the Egyptian President Nasser as the leading figure in the Arab 
postcolonial struggle for autonomy (Figure 5).150 “We need to be cognizant of our Arab 
national identity,” stresses Chahine, “Nasser realized that, and reminded us that being 
Arab is what unites us.”151 
 
Figure 5 Salah-e-Din as the embodiment of President 
Naser – courtesy of el-Naṣer Salah-e-Din 
 
This epic replaces references to the Muslim-Christian religious nature of the 
conflict with an emphasis on the Arab struggle for unity against the dictations of western 
imperialism. The departure from the Islamist narrative does not necessarily ignore the 
parameters of the Islamic anti-colonial critique. Although communicated in standard 
                                                 
149 Khouri, The Arab National Project in Youssef Chahine’s Cinema, xi. 
150 For an Arab reading of the crusades, refer to Maalouf, The Crusades through Arab Eyes, 1984. 
151 Shmeit, Youssef Chahine, 193; as quoted in Khouri, The Arab National Project, 43. 
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Arabic, its utilization of the Egyptian accent invites the audiences to connect with the 
Egyptian role in advocating Arab nationalism at the time. Regardless of the unraveling 
state nationalist politics in the post-Nasser Arab world that further distanced Arabs from 
their dream, Egyptian filmmakers – as illustrated later in this chapter – have continued to 
echo their pan-Arab message in light of its rising critique of the United States and Israel. 
Islamist Narrative 
 
Egyptian filmmakers have also engaged with allegories derived from the Islamist 
critique of the West, which has steadily flourished since the 1970s at the intersection of 
el-Ikhwān el-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood) and the ultraconservative wave of el-
Jamāʿah el-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Group) that Khaled Abou el-Fadle identifies as a 
movement of postcolonial puritanism.152 The two trends were not necessarily mutually 
inclusive, but shared a common interest in promoting Islam as a viable sociopolitical 
alternative in the Arab world and redefining Arab Muslims as part of the Muslim ummah 
(transnational Muslim political entity).153 Unlike the anti-colonial critique of late 
nineteenth century Islamic liberalism spearheaded by intellectuals like Muhammad Abdu 
(1849-1905) or even the subsequent Islamist critique during the1920s-1940s, the Islamist 
critique in Egypt since the 1950s has embattled internal sources of corruption, hypocrisy 
and betrayal as a proxy for neocolonialism.154 The sensational writings of Sayyid Qubt 
(1906-1966) – an Egyptian Islamist tortured and prosecuted by Nasser’s authorities – 
were embraced as authoritative calls for Muslims in Egypt and other Arab countries to 
                                                 
152 Hassan el-Banna (1906-1949) established el-Ikhwān el-Muslimūn in 1928 to propose a mainstream role 
for religion to play in state and society. El-Jamāʿah el-Islamiyyah draws from the salafi school of 
Wahhabism. See, Fadl, And God Knows The Soldiers, chapter 1. 
153 For more about Islamist appeal for the ummah, see Mahmood, The Concept of an Islamic State, 1989. 
154 Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam, 216. President Sadat allowed Islamists some freedom in order to weaken 
the remnant forces of the socialist left, a policy that backfired and claimed his own life; see, Ahmed, The 
Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, Chapter II. 
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adopt political Islam as a front to encounter morally corrupting western forms of 
liberalism and secularism.155 Later on, the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) offered 
hopes for Islamists in Egypt to continue their anti-state apparatus struggle. 
The impact of the Islamist narrative was absorbed in Egyptian entertainment 
circles in response to what Karin van Nieuwkerk identifies as efforts by President 
Mubarak’s regime to “Islamicize its policy” in an attempt to resolve the Post-Camp 
David (1978) public anxiety about normalizing relations with Israel.156 In order to sustain 
its prosecution of fundamentalism, President Mubarak’s government constrained artistic 
expression to state-sanctioned portrayals of Islamist politics while yielding to a more 
discernable religious pressure codified through raqabat el-shariʿ (street censorship). 
Egyptian cultural producers, Samia Mehrez and Shereen Aboulnaga argue, were forced to 
navigate both state and street forms of censorship in their search for a sense of autonomy 
constantly disrupted by political and religious dictations.157 Echoes of this process 
materialized in Egyptian cinema through the double-layered tendency to embrace the 
Islamist narrative of spatial morality (i.e., allocating morality along a perceived division 
between Islam and the West), and to divorce the Islamists from images promoting them 
as the public agents of change. Egyptian filmmakers were forced to censor rampant forms 
of nudity and excessive display of affection that reached their peak during the 1980s. 158 
                                                 
155 A viable source of influence in Qutb’s writings is the South Asian Islamic thinker Syed Abul A'ala 
Maududi (1903-1979) who called for an Islamic revivalist revolution against western forms of liberalism in 
Muslim land: Maududi, Tajdid-o-Ihya-i-din, 1940. Also read, Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of 
Radical Islamism, 2010. 
156 Nieuwkerk, A Trade like Any Other, 64. 
157 Mehrez, Egypt’s Culture Wars, introduction; Aboulnaga, Al-Mouthaqaf al-Intiqali, chapter 1. 
158 Appeal to morality also corresponded with increasing pressures from the cinema’s audiences in 
conservative oil-rich countries. 
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This tendency, argues Abu-Lughod, is an Egyptian cultural means to win “the contest 
over the place of Islam in the social and political life.”159 
Fears of a rising religious power that threatens to re-write the country’s social 
contract and re-brand its perceived western-penetrated culture have constituted a common 
ground for Mubarak’s regime and Egyptian cultural producers. The post-Arab Spring 
Islamist experience in Egypt, the most populous Arab country, galvanized much attention 
in the Arab world and rendered it ever more divided. The year 2012 witnessed 
unprecedented proliferation of Islamist political parties and media outlets ranging from 
moderate to conservative and ultra conservative groups with rapidly shifting coalitions. 
The same year witnessed an unprecedented Islamist control of the two houses of the 
parliament and the government. Islamists dominated elections to the People’s Assembly, 
the lower house, with an impressive win of 71.5 percent of the seats. Of the 180 seats 
available for elections to the Shura council, the upper house, Islamists won by 83.3 
percent. The Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate, Morsi el-ʿAyyat, was elected 
president of Egypt with a cabinet heavily influenced by Islamist thinking.  
This forged a space for Islamist supporters to demand drafting a shariʿa-based 
(Islamic Law) constitution, and rally behind emerging private media that circulated a 
polarizing rhetoric of citizenship and identity. Popular actors like Adel Imam and Ilham 
Shahin underwent criticism for their role in propagating anti-Islamist messages 
throughout their entertainment career; unveiling a rising threat against artistic creativity 
and cultural production. Such rapid changes accompanied a sense of polarization in the 
                                                 
159 Abu-Lughod, “Finding a Place for Islam,” 494. For a reading of the intertwinement of art and politics in 
Egyptian cinema, see Baker, “Combative Cultural Politics,” 1995. 
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Egyptian society. The Supreme Council of Armed forces (SCAF) – responsible for 
ousting Mubarak and representing a sixty-year-old military system – engaged in a series 
of constitutional declarations, Supreme Constitutional Court legal battles, shifting 
coalitions, and mass demonstrations. In response, Morsi solidified his power by 
dissolving the SCAF, rushing an Islamist constitution, and ignoring calls for inclusion. 
The totality of such circumstances led to the military’s surge in coalition with a 
grassroots movement Tamarod (rebellion) and support from the country’s liberal and 
secular political coalition, the National Salvation Front, which eventually led to the 
collapse of the Islamist rule.160  
The surge would not have been possible without popular support laid through 
Egyptian films since the 1990s – whether state-endorsed or foreign-funded – which has 
generated negative portrayals of Islamists. Analyses conducted of films such as el-
ʾErhabi (The Terrorist, 1994), Tuyur el- Ḍalām (The Birds of Darkness, 1995), el-
ʾAbwaab el-Moghlaqa (The Closed Doors, 1999), and Ḥein Maysara (Until Better Times, 
2007) reveal a popularized tendency to project Islamists as groups with violent means 
engaged in undermining the sociopolitical fabric of the society.161 They are often 
presented as trapped in a modern-backward dichotomy or are interwoven into lower 
middle class “misery and confusion,” to borrow Walter Armbrust’s description.162 Unlike 
Hollywood’s one-dimensional portrayal of Muslims as crazed terrorists, Egyptian cinema 
features complex portrayals of fundamentalism that call into question an understanding of 
the sociocultural and political circumstances conducive to acts of violence. Khatib argues 
                                                 
160 The ultraconservative Salafi party, Hizb el-Nur, ironically joined the call. 
161 Armbrust, “Islamists in Egyptian Cinema,” 2002; Allagui and Najjar, “Framing Political Islam in 
Popular Egyptian Cinema,” 2011. 
162 Armbrust, Walter. “Islamists in Egyptian Cinema,” 925. 
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that Hollywood’s portrayals derive from the prerequisite of its action genre that 
necessitates a national encounter with the enemy whereas Egyptian cinema’s portrayals 
emerge from its melodrama genre that emphasizes inter-personal relationships within the 
same nation as rudimentary to encountering terrorism. The Egyptian cinema’s 
engagement with fundamentalism is also informed by its veneration of Islam as a 
peaceful religion that continues to define many of Egyptian traditions and practices.163 
This emphasis on religion dictates the cinema’s engagement with the Islamist 
narrative of spatial morality, particularly in its critique of the West. Perhaps the most 
sensational aspect of this morality emerges out of the discursive clash between Islamists 
and American queer activists around same-sex relationships. In Desiring Arabs, Joseph 
Massad unpacks this clash in a comprehensive study of sexuality in the Arab world 
mostly formulated through Orientalist and Islamist scholarship. He recognizes the rising 
contestations during the 1980s around the issue of queerness between the Gay 
International – a constellation of western advocates to universalize gay rights – and the 
Islamists’ call to reclaim Islam’s governance codes of ethics and morality; a clash that 
follows an earlier one between Islamists and western advocates of universalist 
feminism.164 The missionary nature of such western narratives located them within an 
imperialist hegemonic history, which further hindered the subaltern – including 
postcolonial feminists and queers – from developing their specific contextualized ways of 
knowing.165 Also, promoting the rescue narrative in their advocacy resurrected Orientalist 
images of the cultural Other – be they Arab/Muslim feminists or queers – and reduced 
                                                 
163 Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East, chapter IV 
164 The clash exacerbated in light of the stigma of AIDS and homosexuality. 
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them to a mere source of “colorful life stories to document and validate the prevailing set 
of theoretical assumptions,” to echo bell hooks’ criticism of bourgeois white feminists’ 
approach towards black women.166 Massad describes the type of literature circulated by 
the Gay International as a guide to western audiences interested in “liberating” Arab and 
Muslim queers from their oppressing environment.167 The rise of, what Jasbir Puar calls, 
homonationalism (read, homonormative nationalism) in the post-9/11 context speaks to 
this very polarizing history.168 Hence, the failure of the Gay International in recognizing 
and addressing the particularity of Arabs and Muslims projects an articulation of 
homonormative Islamophobia that constitutes a critical factor in popularizing the 
Islamists’ attribution of queerness to the West in general, and the United States in 
particular. 
The bulk of Islamic literature produced in the Arab world considers queerness as 
a sign of moral degeneration and civilizational decline. Guided by references to the 
Quraʾanic story of “People of Lot” (Sodom in the Bible) in which homosexuality is 
interpreted to have been the reason for their doom,169 writers like Abd al-Rahman Wasil 
and Muhamed Jalal Kishik contributed to a stream of sermons and fatwas that prohibit 
same-sex relationships.170 The Islamist postcolonial rescue narrative has utilized this 
                                                 
166 hooks, “Feminism: A movement to end Sexist Oppression,” 56. 
167 Massad, Desiring Arabs, 162. 
168 Puar argues that homonationalism emerged as a response to a hyped emphasis on patriotism in the 
United States, which necessitated an othering process of Arabs and Muslims. Homonationalism spells out 
an American sexual exceptionalism–i.e., queers in America enjoy sexual freedom unavailable to their 
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women from the repressive rule of the Taliban. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 1-113. 
169 Hud, 11:77-83; al-Hijr, 15:51-77; Ashuaraa, 26:160-175; al-Ankabut, 29:28-35. 
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taboo in its critique of U.S. cultural imperialism in the Arab world.171 It is in this context 
that the United States can be understood to have become the land of the queers in Arabs’ 
popular imagination, and a site of spatial and moral formations of Otherness.  
In their criticism of fundamentalism, Egyptian filmmakers like Nader Galal 
manage to link Islamists to fundamentalism while re-deploying the Islamist morality-
based allegories to queerness as American. This is best captured in his film Hallo 
Amreeka (Hello America, 1998) in which Bekhit (Adel Imam) travels to the United States 
and encounters both Islamist forms of fundamentalism and Islamist-defined spatial 
morality of queerness. In the film, Bekhit joins a fundamentalist group, but soon 
experiences disillusionment in their efforts to radicalize him. The cinema’s portrayal of 
fundamentalism is, however, reconciled with allegorical references to the Islamist 
critique of the American culture as queer-land. Bekhit’s excitement to celebrate freedom 
prompts him to unwittingly join a Times Square rally in support of same-sex marriage 
(Figure 6). When realizing the nature of the rally, he withdraws and screams in a tone of 
sarcasm, “Freedom Act Now!” Later on, he is seduced by a blonde cross-dresser in a 
shopping center, but eventually denounces the act in a statement of heterosexual anxiety 
against imagined vulgarity and dominance of queerness in the United States.172 In jail, he 
narrowly escapes homosexual gang rape in a scene that depicts a popular sensational 
imagery of queerness as corruptive of America’s moral standing. Bekhit’s encounters 
with queerness in the United States, therefore, present an example of a popular trend in 
Egyptian cinema that implicates Islamist allegories in its critique of the United States.  
                                                 
171 Massad, Desiring Arabs, chapter 4. 
172 Humor in Egyptian cinema, according to Najat Rahman, though “simply entertaining or escapist,” is 
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Figure 6 Bekhit in a pro-queer rally in Times Square – 
courtesy of Hallo Amreeka 
 
The polarizing reflections on queerness and the spatial allocation of it – though 
primarily advance through the Gay International’s Orientalist tendency to denigrate 
Islam and the Islamists’ conception of western licentiousness – are also emphasized in 
the Arabist postcolonial critique of the West. Naber attributes the spatial morality of 
queerness to a parallel discursive clash between western colonialisms and masculinist 
anticolonial Arab nationalism.173 The resonance of queerness as a popular allegorical 
reference in the Egyptian cinema, though irresponsive to the Arab/Muslim queer 
community, is informed by its correspondence with such Arabist and Islamist moral 
manifestations of the United States.   
Articulations of Arab American Difference 
 
As highlighted above, Egyptian filmmakers develop their critique of America 
through correlating the imperatives of the Egyptian nation-state with resonating Arabist 
and Islamist rhetoric. This strategy is a testimony to the complexity that defines the Arab 
heterogeneous cultural productions in a region where Arabist, Islamist, and state 
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nationalist narratives have nuanced geopolitics, and shaped the revolutionary fervor of 
the Arab Spring as well as the sociopolitical unrest of its aftermath. Regional factors 
further complicate the Arab world and render Arabs of oil-rich countries different from 
those of the Levant or North Africa; each forming constantly shifting alliances and 
responding to changing priorities. The strategy also resolves a serious challenge to this 
work in distilling Arab mainstream articulations of the Arab American image. Towards 
that end, this section investigates such articulations by identifying Egyptian allegories 
that overlap with common postcolonial critical readings of U.S. interventions in the Arab 
world. The readings also emphasize how the Arab American identity is constructed 
through an Arab disillusionment in the American Dream and a commitment to mediating 
the Arab Dream. Therefore, developing dichotomous notions of Egypt and the United 
States through nationalist, gendered, sexualized, and class-based allegories in the films 
surveyed in this section retains a postcolonial value at the core of Arab collective 
imagination of America and Arab Americans. These allegories fall into three main 
categories structured around reiterations of U.S. hegemony, disillusionment in the 
American Dream, and nostalgia for Arab homeland. 
Reiterations of U.S. Hegemony 
 
In the pre-credit sequence of el-Akhar (The Other, 1999), Chahine stages the 
following brief conversation between two Arab American characters, (i.e. an Egyptian 
American Adam and an Algerian American Boujdad), and Edward Said.  
ADAM. You are an American national and your origin is Palestinian. Where do you 
belong? 
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SAID. I hope we stop thinking this way! They [Americans] invented computer, and we 
[Arabs] invented writing. Forget who contributes what! The Pharaohs Civilization, for 
example, is just like Beethoven’s music. They both belong to all humanity. 
 
BOUJDAD. But do Americans think like this? 
 
SAID. I hope one day we all stop saying “I” and “you” and start using “we” instead! 
 
This brief encounter captures a dichotomy that Egyptian filmmakers invoke in their 
depiction of Arab and American as inherently opposed cultural identities.174 In the film, 
Said’s sobering reflections on this sense of polarization, which Lalla el-Alaoui reads as a 
serious attempt to transgress discussions of identity beyond polarization, is dismissed as 
utopic throughout the film, which results in a stark contrast between Arab innocence and 
U.S. aggression.175 Such a contrast emerges as an essential characteristic of a dominant 
pattern in Egyptian cinema that subverts Hollywood’s construction of the Arab image by 
promoting a fixated sense of reference to America and Americans in terms of a 
solidifying critique against the reiterations of U.S. hegemony. 
It is critical to conceptualize this critique through a careful reflection on the 
distinction between valid contestations of U.S. influence in the region and outright re-
productions of anti-American sentiment.176 In his introduction to the four-volume 
collection on anti-Americanism, the Australian Americanist Brendon O’Conner calls for 
a clear definition of the concept, which often conflates healthy criticism of the United 
States with reductive and prejudicial caricature of the U.S. cultures and its people.177 
Scholars have often characterized Arab critiques of the United States, which reverberate 
                                                 
174 For more about this polarity, refer to el-Bendary, The “Ugly American” in the Arab Mind, 2011. 
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grievances against its neo-colonial presentence in the Middle East during the Cold War 
and War on Terror eras, as signs of an anti-American sentiment.178 Ussama Makdisi, for 
instance, draws an evolutionary historical map of the Arab interaction with the United 
States from an early fascination with benevolent America in the first half of the twentieth 
century to a Post-WWII solidifying sense of anti-Americanism.179 Although sensational 
critiques of the United States in Egyptian cinema often mediate echoes of critical 
narratives that appear to be anti-American, it is important to contextualize them as 
postcolonial responses that do not necessarily reflect the complexity of Arab attitudes 
towards the United States. The apparent incongruence of Arabs’ simultaneous criticism 
of the United States and consumption of its cultural products – a love-hate relationship 
that Hammond identifies as schizophrenic – stands as a strong testimony to the 
postcolonial nature of their criticism.180 Qutb’s staunch criticism of the United States, for 
example, is in itself enveloped with a greater sense of admiration for the country’s 
dedication to hard work and material progress. Arabs and Muslims tend to offset their 
critique by registering an inclination to live in the United States, where they believe the 
Islamic core values of peace and justice are cherished. 
Thus, while Egyptian films may seem to espouse a sense of anti-Americanism in 
their portrayals of the United States, contextualized analyses uncover a representation 
trend that merely wrestles with the echoes of U.S. power in the Arab world. For instance, 
a film like Agdaʿ Nas (The Toughest People, 1993), which Armbrust characterizes as 
anti-American, is less interested in propagating an anti-American sentiment and more 
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invested in communicating a nationalist pride in Egyptian resilience in the face of the 
U.S. global power.181 Director Medhat el-Sharif dramatizes this nationalist rhetoric in the 
story of a sport contest between the U.S. and the Egyptian teams as they compete for 
championship title in Full Contact Fighting. The choice of this particular sport enables el-
Sharif to advance a plot with an allegorical appeal to masculinity as a fertile ground to 
develop rhetoric of power and triumph. The three-month old Egyptian team is set to 
battle against the four-year champion U.S. team in a David-Goliath fight, which ends 
with an Egyptian impressive win loaded with references to national perseverance.  
The film’s emphasis on masculinity contributes to an Egyptian cinematic pattern 
that addresses a critique of U.S. power by interpolating a transnational repertoire of 
gendered and sexualized dichotomous tropes.182 The repertoire draws from decolonial 
and postcolonial rhetoric that associates power with masculinity and weakness with 
femininity/effeminacy; the former is ascribed to Arabs while the latter to Westerners.183 
Mohamed Amin’s Laylat Soqūt Baghdad (The Night Baghdad Fell, 2005) stands as the 
most iconic film that utilizes this repertoire to present a sensational critique of the U.S. 
invasion in Iraq (2003). The film features the story of a retired high school principle, 
Shāker (Hassan Hosny), whose anxiety about a prominent U.S. invasion of Egypt 
following Iraq forces him to search for his brightest student, Tariq (Ahmed Eid) and 
convince him to develop a defensive weapon. Shāker offers his financial resources and 
mobilizes his relatives and neighbors in the service of Tariq’s patriotic mission. Facing 
psychological pressures to invent a deterring device proves overwhelming for Tariq, who 
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measures the U.S.-Egypt technology gap in terms of light years. He seeks motivation by 
enveloping his life with nationalist music, and even hangs a picture of a U.S. marine he 
names “John” at the back of his toilet lid. In a moment of collapse, he smokes marijuana 
to escape the anxiety but soon delves into hallucination that projects John getting ready to 
rape him. This image features a representation strategy that reverses the cinema’s 
gendered and sexualized associations in a statement of critique against the weakening 
status of Arab nations that renders them available for U.S. penetration. In a passionate 
address to his neighbors, Shāker invokes this critique by informing his audience that their 
weakened defense state prepares them to confront the U.S. invasion with a plea, “Please, 
Don’t F**k me!” 
Tariq’s sexual vulnerability coincides with rising frustration in his ability to 
pronounce his heterosexuality, i.e., he fails to perform sexual intercourse with his wife. 
As the trauma takes its toll on his masculinity, he fantasizes about an erotically dancing 
U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who rekindles his sexual appetite. Realizing 
the opportunity, he asks his wife to wear U.S. military clothing that eventually enables 
him to come to terms with his sexuality (Figure 7). The formula seems to work with 
others when the neighborhood women use the U.S. military clothing to lure their inactive 
husbands to bed. Attributing such clothing to the men’s ability to regain normalcy in their 
sexual life represents a reconciliatory moment in which the resuscitation of Arab 
heterosexuality is contingent on their ability to reclaim a masculinity held hostage by the 
threats of U.S. hard power. Shāker’s very dedication to defending his homeland is 
sustained by recurring nightmares of losing both his masculinity and manhood in the 
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infamous Abu Ghraib prison, where images of U.S. torture include accounts of sexual 
assault.184 
 
Figure 7 Tariq’s masculinity is restored with help from his 
dressed-in-American-military costume wife – courtesy of Laylat 
Soqūt Baghdad 
 
Egyptian directors have mainstreamed portrayals of this notorious prison as a 
critical site for their gendered and sexualized readings of U.S. power. In Sherif 
Mandour’s Maʿalish Ihna Benetbahdel (No Problem, We're Getting Screwed, 2005) and 
Adel Adeeb’s Laylat el-Baby Doll (The Baby Doll Night, 2008), the prison becomes a 
site of imperial coercion signifying a contradictory statement to the Bush administration’s 
democracy and freedom rhetoric.185 The cameras re-enact glimpses of the U.S.-endorsed 
processes of rounding up suspects in the name of Iraq’s national security without offering 
them the right to court justice, and subjecting them to the CIA torture manuals, 
euphemistically known as “enhanced interrogation techniques.” The extent of humiliation 
the prisoners endure at the hand of U.S. soldiers include inflicting physical and mental 
pain, and exposing them to such distressing situations as sexual harassment, forced 
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most illustrative site of U.S. imperial history, see, Kaplan, “Where is Guantanamo?,” 2005. 
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nudity, and disgracing the Holy Qur’an.186 In Maʿalish Ihna Benetbahdel, el-Qarmouti 
(Ahmed Adam) experiences a masculinity crisis as a U.S. female soldier threatens to rape 
him to solicit confessions for his suspected terrorist activities. In Laylat el-Baby Doll, 
Awadain (Nour el-Sherif), a journalist embodying an Arab/Muslim rejection of the U.S. 
occupation, is forced to pose for pictures taken by U.S. soldiers along with other 
prisoners in an orgy of nudity in addition to being intimidated by dogs and sustaining 
inhumane positions for long hours. A female soldier removes his genitalia in a symbolic 
reference to the U.S. emasculating power of Arab masculinity.  
The cinema’s engagement with the Arab American image draws from such 
allegorical appeal of its gendered and sexualized readings of the U.S. hegemony. In el-
Akhar, the Arab American Adam is torn in his love to his American mother, Margaret 
(Nabila Ebeid), and to his Egyptian wife, Hanan (Hanan Tork). In the film, Margaret and 
Hanan emerge as gendered allegories of the United States and Egypt respectively. They 
present American and Arab identities in stark contrast; further bewildering Adam who 
already wrestles with the question of belonging, signaled in his conversation with Said at 
the beginning of the film. On the one hand, Margaret is a self-centered mother who 
vehemently rejects a matrimonial relationship between Adam and Hanan. Believing in 
her ability to get her son back, she attempts to abort the relationship and does not hesitate 
to strike a deal with Hanan’s brother – a now radical Sheikh Fathallah (Ahmed Wafeeq). 
Fathallah kidnaps Hanan and forces her to get divorced from Adam in return for a visa 
that grants him admission into the United States. The plan backfires, claiming the very 
lives of Hanan and Adam. On the other hand, Hanan is innocent, simple, and welcoming. 
                                                 
186 Bayoumi, “Disco Inferno,” 2005. 
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Unlike Margaret’s U.S.-symbolic destructive love, Hanan’s Egypt-symbolic love is 
unconditional. Her low-income background allows the audience to identify with her as an 
appropriate representation of Egypt, particularly when contrasted with Margaret’s wealth, 
associated with the Egyptian elites – often perceived to be America’s puppets in the 
country. She rejects her brother’s extremist inclinations as deviant and urges Adam to 
develop a critical attitude against corruption practiced by his parents’ shaky business 
transactions. Khatib illustrates the gendered formations of the two identities:  
The Other represents the imperialist United States as a devouring mother. A wealthy 
American businesswoman indulging in a world of fraud, Margret serves as a classical 
villain: her unholy alliance with Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, and her selfishness, 
immorality… detach us from any identification with her character, and highlight her 
contrast with Egyptian purity and simplicity as seen in the character of Hanan, Margret’s 
Egyptian daughter-in-law.187 
Adam’s disillusionment in his mother’s love contributes to his growing de-
attachment from his American background. In the process, he expresses a sense of 
hesitation through an emotional exchange with Hanan whose journalistic curiosity leads 
her to uncover details that condemn his parents’ fake nonprofit scheme. Hanan’s 
yearnings to expose Adam’s parents represents her search for Egyptian independence 
from foreign influences. Her rejection of Adam’s attempts to silence her voice prompts 
him to slap her. As a response, she decides to cover her body from top to toe in a black 
address, and in a very sarcastic tone, suggests that silencing her is equivalent to reducing 
her to a submissive commodity. As a token representative of Adam’s entrenched belief in 
U.S. entitlement to penetrate the Other’s body, he decides to rape her in hopes to re-assert 
his masculinity. As his attachment to the Egyptian culture grows, he learns to develop a 
                                                 
187 Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East, 86. 
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critical attitude against the masculinist reiterations of U.S. hegemony. Later on, when 
Margaret denigrates Hanan’s Egyptian background as one weakened for thousands of 
years by the Hyksos, the Romans, the English, and the French, Adam registers his 
critique by adding, “And now the Americans!”  
The Sudanese filmmaker Saeed Hamed projects a similar interest in addressing 
the Arab American image through gender and sexuality in his popular Egyptian-made 
film Siʿdi fi el-Gameʿa el-Amreekyya (An Upper Egyptian in the American University, 
1998). The film narrates the story of an Egyptian local farmer, Khalaf (Mohamed 
Henedi), who manages to secure admission to study at the American University in Cairo 
– presented as a powerful academic institution seeking to re-create a mini-model of 
America at the heart of Egypt. Khalaf experiences a series of personal and political 
confrontations and emerges more disillusioned in what America stands for. Central to 
these confrontations is the figure of Sirag (Hany Ramzy), an Egyptian-born American-
citizen working as an assistant professor in political science.  
Sirag is initially presented as a model of Arab American intellectuals who have 
embraced the American spirit of democracy and freedom. He instructs his class that there 
exists no difference between students and instructor, and that democracy is an ideal to be 
celebrated and embraced. Preaching such ideals is soon to be interrupted by Sirag’s one-
dimensional reading of democracy and freedom as he proves intolerant of an 
Arab/Islamic critical perspective of U.S. foreign policy – presented through a student 
named Ahmed (Fathy Abd el-Wahab). Protesting Sirag’s comment that students should 
forget anything they have learned outside the classroom, Ahmed responds, “This is anti-
democracy! This means your opinion is the only right opinion, the university’s opinion, 
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or America’s opinion.” Ahmed furthers his criticism of the contradictory nature of 
American democracy by distributing pictures of civilian victims of the economic 
sanctions laid against Iraq in the post-1990 gulf war. Sirag threatens him with failure in 
the course for the third time and decides to report him to the university’s administration.   
The contradiction in Sirag’s call for freedom and his conception of such an ideal 
is allegorical of an Arab reading of America’s freedom as a code for the U.S. need to 
“invest the world over,” to put it in Khalidi’s words.188 This particular profit-driven 
understanding of freedom cannot be advanced without necessarily silencing such local 
critical voices as Ahmed’s. The critique of America’s contradiction in preaching 
democracy and freedom is particularly highlighted in Ahmed’s leading role in 
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. In an 
organized student sit-in at the university, he distributes and delivers a strong statement of 
protest against Israeli aggressions while blaming America for its double-standard 
approach. “America stands behind all this and protects it,” he declares, “while leaving us, 
Arabs, to its fatal weaponry, and ignores Israel’s behavior and its discriminatory 
practices.” He reflects on the relationship between students and the American university’s 
administration in a symbolic reading of Arabs’ rights to react and resist America’s 
restricting foreign policy:    
Will our study here force us to forget our Arab identity and belonging? We are here on an 
Egyptian land and nobody can restrict our freedom and sweep away our will. If the 
university’s administration prevents us from demonstrating against oppression and terror, 
thinking that we are dead, then let it be known that we are still alive and that we will resist. 
If justice norms are dead, we retain our right in hope and resistance! 
                                                 
188 Khalidi, Sowing Crisis, 164. 
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During the sit-in, Sirag sides with the university’s administration and forsakes issues of 
concern to his Arab people. Throughout the film, his allegiance to his Arab heritage is 
questioned. “If one day,” Ahmed asks him, “you were to hold a distinct position at the 
United Nations or the International Monetary Fund, which country will you be loyal to? 
Egypt or America?”  
Projecting Sirag’s conscious decision to alienate himself from his roots and 
embrace the U.S. hegemony in the Middle East enhances with gendered and sexualized 
depictions that render him effeminate. His masculinity is challenged throughout the film 
by Khalaf, the upper Egyptian student who seeks to attract Sirag’s girlfriend, Abla 
(Ghada Adel). Sirag’s failure to express his manhood is symbolized in his loss of a 
swimming challenge against Khalaf. In a staged contest, Khalaf’s friends sneak behind 
Sirag and easily intimidate him to remove his underwear, leaving him to battle a sense of 
embarrassment that scars his masculinity. To further stress the gendered nature of his 
weakness, Khalaf and his buddies celebrate their symbolic triumph by addressing him in 
the feminine name “Susu” as they reproach him for being Americanized. “If you stepped 
on your origin,” they sing, “what would be left for you, Susu?” Sirag’s masculinity is also 
challenged by his students whose protest against the U.S. support of Israeli aggressions is 
rendered as heroic and masculine. Perhaps, the ultimate measure of Sirag’s effeminacy is 
Abla’s decision to break up with him towards the end of the film. He is eventually forced 
to resign and return to the Unites States in a symbolic reference to a popular rejection of 
Arab Americans who choose to dissociate themselves from the Arab mainstream 
grievances of U.S. neo-colonial echoes in the region.   
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Thus, the Egyptian cinema circulates a representation pattern that invokes gender 
and sexuality along a dichotomous imagery of the United States and Egypt in light of its 
postcolonial critique of U.S. hard power. This pattern promotes a fractured portrayal of 
Arab Americans as either pro-American or pro-Arab. Both Sirag and Adam are subjected 
to gendered and sexualized articulations of difference inherently defined through spatial 
references to the United States and Egypt. While the former is rejected as a cloned 
embodiment of U.S. exercise of power and dominance, the latter is eventually celebrated 
as a martyr defending the ever-resilient Arab homeland. In the two cases, the issue of 
geopolitical allegiance emerges as a defining factor in shaping the audience 
understanding of what constitutes an Arab diasporic image. 
Disillusionment in the American Dream 
 
For contemporary Americans, the American Dream bears connotations of social 
mobility, homeownership, religio-political liberty, and individual fulfilment. Although 
scholars like Jim Cullen, Calvin Jillson, and Lawrence Samuel embed the concept in the 
earliest stages of U.S. nation-state formation, Cyril Ghosh argues that it is a twentieth 
century secularized iteration of the relationship between “work, virtue, and happiness” 
advanced by the early puritans in their search to establish a sense of exceptionalism to 
their colonies.189 The deterioration of economy during the Great Depression and the 
sudden boom of growth and consumption in the Post-World War II era foregrounded a 
reading of the American Dream through the racialized lenses of material prosperity.190 In 
a controversial account of his travel to the United States (1948-1950), Qutb interpolates 
                                                 
189 Cullen, The American Dream, 2003; Jillson, Pursuing the American Dream, 2004; Samuel, The 
American Dream, 2012; Ghosh, The Politics of the American Dream, 7. 
190 Adams, The Epic of America, 1935; Krickus, Pursuing the American Dream, 1976. 
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an Islamist sensational outcry against the materialistic articulations of the American 
Dream: 
America, the New World, is that vast, far-flung world that occupies in the mind’s eye more 
space than it really does on this earth. Imaginations and dreams glimmer on this world with 
illusion and wonder. The hearts of men fall upon it from every valley, men from every race 
and color, every walk of life, and every sect and creed… This great America: What is its 
worth in the scale of human values? And what does it add to the moral account of 
humanity? And, by the journey’s end, what will its contribution be? I fear that a balance 
may not exist between America’s material greatness and the quality of its people. And I 
fear that wheel of life will have turned and the book of time will have closed and America 
will have added nothing, or next to nothing, to the account of morals that distinguishes man 
from object, and indeed, mankind from animals.191 
Qutb’s rejection of materialism as a measuring ground of civilizational triumph draws 
from an ultraconservative morality-based critique of the American culture as a generating 
site of Jahili (pre-Islamic) vulgarity and degeneration. As early as 1954, Egyptian 
director Lotfy Nour el-Din projected an alternative Arabist and state nationalist 
disillusionment in the American Dream in Amricany fi Tanta (An American in Tanta) 
through the return-to-home story of an Egyptian American Mahrous (Soliman Bey Nag) 
and his family. Having failed to realize the American Dream for his family, Mahrous 
plots a scheme against a poor civil servant, Ibrahim Afendi (Hussein Riad), and gains 
access to his savings in return for a fake employment promise. As the plot progresses, 
Ibrahim learns about the scheme and confronts Mahrous, who eventually pledges to work 
along with his family in order to pay back their debts. In the film, the scheme’s 
illusionary promise is symbolic of the unfulfilling value of the American Dream for 
                                                 
191 Qutb, “The America I have seen,” 9-10. For a parallel critique of U.S. materialism, see Baudrillard, 
America, 1986. 
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Egyptian migrants. It is in Egypt, after all, where Mahrous and his family manage to 
secure the unrealized aspirations of their dream.  
The criticism advanced by both Qutb and Nour el-Din represent early attempts to 
circumvent the expansion of a conceived U.S. cultural imperial project, which later 
consolidated through the interchangeable processes of globalization and 
Americanization.192 Dutch scholar Jaap Kooijman locates this interchangeability through 
the global circulation of U.S. popular culture.193 Richard Pells and Andrew Lainsbury, for 
instance, showcase how the European fascination with Disney brand constitutes a global 
cultural iteration of the American Dream.194 Arabs’ consumption of U.S. popular culture, 
I argue, functions as another medium to a fanaticized search to realizing the global 
promises of the American Dream. Hollywood films are widely accessible to Arab 
audiences in movie theaters, television channels, online streaming websites, and video 
rentals. The U.S. television dominates the Arab small screen with satellite channels airing 
sitcoms, primetime news, and music.195 Programs like Fakir Willa la (Don’t Forget the 
Lyrics), Man sa Yarbaḥ al-Malyūn? (Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?), al-Safqa (Deal or 
no Deal), al-Mwājaha (1 vs. 100), Surfifer (Survivor), Iks factor (X Factor), and al-
Maḥak (Jeopardy) usher a rising generation of Arab youth deeply invested in consuming 
American culture.196 Egyptian cinema itself perpetuates Hollywood-style marketing 
strategies with images inviting the audiences to mall shopping through its films.  
                                                 
192 Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, 1994; Winant, The World is a Ghetto, 2001;  Abaza, 
“Egyptianizing the American Dream,” 2006. 
193 Kooijman, Fabricating the Absolute Fake, chapter I; also, Abaza, “Shopping Malls, Consumer Culture,” 
2001, Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World, 2006;  
194 Pells, “The Europeanization of America,” 1997; Lainsbury, Once Upon an American Dream, 2000. 
195 Hammond, What the Arabs think of America, 35. 
196 Ayish, “Television Reality Shows in the Arab World,” 2011.  
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Consuming the American Dream and embracing globalization serve as two fronts 
of western liberalism.197 In The Liberal Virus, the Egyptian Marxian economist, Samir 
Amin, extends his reading of the inherent classist flaw in the American rhetoric of 
individual liberty into a critical interpretation of globalized liberalism further intensifying 
inequality between peoples and within South-North populations. The de-development of 
the Arab world in the past three decades, most evidently illustrated through civil wars in 
Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria, stands as a testimony 
for “capitalist decadence, made manifest by the acute degrees of misery in security-
exposed peripheral countries,” so argues Ali Kadri.198 The rising gap in income inequality 
and soaring unemployment rates have instituted a ground for socio-political unrest in a 
relatively stable country like Egypt, where the emergence of “mass society” in the post-
1952 revolution, as Galal Amin contends, was once declared as a triumphant class 
empowering moment of Americanization.199  
It is in this context that Egyptian filmmakers have projected a polarizing class-
based critique of the global iteration of the American Dream, particularly since the 
1990s.200 Khairy Behsara’s Amrica Shika Bika (America Abracadabra, 1993) illustrates 
this critique through the story of eight Egyptians seeking migration to the United States. 
Afflicted by the country’s privatization frenzy and the government’s redefinition of its 
social programs, the migrants suffer deteriorating economic conditions that dissolve their 
                                                 
197 Polet, Globalizing Resistance, 2004. 
198 The de-development of the Arab world is marked by the “depreciation of capital stock,” “plummeting of 
median incomes,” “soaring of unemployment,” and “restricting already constrained civil rights;” Kadri, 
Arab Development Denied, 3. 
199 Verme, Milanovic, et al, Inside Inequality in the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014; Noland and Pack, The 
Arab Economies in a Changing World, 2007; Amin, Whatever Else Happened to the Egyptians?, 2004. 
200 For more discussion on the centrality of class in Egyptian cinema, see Shafik, Popular Egyptian 
Cinema, chapter 5 and 6. 
Mahdi 104 
 
 
middle class status.201 Their professions (that is, a mechanic, a physician, a tailor, a 
banker, a dancer, a bodybuilder, and a farmer) – once respected and supported by 
Nasser’s developmentalist regime during the 1960s – are now set to the margins as the 
chasm between elites and working class grows wider. They are promised to receive 
American visas in Romania by a Mr. Gaber (Samy el-Adl), who convinces them of his 
connections to an American embassy employee there. In their utmost belief in the 
American Dream, they sell their relatives’ jewelry, borrow money from friends, and take 
conditional loans to cover visa charges and travel expenses.  
 
Figure 8 American products thrown away in a 
symbolic rejection of the American Dream – 
courtesy of Amrica Shika Bika 
In Romania, they consume such products as Marlboro, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and 
Jeans as a ritual in their journey to realize their American Dream, but eventually learn 
that they have been duped. Upon their return to Egypt, they get hold of Gaber, and throw 
away his belongings, mostly American products. The camera is careful in capturing the 
throwing process to symbolize a moment of realization that the American Dream is but a 
mere tool to mass-mediated U.S. products at the cost of local economies and lived 
                                                 
201 Beinin argues that privatization allowed the rise of a new business class closely related to Egyptian 
ruling elites; Beinin, “Neoliberal Structural Adjustment,” 2009. 
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realities (Figure 8). The film concludes with a sober tone of pride in one’s home as the 
place where they can attain their dreams. 
Director Muneer Radhy shares a similar critique of the vanity in searching for the 
global promises of the American Dream, which is presented as a “mirage,” to put it in the 
Egyptian film critic Khalid el-Sargany’s diction.202 In Ziyarat el-Sayed el-Rayees (Visit 
of the President, 1994), people learn of a planned visit for the American president to their 
remote Egyptian village.203 Prior to the visit, the villagers receive U.S. food aid, which 
prompts them to dedicate their resources to create a welcoming environment for their 
guest. They decorate their streets with U.S. flags, their stores with English signs, their 
bodies with U.S. T-shirts and Jeans, and their life with plans to uproot their impoverished 
conditions. They even designate a full day to rehearse speeches, songs, and slogans to be 
used in their welcome procession. The community’s routine life is suspended in an 
anticipation of the chance to live the globally mediated American Dream. To their 
dismay, the train carrying their ticket to dreamland does not stop. It passes and crashes 
their hopes and aspirations. A few seconds later, their jubilation abruptly ends leading to 
a moment of disillusionment in the material lures of the American Dream, thereby, 
unyielding a powerful critique of the unfulfilled promises of neoliberalism. 
Another articulation of the American Dream critique in Egyptian cinema draws 
from a common anxiety to harnessing the Arab northward migration flow.204 At the core 
of this anxiety does emerge a concern about the brain drain flow, i.e., draining talent-
                                                 
202 El-Sargany, “From Alexandria to New York.” 55. 
203 The film recounts President Richard Nixon’s visit to Egypt in 1974. 
204 International Organization for Migration, Arab Migration in a Globalized World, 2004. 
Mahdi 106 
 
 
exporting Arab countries of their professional resources.205 The annual migration of 
scientists, doctors, and engineers from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Algeria is estimated around 100,000.206According to the Arab League’s 
Department of Population and Migration Studies, the permanent loss of skilled labor 
comes at an additional cost of $1.57 billion annually.207 Statistics show that 50 percent of 
Arab students and 70 percent of scientists traveling for study and research do not go back 
to their homelands.208 The rhetoric of the American Dream has served as a migration pull 
factor in circulating a promise of rewarding growth for Arab scientists and professionals, 
ever more increasingly since the 1960s.209 Parallel to the temporary flow of Egyptian 
professional force in the Arab world has risen a more challenging permanent flow into 
western countries of which the United States stands as the most welcoming.210 Of the 
countries hosting the Egyptian academic staff on scholarship or study leave by 1976, the 
United States had attracted 52.74 percent of the non-returnees.211 The trend continued 
during Mubarak’s pro-U.S. regime. 
Similar to Amrica Shika Bika, Dawoud Abdel Sayed’s Ardh el-Ahlam (The Land 
of Dreams, 1993) foregrounds this anxiety through portraying the middle class Egyptian 
search to leave their homeland in hopes to fulfill their American Dream. The film tells the 
story of the middle class mother Nargis (Fatin Hamama) as she plans to join her son, who 
                                                 
205 The “brain drain” concept was initially coined in a report describing the flow of British scientists and 
professionals to the United States and Canada during 1950s and 1960s; Balmer, Godwin, and Gregory, 
“The Royal Society and the ‘Brain Drain,’” 339-353. 
206 Al-Mansoory and Al-Daikh, “Hijrat al-Uqool al-Arabiyya.” 
207 Staff “Arab Countries lose US$1.57 billion annually from brain drain,” Mena Report, September 6, 
2009. 
208 Ibid. 
209 The study investigates the Arab flow to the United States in the period 1965-1973; Askari and 
Cummings, “The Middle East and the United States,” 1977). 
210 To learn about the Egyptian labor flow in the Arab world, see Ṣāliḥ. Hijrat al-kafāʼāt al-ʻilmīyah min 
Miṣr, 1990. 
211 Ayubi, “The Egyptian ‘Brain Drain,’” 1983. 
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works in the United States as an engineer. Throughout the film, she is forced to negotiate 
between the appeals of realizing the American Dream for her other two Egypt-based 
career-established children, a physician and a TV host, and her fears of disrupting her 
social life. Abdel Sayed emphasizes the public fascination with immigration to the United 
States as a precondition for success through capturing the mounting pressure that Nargis 
endures from her family, friends, acquaintances, and random people. To further illustrate 
the disruptive nature of the American Dream on Egypt, he inserts the character of an 
Egyptian American professor and depicts him as a lost resource to his country of origin. 
The film concludes with Nargis and her children coming to terms with their aspirations 
and opting to draw means of happiness in their home. 
While entertaining the Arab American image in their critique of the American 
Dream, Egyptian filmmakers advance a consideration of Qutb’s criticism of, as John 
Calvert puts it, America’s “damaging effects of materialism and individualism.”212 The 
imagery proposed in this context is that of Egyptian Americans as either selfish and 
money-oriented or selfless and community-oriented. This polarizing imagery builds on an 
important site of Egyptian collective identity, i.e., awlad el-balad (sons of the country), 
which calls into question one’s social conduct of hospitality, generosity, solidarity, 
chivalry, and national pride. Sawsan el-Messiri historicizes this site at the intersection of 
Egyptian indigeneity – as opposed to Khawagāt (western foreigners) – and lower 
socioeconomic class – as opposed to effendis (bureaucrats).213 Egyptian filmmakers 
externalize this intersection through a dichotomous nationalist and class-based imagery of 
                                                 
212 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, 153.  
213 El-Messiri, Ibn al-Balad, introduction; Goldschmidt, Johnson, and Salmoni, Re-Envisioning Egypt, 124-
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Egyptians and Egyptian Americans as either dollar worshipping Khawagāt and effendis 
or non-material, value conscious, and working-class friendly awlad balad.  
This representation strategy is illustrated in films like Hallo Amreeka in which the 
Egyptian Bekhit encounters a sense of disconnection from the awlad el-balad code in the 
life of his Egyptian American cousin, Nawfal (Osama Abbas), who turns out to have 
compromised the Egyptian codes of chivalry and generosity during his long stay in New 
York. Nawfal’s well-to-do family of four living in a spacious house and enjoying New 
York’s material blessings is spatially contrasted with Bekhit’s Egyptian over-crowded 
and impoverished neighborhood. This contrast underscores a collective sense of 
traditional Arab values and practices unaffected by the infiltrating appeal of western 
materialism.  “Lower-class Egyptian solidarity,” Shafik contends, “and affluent bourgeois 
Westernization and alienation are shown as opposite extremes.214  
The film starts with Bekhit receiving a phone call from Nawfal, who has lived in 
the United States for twenty years and disconnected communication with his Egyptian 
relatives for years. The contact is not initiated as a response to any sense of nostalgia that 
Nawfal experiences; it is rather dictated by a material purpose. He requests Bekhit to help 
him sell a piece of land in Egypt, another sign of his intent to disconnect from his 
Egyptian roots. Bekhit refuses to accept any commission as he cites the awlad el-balad 
code that demands relatives to help each other for no monetary returns. When he turns 
down a check of $3,421.12, one percent of the estate value, Nawfal’s American wife 
Jackie (Enas Mekky) – presented as the source of Nawfal’s material corruption – thinks 
Bekhit wants more and asks Nawfal to offer him two percent instead. Bekhit insists on 
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refusing the amount and reminds Nawfal of the awlad al-balad code by reproaching him, 
“Shame on you, Nawfal! I would not take a penny for my help. Has America changed 
you, man?” Nawfal is appreciative of Bekhit’s attitude, but soon demonstrates his lack of 
commitment to the code when Bekhit requests to borrow money to help him settle down 
as a new immigrant. Jackie responds negatively, “No, hell no! No way to give him 
anything!” Nawfal does not take much time in deciding to suspend the code, side with his 
wife, and offer Bekhit and Adila $200 a week in return for performing housework duties 
that include cooking, cleaning, caring for the dog, car washing, and gardening.  
The film presents Nawfal as an example of Arab Americans who choose to reject 
the collective spirit and moral codes of their Arab background in return for America’s 
illusionary promise of material success. Nawfal forsakes any sense of allegiance to his 
Arab ideals and is juxtaposed alongside his wife as dollar-worshippers. Perhaps, this is 
clearly showcased in the aftermath of an incident when Bekhit is almost hit in a car 
accident. Although Bekhit is not hurt, Nawfal convinces him to file a hit-and-run accident 
report in which case the American judicial system would grant him millions of dollars in 
compensation. Nawfal’s enthusiasm to proceed in the fraud report is contingent on 
receiving twenty-five percent of the compensation amount. Immediately, Nawfal and 
Jackie become friendly and hospitable to Bekhit and his wife. The system fails to 
recognize the car involved in the accident, and soon afterwards, Nawfal and Jackie 
become aggressive and kick their guests out of their house. When the car driver is 
eventually recognized to be the daughter of a Democratic presidential candidate, Nawfal 
and Jackie move heaven and earth to find the dislocated couple in order to access the 
millions of dollars that might be reached in a settlement.  Throughout the film, Nawfal 
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fails to come to terms with his Egyptian non-material values and constantly aligns 
himself with the U.S.-manufactured materialist-consumerist tendencies.  
Opposite to the negative image that Nawfal represents of Arab Americans as 
victims of the American Dream, his son Sam (Ayman Mohammed) emerges as a hope to 
reconnect the family with their Arab and Islamic heritage. He demonstrates eagerness to 
do so by deciding to learn the Arabic language and accompany Bekhit to the mosque for 
Friday prayers. He learns such Arabic words as shahāmah (chivalry) and nakhwa 
(generosity), and chooses to demonstrate them in his life. When Bekhit gets sick, Sam – 
unlike his father who refuses to pay Bekhit his weekly allowance because he is not fit to 
work – is comforting and promises to work in his (Bekhit’s) place to guarantee his 
income flow on the condition that his father does not learn of such actions. Sam seems to 
be supportive of Bekhit’s criticism of Nawfal’s inactive response to his daughter’s 
premarital sex with her boyfriend. He even questions the incongruity of Bekhit’s 
perceptions of and actions in the United States. If you think America is a devil, Sam asks, 
“then, why did you come to America?” Unable to respond, Bekhit smiles and says, 
“You’re the only in this family who still has some Egyptian left in him!’ Honesty 
validates Sam’s sense of belonging to his Arab cultural background. While his father is 
drawn to America’s material gains at the cost of given up his Arab codes of honor, Sam is 
drawn to the promise of morally defined relationships embraced by his visiting Arab 
relatives and ancestors. 
A similar father-son polarizing portrait of Arab Americans as either dollar 
worshippers or community-conscious individuals is advanced in el-Akhar. The director 
chooses the characters to collide in Egypt rather than the United States in an attempt to 
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register a statement against the disruptive nature of American-style globalization on the 
Arab world. The film aligns the disparity between the wealthy and the dissolving middle 
class in Egypt alongside allegorical references to khawagāt versus awalad el-balad. Its 
depiction of the Egyptian American father Khalil (Mahmoud Hemida) and son Adam 
(Hani Salama) invokes a contentious class-based alliance with the elites and the working 
class respectively. Khalil arrives in Egypt with a group of businesspersons in hopes to 
carry out a proposed inter-faith project at Mount Sinai.215 His foreignness to the Egyptian 
culture is communicated through his inability to recognize the needs of its lower class 
citizens. At his resort, he lays off half of his employees for business restructuring 
purposes. When approached with a request to re-consider hiring an architect-turned-
waiter, he vehemently rejects, “I am a businessman, not a philanthropist!”  
Chahine develops Khalil’s character to register a critique against the failure of 
America’s blessed globalization in responding to local public needs. His critique is 
informed by a consciousness of the one-way direction of globalization, which invests the 
Arab world in the name of “open market” yet denies Arabs the right to “penetrate 
America,” as he puts it.216 He also foregrounds materialism and morality in defining 
nationalist constructions of what would render an Arab American image to become more 
American or less Arab. Khalil’s Egyptian American status is reduced to a mere site of 
enunciating an identity informed by search for wealth at the cost of his Egyptian 
community. His proposed inter-faith project eventually turns out to be a fake scheme to 
generate half a billion dollars from national, regional, and international funders. He sells 
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the public land allocated to the project and slams the aspirations of the hired architects. 
The project’s inter-faith promise gives way to profit that constitutes grounds for the 
illusionary potential of the globalized American Dream, often exemplified by 
Americanized individuals like Khalil. 
Unlike his father, Adam undergoes a process of disillusionment with American 
materialism. He is a UCLA doctoral student and is in Egypt for dissertation fieldwork on 
terrorism. Adam falls in love with an Egyptian girl and the awalad el-balad code of her 
lower class. He rejects his family’s upper class status as an iteration of the illusionary 
American Dream, and opts to live with the working class community in an attempt to 
identify with his Egyptian roots. He expresses his plans to denounce the American Dream 
while dancing with the daughter of the American ambassador in Egypt and ignoring her 
as a potential life partner. The ambassador’s daughter rejects him as well; in a symbolic 
reference to the impossibility of reconciliation between Americans and Arabs. His 
disconnection from American culture leads him to embrace an affinity with Egypt. 
Perhaps his ultimate dedication to his newly identified homeland is captured when 
rushing to donate his blood to victims of a terrorist attack; an act that infuriates his 
American mother. “My father is Egyptian and I am Egyptian,” he responds. She attempts 
to instill suspicion in him by informing him that his father may be an American person 
named Max.  This does not shake the newly transformed Adam as he maintains, “I chose 
to be Egyptian. I will live and die in this Egyptian land!” 
The articulations of difference in Hallo Amreeka and el-Akhar polarize the image 
of Arab Americans around the issue of respecting the awlad al-balad code of honor. The 
films extend an important class-based theme in Egyptian cinema to examine certain Arab 
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nationalist and Islamist narratives that espouse inherent civilizational difference between 
Arabs and Americans. Therefore, drawing an image of Arab Americans as either 
American dollar worshippers or Arab community contributors corresponds with a 
mainstream cultural tendency to ascribe positive and negative values alongside fixed and 
rigid spatial identity formations. Using parents and children in this polarity suggests hope 
in the new generation to reclaim their postcolonial struggle that the older generation has 
long compromised.  
Nostalgia for Arab Homeland 
 
The third critical articulation of difference shaping the imagination of Arab 
Americans in Egyptian cinema is subsumed under el-Ghorba, or the sensation of 
(alienation). Mohammad Abdul-Wali’s Ya Mouton Ghurabaʾa (They Die Strangers) is a 
canonical literary work that entertains the concept mostly as a conflation of a spatial 
departure of one’s homeland and a spatial-temporal nostalgic tendency to re-connect with 
it. To experience el-Ghorba presupposes one to endure a sense of alienation that 
materializes when living in mahjar (diaspora). The root Arabic word for mahjar is 
hajara, which roughly translates to “leaving the familiar.” As a space, mahjar in Arab 
scholarship is broad in scope and includes all kinds of voluntary and involuntary 
migrating processes. With the rising sense of Arab nationalism, the term mahjar has 
gained a political meaning that prescribes it as a space where Arabs exist, usually in a 
non-Arab country. Arabs living in Europe, America, and Australia are said to live in 
mahjar. For Arabs who rather celebrate their particular national heritage (e.g., Egyptians, 
Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis, Yemenis, etc.), mahjar refers to any place in which they live 
away from their country of origin, including other Arab countries. For instance, Yemenis 
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living in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, or India are said to live in mahjar. 
While the term mahjar varies in usage among the migrating Arab communities, Arab 
states circulate the term in an attempt to keep ties with their nationals living in diaspora. 
This is usually administered through government measures to facilitate remittances, 
investments, visits, property purchasing, construction, etc. Embassies are often assigned 
the role of the state in deepening one’s affiliation with their country of origin. In Arab 
popular culture, the term mahjar mostly circulate in relation to questions of identity and 
belonging with a strong emphasis on nostalgia for one’s native land. The Arab music 
industry is perhaps the most outstanding popular culture medium that captures this 
rhetoric, and offers a variety of emotional struggles with migration as a factor severing 
one’s connections with family and home.217  
Egyptian cinema utilizes this rhetoric through espousing both a sense of 
estrangement from newly settled destinations and a sense of longing to one’s roots. In 
Amrica Shika Bika, director Behsara relies on the rhetoric of el-Ghorba sensation to 
accelerate the migrating group’s growing disillusionment in their search for the American 
Dream in Romania. This is made possible by the sudden death of their eldest, which 
triggers a deep sense of anxiety about the meaning of their lives in such an unfair global 
system. Upon burying the deceased migrant in a foreign land away from his wife and 
children, the group’s leader, el-Mansi (Mohamed Fouad), remarks in a tone of grief: 
                                                 
217 Examples include Fares Karam’s el-Ghorba, Hussein el-Jismi’s Ana Ṣabir (I am Patient), Haitham 
Youssef’s and Majed Kaka’s Mellina el-Ghorba (Sick of Ghorba),  Hussam al-Rassam’s el-Ghorba, 
Sandra’s Beblad el-Ghorba (In Ghorba Land), Majed al-Muhandis’s Ana Mushtag (Longing), Hussam al-
Labbad’s el-Ghorba, Nancy Agram’s Safer (Travel), Akeel Mussa’s Ghorba, Adnan al-Jiburi’s Wili Yuma 
bil Ghorba (Oh, Mom!), Hatem al-Iraqi’s Mawaal el-Ghorba, Kathim el-Sahir’s Mawaal el-Ghorba, Ali 
bin Mohammed’s ya tair ya shadi (Singing Bird), and Ridha al-Abdullah’s Bu’dak habibi (Goodbye Love). 
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Why is all this? Just to eat? We are already dying here [in Romania] out of hunger, cold, 
and poverty. What is his fault to be buried lonely under a strange sky and in a strange land? 
He tried and traveled, just to feel comfort for one day, half a day! What kind of comfort is 
he getting! His back was overwhelmed with poverty, and when he wanted to do something 
about it, he died forgotten; just like you and me! 
The leading character’s name el-Mansi, which roughly translates as the forgotten, applies 
to the already buried migrant whose very life has been consumed and claimed in mahjar.  
In Ardh el-Ahlam, director Abdel Sayed capitalizes on el-Ghorba sensation in 
disrupting Nargis’ travel plans to realize the American Dream for her children. 
Throughout the film, she is emotionally consumed by her fears of leaving her relatives, 
neighbors, and friends. While bidding her mother farewell at a nursing home, she bitterly 
cries, “Damn America that turned us to this!” Nargis is already nostalgic about leaving 
the familiar for the foreign. She looks at an old tree, reflects on her life, and wonders if 
she should leave the place that has become part of her soul. The foreignness of American 
culture reveals itself as a challenge as she continues listening to tapes of English 
conversations for beginners. “I don’t know English, and there, everything is in English: 
people, television, and neighbors!” Her struggle unveils the power of el-Ghorba sensation 
in dissipating the lures of migration and strengthening the appeal of staying in one’s 
home. 
The use of el-Ghorba rhetoric in Egyptian cinema, particularly when related to its 
projection of the Arab American image, necessitates a more contextualized reading of the 
concept in light of western alienation of Arab migrants. Going back to the Arabic root of 
the word el-Ghorba in such dictionaries as Lisan al-Arab (The Arab Tongue), al-Ṣiḥaḥ fi 
al-lughah (The Correct in Language), and al-Qamus al-Muheet (The Inclusive 
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Dictionary), a third meaning is revealed (i.e., that which is oriented/directed to the West). 
With this additional meaning, my reflections on el-Ghorba entail a reference to the Arab 
alienation experience in the West (the United States for the purpose of my work).218 With 
this in mind, the concept of el-Ghorba serves as a conceptual tool underwriting the 
Egyptian filmic image of Arab Americans as swinging between a sense of Otherness that 
they experience in their newly adopted home and a sense of disconnection from their 
Arab homeland. Towards that end, Egyptian filmmakers have taken an active role in 
promoting el-Ghorba sensation whereby their Arab American image spells out at the 
crossroads of an alienating American culture and a welcoming Arab homeland.  
Chahine’s Iskindiriyya…New York (Alexandria…New York, 2004) presents the 
Arab American image in light of this contextualized reading of el-Ghorba.219 The film 
narrates the story of Yehya (Mahmoud Hemeida) – an Egyptian director who undergoes a 
fifty-year long journey of struggle to realizing his American Dream. Through the years, 
his dream materializes into a sense of disappointment and regret, shaped by America’s 
rejection of his Arab background. As an aspiring young student, Yehya travels to 
California to study acting in the 1940s. There, he encounters a fixed and stereotypical 
perception of Arabs as backward and uncivilized. A fellow student wonders whether he 
lives in tents and ride camels. His lodging host reminds him that a daily shower is a holy 
practice for Americans, revealing a stereotypical image of Arabs as “unclean.” He is 
escorted out of Columbia Pictures studios for being an Arab. Young Yehya’s passion to 
travel to the United States, which Chahine captures in the earlier film, Iskindiriyya... Lih? 
                                                 
218 Al-Aswany’s Chicago and al-Tahawy’s Brooklyn Heights are two salient novels navigating the contours 
of Arab American experience of el-Ghorba.  
219 This is one of four films recounting the critically acclaimed director’s six-decade filmmaking career. 
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(Alexandria, Why?, 1979), reaches a breaking point because of the anti-Arab racism that 
Yehya experiences in Iskindiriyya…New York. In the final scene of Iskindiriyya... Lih?, 
Chahine hints at the hardships awaiting the ship-borne migrant Yehya (Mohsen Mohei el-
Din) by replacing the statue of liberty image with an alternative one that personifies that 
statue as an ugly-looking woman, vulgarly laughing and winking. Thus, the totality of 
anti-Arab racism that Yehya eventually experiences in Iskindiriyya…New York sustains 
his pre-stablished encounter with an alienating image of American culture.  
After completing his study, Yehya opts to go back to Egypt, where he becomes a 
dedicated and recognized director. Despite international acclaim, his work continues to 
be over-shadowed for forty years by U.S. film distributors because of its projection of an 
Arab perspective. In 2000, Yehya is finally recognized at a New York film festival 
celebrating his work, which comes at a time when his frustration with the U.S. anti-Arab 
foreign policy reaches a critical turn. There, he meets Ginger (Yousra) – his American 
girlfriend and lifetime love – who informs him that her twenty-five-year-old son (now, a 
highly rated opera dancer), Iskandar (Ahmad Yahya), is in fact Yehya’s son. His 
fatherhood is soon to be rejected by Iskandar, who is not ready to acknowledge any Arab 
ancestry partly due to the anti-Arab stigma in the U.S. entertainment industry.  Yehya 
erupts in tears for falling short yet again of his American Dream and his love for America 
is deeply wounded. The film concludes with Yehya wandering around New York City 
streets with the musical refrain “New York kills any sense of longing” played at the 
background to signify America’s tendency to sever family ties. 
Iskandar is presented as a heartless and insensitive individual whose 
Americanness manifests through his rejection of, if not inability to interact with, the 
Mahdi 118 
 
 
world beyond U.S. borderlines. In response to his remarks about Arabs not existing on 
the map, his mother informs him that the world does not end at America’s shorelines. His 
Americanness recycles Hollywood’s Orientalist imagery of Arabs. “You want me to have 
a father coming from a land,” he reproaches his mother, “where they live in tents and ride 
camels; where people are backward and ignorant!” In a subsequent conversation with 
Yehya, Iskandar boasts his pride in belonging to America – “the most powerful nation in 
the world” – and denigrates his father as belonging to a still developing part of the globe. 
Yehya eventually dismisses his son’s rejection of his Arab background as a token of 
arrogance, symbolic of U.S. reckless global character. 
A counter-image of Arab Americans embracing el-Ghorba rhetoric is presented in 
the character of Masri el-ʿArabi (Ahmed Helmy) in Khaled Mereʿai’s ʿAsal Iswid (Black 
Honey, 2010) – the rough translation of the character’s name is Egyptian the Arab. Masri 
is an Egyptian American who left Egypt as a child and lived in the United States for 
twenty years. He is now traveling back to Egypt to capture photos of the place he vaguely 
remembers as his ancestors’ land in order to enrich the photography exhibit that he plans 
to set up in New York. During his stay, Masri encounters a range of attitudes as he 
struggles to secure a proper identity for himself. Initially, he finds it unnecessary to carry 
his U.S. passport and prefers to show his Egyptian one to demonstrate his connection 
with Egypt. His thoughts of the absurdity to bring the American passport and be treated 
as a foreigner in his country of origin are soon interrupted by the Egyptian diction of 
tourism that prioritizes exceptional treatment of Americans, westerners, and Arabs 
coming from oil rich countries to locals. He subsequently experiences a delay at the 
airport, a cancellation of his hotel reservation, a subjection to extra bureaucratic 
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procedures at a car rental company, a low standard service at the pyramids, and a sense of 
intimidation at a police station.  
Worn by the indifference to his Egyptian passport, Masri disposes it as soon as he 
receives his U.S. passport. He is now being treated exceptionally by the same people 
offering him lodging and transportation services. They recognize his American status and 
respect him accordingly. This celebration is, however, short-lived. Boasting his American 
status soon invites trouble when he gets beaten in a rally protesting America’s foreign 
policy. His belongings, including the U.S. passport, are dispersed and lost (Figure 9). 
With no proof of either Egyptian or American nationality, Masri is forced to look for the 
apartment in his childhood’s neighborhood. There, he interacts with his childhood friends 
and neighbors and re-live the awlad el-balad code of generosity, hospitality, and 
community support. The film ends with Masri struggling to decide whether to leave for 
the United States or stay in the community he now considers as family.  
The interaction between Masri and an old neighbor, Hilal (Youssef Dawood), is 
illustrative of the power of el-Ghorba rhetoric in the Arab world. “I don’t understand how 
people emigrate,” Hilal expresses his disdain of migration, “waste their life abroad, and 
then wish to be buried in this land as if this country is just a burial ground!” He turns to 
ask Masri, “Do you plan to get buried here or abroad?” This particular emphasis on the 
locale of death is expressive of an Arab popular sensation that keeps Arab migrants 
attached to their original homeland, if not deterring them from migrating. This sense is 
particularly expressed towards the end of the film when Masri asks an old sailor whether 
he wants to leave his country. The sailor responds that he wants to die there. Masri’s 
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follow-up question, “But, when you die, you will not feel it?” is met by the sailor’s 
appeal to the metaphysical as he affirms, “My spirit will be here!”  
 
Figure 9 Masri’s U.S. passport attracts trouble in a rally protesting U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East – courtesy of ʿAsal Iswid 
 
As an Egyptian American, Masri is conflicted about staying or leaving Egypt. He 
feels that his life has already been shaped in the United States while the socioeconomic 
circumstances in Egypt are dire. Hilal attempts to draw a different portrait for Masri to 
examine: 
Son! I always say, “Thank you God!” Do you want me to say it the American way so you 
can understand?!...If I look at circumstances the way you do, I will see a lot of bad things 
and I may become a non-believer. If you only search seriously in these tough 
circumstances, you will definitely find many good things. This point, however, needs 
someone who can feel!…It may be true, as you say, there are a lot of good things in 
America but those things are easy to get one day. Meanwhile, we have things that are hard 
to get; otherwise, I would have the one standing in front of me [Masri] feeling and sensing! 
It takes Masri time before he realizes the emotional dimension of his experience in Egypt, 
and eventually decides to stay.  
Iskindiriyya…New York and ʿAsal Iswid showcase a representation strategy in 
Egyptian cinema of Arab Americans wrestling against the resonance of el-Ghorba 
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rhetoric, which underscores an imagination of the Arab diasporic experience in the 
United States struggling against an alienating culture and invites emotional 
connectedness to the Arab homeland. This strategy invests in polarizing the Arab 
American image in terms of belonging and allegiance. Arab Americans like Iskandar who 
choose to distance themselves from their Arab roots are imagined to embrace the 
American culture with no sense of longing to anything Arab. Arab Americans like Masri 
only perfect their sense of affiliation once they identify themselves with their original 
home-country and choose to live so. The former is rejected and shunned as an aberration 
of the American Dream while the latter is embraced and celebrated as an affirmation of 
the Arab Dream.  
Conclusion 
As a Middle Eastern cinema, the Egyptian filmmaking industry has operated at 
the front of resisting a perceived U.S. cultural imperial project, mediated through 
Hollywood’s global circulation of its Orientalist and highly racialized images of Arabs 
and Muslims. Arab and Muslim moviegoers and image consumers have sought refuge in 
the industry to voice a sense of postcolonial independence as well as reclaim a sense of 
agency through its counter modes of representations. The cinema’s transnational 
framework has consolidated Arabist, Islamist, and state nationalist critiques of the United 
States and rendered its audiences in the Arab-speaking world ever more empowered with 
materials that challenge Hollywood’s. As illustrated above, the prevailing cinematic 
pattern foregrounds a complicated sense of a critique that marks political, social, cultural, 
and economic territories in the Arab popular imagination of America. This includes 
referencing a sense of disillusionment in the American Dream, a critique of globalization 
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as an Americanization process, a rejection of U.S. presence in the region, and a reading 
of the United States as the land of queers.  
The cinema’s subversion process, however, fails to navigate away from merely 
reversing Hollywood’s one-dimensional binary constructions. Egyptian writers, directors, 
and producers operate within a highly polarizing frame of reference that glorifies 
everything Arabic and denigrates anything American. The result is rather a reproduction 
of an alternative process of Otherness that shatters the Arab American image alongside 
the U.S.-Arab socio-cultural and geopolitical divide. This process commodifies the Arab 
sentiment against the articulations of U.S. hegemony, and allocates Arab Americans 
alongside certain preconceived formations to seemingly clear-cut distinctions of Arab and 
American cultures. It advocates polarizing spatial morality through the juxtaposition of 
its transnational abstractions of materialism, power, and nostalgia with references 
implicated in the identity particularities of nation, class, gender, and sexuality.  
The Arab American image in this pattern becomes a tool to mediate Arab and 
Muslim grievances. The articulations of their identity are strictly limited to the awlad al-
balad code of honor and their substitution of the American Dream with an Arab one. 
Portraying Noufal as a dollar worshipper and Sam as a community facilitator in Hallo 
Amreeka speaks of a representation strategy that subjects the two Arab American 
characters to binary projections meant to underscore their cultural allegiance as either 
American or Arab. These projections attain positive and negative values respectively 
alongside rigid spatial identity formations. The same representation formula is used 
denounce the Arab American characters, Sirag in Sidi fi egameʿa el-Amreekya and 
Iskandar in Iskindiriyya…New York, as an Arab aberration while celebrating the Arab 
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American characters, Adam in el-ʾAkhar and Masri in ʿAsal Iswid, as the ultimate 
manifestation of the Arab identity.  
The emphasis on such dichotomous constructions in the Egyptian filmmaking 
subversion process, not only alienates the Arab street from a more complex 
understanding of the United States, but also renders Arab Americans doubly alienated. 
Noufal, Sam, Sirag, Adam, Iskandar, and Masri are simplified manifestations of a very 
complicated Arab American identity that defies reduction along the lines of spatial 
morality. Although the Egyptian cinema offers an intricate representation framework 
unlike Hollywood’s strictly nationalist framework, its consolidation of the Arabist, 
Islamist, and Egyptian postcolonial rhetoric fails to locate the Arab American image in its 
empowering transnational context, which will be explored in chapter III and chapter IV. 
Both Hollywood and Egyptian filmmakers, to conclude, uses notions of cultural 
citizenship that alienate and exclude Arab Americans. 
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Part II: Re-Narrating Arab American Subjectivity in Film 
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Chapter III Transcultural Constructions of Arab American Interstitial Activism 
  
    
   It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference 
– that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or 
cultural value are negotiated. How are subjects formed ‘in-between’, or in excess of, the sum of 
the ‘parts’ of difference (usually intoned as race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies of 
representation or empowerment come to be formulated in the competing claims of communities 
where, despite shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values, 
meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may be profoundly 
antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable? 
—   Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture 
   
   If citizenship is understood chiefly as a fixed or static concept, signifying passive legal 
relationships between individuals and their respective states, then globalization might appear to 
have little to say about citizenship other than influencing, if not transforming, this binary 
relationship as it evolves from generation to generation. However, if citizenship is also 
understood as a verb signaling activity in politics and society–as a series of habits, dispositions, 
and practices in which individuals situate themselves in all kinds of communities and immerse 
themselves into public initiatives, as well as public debate and often public controversy and 
struggle, then the idea of citizenship takes on some of the same dynamics and qualities as 
globalization. 
—   Hans Schattle, Globalization and Citizenship 
 
 
Introduction 
As highlighted in the first part of this project, the Arab American image in U.S. 
and Arab motion pictures has been hostage, for decades, to nationalist and postcolonial 
politics of representation, mostly advanced through mainstream cultural producers in 
Hollywood and Egyptian cinemas. The two film industries have subjected their 
sensational imagery of Arab Americans to a commercially coded repertoire of East-West 
binaries (read: veneration of Self and vilification of Other). While Hollywood has 
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extensively relied on its nationalist rhetoric of post-Orientalism and racialization in 
generating demeaning stereotypes of Arab Americans, Egyptian cinema has confined 
Arab Americans within a nationalist appropriation of Arabist and Islamist postcolonial 
critiques of the U.S. hegemonic trends in the Middle East through certain classist, 
gendered, and sexualized tropes. In this context, constructions of the Arab American 
image since the 1970s in Hollywood and the 1990s in Egyptian cinema have promoted a 
limited sense of cultural citizenship, thereby, rendering Arab Americans doubly-alienated 
in both American and Arab collective imagination. 
Despite the growing visibility of Arab American scholarly and literary production 
as well as solidifying presence in civil society and entertainment circles, there remains a 
challenge in the two industries that continues to contest the transnational nature of the 
label Arab American. Articulations of Arabness in Hollywood and Egyptian cinemas 
continue to circulate imagery of Arab Americans whereby their Arabness is associated 
with terrorism in the former medium and resistance in the latter. Meanwhile, 
articulations of their Americanness in the two cinemas constantly question Arab 
Americans’ patriotism and allegiance. Consequently, the dominant representation 
patterns surveyed in the previous chapters fail to recognize the Arab American 
transnational role in both invoking an appeal to a common Arab heritage and reclaiming a 
diasporic agency that challenges a post-9/11 rising sense of discrimination against Arabs, 
Muslims, and look-a-likes in the United States. They present the Arab American identity 
as “mortal,” to borrow the Lebanese French thinker Amin Maalouf’s characterization of 
the diasporic identity once homogenized through nationalist constructions. Reducing 
identity into one single affiliation, he argues, invites “partial” and “intolerant” 
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considerations of migrants that render them torn between their “country of origin and 
country of adoption.”220 Thus, the mainstream representation strategies employed in the 
two cinemas devote a commitment to recycling the U.S.-Arab sociocultural and 
geopolitical encounters through the image of the Arab American. They reveal a serious 
disinterest in the interstitial space that Arab Americans occupy and the articulations of 
their hybrid subjectivity. Meant in Bhabha’s sense, hybridity defies hegemonic calls for 
purity and operates in a third space, which constitutes a critical site of spatial disruption 
to dominant nationalist imperatives. “The process of cultural hybridity,” Bhabha 
maintains, “gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new 
area of negotiation of meaning and representation.”221  
The following chapter departs from the afore-mentioned hegemonic emphasis on 
polarization, and searches for emerging representation strategies in the two cinemas that 
engage with this empowering sense of hybridity. To do so, it delivers a content analysis 
of two films mediating to American and Arab audiences echoes of a post-9/11 disruptive 
consciousness of the Arab American in-betweenness. Central to this consciousness lies a 
newborn effort by filmmakers in the cinemas to register an interest in the multi-
directional diasporic experience of the Arab American community, which I will further 
capture in my analysis of the Arab American filmic experience in Chapter IV.  
The chapter advances analysis of the Arab American characters in Jeffrey 
Nachmanoff’s Traitor (2008) and Adel Adeeb’s Laylat el-Baby Doll (The Baby Doll 
Night, 2008) structured around their role of diasporic activism in enunciating a form of 
                                                 
220 Maalouf, In the Name of Identity, 30-38. 
221 Rutherford, “Interview with Homi Bhabha,” 211; as quoted in Mandaville, Transnational Muslim 
Politics, 93. 
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Arab American transcultural citizenship at crossroads of U.S.-Arab geopolitics. It draws 
from Appadurai’s emphasis on the deterritorializing interconnectedness of migration and 
media in introducing “a new order of instability in the production of modern 
subjectivities,” codified through, what he names, diasporic public spheres.222 The guiding 
framework for my analysis parts ways with Appadurai’s “prognostications” of the nation-
state demise in the face of a rising postnational global order.223 It locates the Arab 
American diasporic public sphere at the disjuncture of the sustained relevance of 
nationalism in today’s globalized context and the solidifying demand by diasporic 
communities for hybrid identities as they navigate the contemporary transnational flow of 
commodities, ideas, technologies, corporations, and people. Interrogating this disjuncture 
necessitates an investigation of the Arab American transnational voice at the backdrop of 
a consistent struggle against the alienating contestations of the U.S. post-Orientalist and 
racialized discourses as well as the Egyptian Arabist/Islamist/nationalist postcolonial 
narratives. Therefore, exploring the particularity of this disjuncture, especially in the 
realm of U.S.-Arab cultural imagination, emphasizes the role of transnationalism in 
enunciating the issue of belonging for the Arab American community.  
The chapter offers a methodological model of an intertextual and comparative 
analysis of three Arab American characters to highlight their embodiment of, what I shall 
refer to as, interstitial activism in the Arab American transnational public sphere. In the 
Hollywood film Traitor, Samir Horn (Don Cheadle) personifies the congruence of Arab, 
Black, Muslim, and American identities in the war on terror context. In battling foreign 
and homegrown terrorism in the United States, Samir proclaims a transnational identity 
                                                 
222 Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 4. 
223 Ibid, 21-22. 
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marked by an Arab/Muslim double consciousness that responds to the U.S. dictations of 
imperative patriotism while preserving an Arab diasporic critique of the war on terror.224 
In the Egyptian film, Laylat el-Baby Doll, Layla Corrie (Ghada Abdel Razeq) and 
Housam al-Ashry (Mahmoud Abdel Aziz) engage with an Arab American diasporic 
public sphere consumed by the reiterations of U.S. hegemony in the Arab world. Layla is 
an Arab/Jew American whose rejection of the Israeli aggressions against the Palestinians 
prompts her to forsake her journalistic duty in the occupied territories and embrace an 
activist stance that claims her life. Housam is an Arab/Muslim American who opts to 
reconcile the U.S.-Arab polarizing rhetoric by voicing concerns for U.S. national security 
without compromising his criticism of the disturbing impact of the U.S. declared war on 
terror, grounded in both the domestic alienation of Arab Americans and the military 
invasion of Iraq. Hence, this intertextual analysis proposes a reading of Arab American 
interstitial activism as a critical site solidifying their transcultural identity and diasporic 
agency in two dimensions, i.e., the citizen-traitor paradox and U.S.-Arab geopolitics. 
 
The Citizen-Traitor Paradox 
 
Traitor revolves around the story of Samir’s struggle with the transnational 
articulations of terrorism and belonging in the post-9/11 context. His character unravels 
in unexpected ways, leading the audience into a state of suspense and bewilderment. At 
the beginning of the film, he is presented as a stereotypical radical whose anger and 
frustration at the un-welcomed interventions of the West, the U.S. in particular, in the 
lives of Arabs and Muslims seem to be instrumental in leading him to embrace violence 
                                                 
224 My use of the term “double consciousness” is informed by Du Bois’ conceptualization of the African 
American collective struggle to maintain a consciousness of their own authenticity in a sociocultural 
system defined through whiteness; Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 1903. 
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and chaos as disruptive political means. Held at a Yemeni prison on terrorism charges, he 
befriends the radical Omar (Saïd Taghmaoui), who later introduces him to Fareed (Alyy 
Khan), the leading figure of the international terrorist cell, al-Nathir (Warning). 
Immediately, Samir initiates himself into al-Nathir by turning deadly and detonating the 
U.S. embassy in France. The subsequent scenes show intercutting images of the FBI’s 
frenzied interrogation of Samir’s background and his mother’s and girlfriend’s statements 
of rejection of the official characterization of Samir as a citizen-turned-terrorist.  
A surprising twist in the plot reveals his actions to be a cover story for “heroic” 
acts of espionage to infiltrate al-Nathir and thwart their next planned attacks in the United 
States. The audiences learn that he works with a U.S. intelligence agency that keeps his 
mission “off the books.” The story becomes more intricate when his intelligence 
contractor, Carter (Jeff Daniels), is killed. Unaware of his mission, the FBI agency, 
represented by the typical good cop-bad cop agents Roy Clayton (Guy Pearce) and Max 
Archer (Neal McDonough), list him as a high-value target. This forces him to undergo a 
thrilling hide and seek type of relationship with the U.S. authorities in the midst of his 
continuing waged war against terrorism. Towards the end of the film, his undercover 
identity is revealed, which translates into a hero-status recognition and a wiped clean 
record. He turns down an offer to work for the FBI by citing his faith-based 
disillusionment in using violence as both a means and a normalizing narrative that 
renders the human life a commodity for rhetorical consumption, both by terrorist cells 
and U.S. counter-terrorist agencies. With blood on his hands accumulated through his 
dual duty as a U.S. undercover agent in al-Nathir, he decides to retire for worship in 
search for heavenly forgiveness, inner peace, and spiritual tranquility (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10 Samir retires in search for spiritual peace – courtesy of 
Traitor 
 
Traitor sets in motion a serious attempt to challenge, to a certain extent, the 
exclusionary readings of the Arab/Muslim American cultural citizenship in Hollywood’s 
citizen-terrorist pattern.225 Commissioned by Disney to develop the idea of the film, 
initially conceived by comedian Steve Martin in 2002, screenplay writer and director 
Nachmanoff invested time in research and consultation with the Arab/Muslim American 
communities.226 Subsequently, he developed a consciousness of the paradoxicality and 
interstices of the Arab/Muslim American diasporic public sphere during the war on terror 
era. The result was a film project structured around an activist sense of agency claimed 
by its Arab/Muslim American protagonist, Samir, in fighting terrorism, and mediated 
through the disruptive interstitial contestations of the character’s multiple identities. 
Samir’s Arab, Muslim, and American identities mutually enforce his response to duty. In 
this context, it is Islam’s message of peace and respect for human lives that instills in him 
the passion to confront al-Nathir extremists and protect his American society. As a kid 
witnessing the death of his father through a terrorist car bombing in Sudan and a 
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Chicago-raised adult mourning 9/11 victims, he is deeply saddened by the radicals who, 
as the Muslim American scholar Hamza Yusuf puts it, have hijacked the name of Islam to 
advance their political grievances.227 The emphasis on the faith-driven motivation of 
Samir’s counter-terrorism mission unsettles Islamophobic voices across the U.S. political 
spectrum that project Islam as the antithesis of western liberalism.228 Samir’s role as a 
former Special Operations officer with military expertise in explosives and his history of 
fighting with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan allow him access to al-Nathir. Once he loses 
contact with his U.S. intelligence contractor, however, he is forced to battle the citizen-
traitor paradox, which calls into question his diasporic allegiance as well as transcultural 
identity, and, at some point, configures his Arab, Muslim, and American identities as 
mutually exclusive.  
Nachmanoff’s script version proved too critical to meet Hollywood’s sensational 
format and hegemonic portrayals of Arab/Muslim Americans, which prompted Disney to 
deny it production privileges, forcing the director to navigate the independent filmmaking 
venue.229 With a medium budget of $22,000,000, the film was shot in five countries (i.e., 
Canada, France, London, Morocco, and the United States), and accumulated gross 
earnings of $23,530,832 in the United States and $27,882,227 worldwide.230 Despite 
featuring high profile Hollywood actors and a strong start with a gross of $10,006,327 in 
the first weakened of its release, the film lost momentum almost immediately 
afterwards.231 Audience reviewers varied in their interpretation of the film’s failure to 
generate movie theater traffic. Despite reflections on the poor timing of its release (end of 
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the summer/beginning of the fall) and the low excitement about its computer-generated 
images, most reviewers considered the plot as a major drawback. The plot, according to 
one reviewer, suffers from an “attention deficit disorder” in the way it addresses so many 
questions at once.232 Critical of the storytelling that “slips out of complexity into 
perplexity,” another reviewer wondered whether audiences were ready to handle “moral 
ambiguity and narrative intricacy” in thrillers engaging with terrorism.233 The director’s 
interest in producing an intelligent thriller that retains a flavor of Hollywood’s action 
genre is an experiment that he considered important to raise critical questions while 
entertaining the audiences: 
Our ambitions were modest for the film purely as a fun espionage story, but it also has a 
political edge…and those films are hard to sell in America. Audiences seem to want their 
entertainment to be mindless, where they don’t really have to think about anything, or they 
want them to be really serious. I’ve always thought it is possible to do both.234  
This confused an IMDB user who read the film as neither “a silly action movie,” nor “an 
intelligent thriller.”235 Another user found it too professorial for a spy thriller film.236  
Traitor retains an average rating of 3.4/5 in rottentomatoes.com and 7.0/10 in 
IMDB.237 The film’s lowest raters in IMDB primarily predicate around what Peter 
Bradshaw calls Nachmanoff’s “fantastically flaccid and perfunctory gestures of 
friendship towards the Muslim world.”238 An Arab rater from Jordan challenges these 
gestures by protesting the director’s neglect of balancing views of Arabs and Muslims 
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outside the United States.239 The only good Muslim, the film proposes, is an American 
one. Meanwhile, an American rater denounces the film as a means to “erode American 
patriotism” for its “untrue” agenda that portrayers Muslims as “family oriented, spiritual, 
thoughtful and worthy of our sympathy.”240 Another American rater finds the film to be 
“anti-American propaganda” that attempts to establish “moral equivalence between us 
and the terrorists.”241 This angry response from both Arab and American raters only 
validates the relevance of 9/11 in generating polarizations that Samir seeks to disrupt.  
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the rhetoric of nationalism hyped the invoked 
terror to declare a state of emergency and subsequently prohibit any line of criticism 
deemed unpatriotic or offensive to the grief-stricken nation. “Americans are now being 
asked not to be critical,” W. J. T. Mitchell complained, “not to question the judgment of 
our leadership.”242 The United States, stressed Judith Butler, missed the opportunity to 
“redefine itself as part of a global community when, instead, it heightened nationalist 
discourse, extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended constitutional rights, and 
developed forms of explicit and implicit censorship.”243 Americans were reduced to – to 
borrow Lauren Berlant’s term –  “infantile citizens” whose curiosity to understand the 
causes of terrorism and the appropriate measures undertaken to counter it was met with 
over-simplistic references to the terrorists’ cultural identity as a driving force behind the 
attacks.244 Bernard Lewis’s Orientalist polarizations and Samuel Huntington’s clash of 
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civilizations theory opened doors for more sensational reflections.245 References to Pearl 
Harbor made it possible to invite echoes of World War II and Cold War security culture 
in the government’s declared war on terror.246 Arab/Muslim Americans and look-a-likes 
were targeted as potential homegrown threats and racially mapped into a narrative that 
questioned their patriotism. So, it is not surprising for movie theater audiences to be 
wrapped in this sense of patriotism and resist consuming critical works.  
Samir’s diasporic agency in Traitor develops in two intersecting directions. The 
first direction draws from an Arab/Muslim struggle in the United States to re-define 
terrorism beyond racial profiling. The popular myth that “all Muslims are not terrorists 
but nearly all terrorists are Muslims” continues to circulate the U.S. popular culture as a 
token to the racialized codification of terrorism in the Arab/Muslim body. Despite the 
FBI’s reporting emphasis on the role of certain “right- and left-wing extremist groups” 
and “drug cartels” in addition to that of the “Islamic political terrorists,” particularly in 
the context of homegrown terrorism, mainstream media reporters and pundits have 
exercised racially-defined discretions in assigning the word “terrorism” based on the 
background of the perpetrator(s).247 This is true even in cases exhibiting main elements of 
the FBI’s definition of terrorism as a violent act “intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population, or influence the policy or conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”248 Hollywood’s representation patterns confine 
the Arab/Muslim American image primarily within its racialized repertoire of terrorism, 
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which, as illustrated in chapter I, dates back to the 1970s. Even though the latter registers 
a revolutionary interest in recognizing the legality of the Arab American citizenship in 
screen, its utilization of “simplified complex” strategies speaks of a calculated 
consciousness to come to terms with the post-9/11 Arab/Muslim American visibility. 
However sympathetic, the imagery of the Arab/Muslim Americans in such a venue is 
locked within the context of terrorism.   
In an attempt to speak to the sub-theme of Traitor, i.e., “the truth is complicated,” 
director Nachmanoff employs a “simplified complex” representation strategy of 
Arab/Muslim Americans within the parameters of Hollywood’s citizen-terrorist pattern. 
In order to offset the industry’s racially saturated imagery of homegrown terrorists, he 
refrains from showing the American Muslim terrorists wearing traditional clothing or 
growing beards. When revealing the identities of the U.S.-based terrorists, the camera 
focuses on four of them: a black man, a non-scarfed woman, a working Middle Easterner, 
and a racially ambiguous family man. This emphasis on race, gender, and marital status, 
which underlines an implicit critique of the post-9/11 racial profiling momentum, 
promises a complicated reading of homegrown terrorism in exchange for a license to 
project the highlighted four American Muslims as ticking bombs awaiting to blow up 
fifty public buses in the United States. The sheer volume of the terrorists, which David 
Stratton finds “disturbing,” illustrates a troubling undertone that draws strict boundaries 
around the mainstream articulations of a rigid overlap between homegrown terror and 
Arab/Muslim American communities.249 Thus, Nachmanoff reinforces the very issue of 
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Hollywood’s racialized portrayals that his work seems to criticize, locating his work in 
Hollywood’s post-9/11 citizen-terrorist representation pattern.  
Despite this limitation, Traitor entertains a critique of racial profiling in light of 
the post-9/11 backlash against the Arab/Muslim American communities, and reflects the 
sense of disillusionment the American public ought to embrace in response to the 
government’s war on terror problematic conduct. Corresponding with the growing impact 
of Arab/Muslim Americans, the film proposes a representation mode that offers critical 
readings of the industry’s racially coded anti-Arab and Islamophobic imagery. 
Nachmanoff advances this through an explicit critique of racial profiling as an 
institutional measure to counter terrorism. In the film, this critique materializes through 
agent Clayton whose character mediates, in the words of Pearce, “a way for westerners to 
view somebody like Cheadle.”250 Clayton expresses his frustration with the U.S. 
Homeland Security directive to racially map potential suspects by undertaking a major 
roundup of “guys who fit the profile.” “Homeland security is a waste of time and 
resources,” agent Clayton stresses, “We’ll never find them [the terrorists] this way. There 
are 1.2 billion Muslims in this world. Only 20% of them are Arab. These people could 
look like anybody.” Agent Clayton prefers to execute a thorough investigation of the 
individuals already suspected rather than using state apparatus to coerce the Arab/Muslim 
American population. He also refuses to ascribe trends of terror to Islam, and continues to 
maintain that terrorism is a version of political violence. He rejects the characterization of 
the terrorists in terms of, what Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai call, failed heterosexuality, i.e., 
terrorists end their lives in order to fulfil their sexual fantasies through the promised 
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seventy-some virgins.251 In a conversation with his partner, he brings forth the KKK’s 
manipulation of the Christian faith as an illustrative example that disrupts the popularized 
conceptions of Islam as an exclusively and inherently violent religion. “Where I grew 
up,” he emphasizes, “the Klan burned crosses in front of people’s houses and called it 
Christianity. [It] seems every religion has more than one face.” 
Nachmanoff’s criticism of racial profiling further investigates the racialized 
underpinnings of agent Clayton’s seemingly race-sensitive investigation methodology. 
When identifying Samir as a potential terrorist suspect, agent Clayton reads his life to fit 
a classic profile of a terrorist (the stress is not mine). Samir, the FBI profile reads, is 
performing violence because of a “cultural shock” for being caught “between traditional 
Islam and the West.” Samir’s cultural shock, agent Clayton suggests, invokes an 
inevitable clash of identity, specific to Arab/Muslim migrants and even citizens. 
Following Huntington’s flowed logic, this clash emanates from a perceived inability 
among Muslims living in the United States to forsake their Islamic values and principles 
to those of the Judeo-Christian (or the secular in the case of liberals). The Bush 
administration’s post-9/11 domestic and global policies in combating terrorism, met with 
not much public criticism, especially in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and 
further sustained by the Obama administration, reflect an uncritical challenge to a 
governing continuum deeply shaped by serious national security concerns that 
foregrounds the nation’s interests and renders Americans with a subscription to Arab or 
Islamic identities as primary suspects. This has instituted a fertile ground for a 
xenophobic perception, communicated primarily through conservative media and 
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religious establishments, presupposing the migration of Arabs and Muslims into the 
United States as a trajectory of decline to the Western civilization. Rod Parsley, the 
senior pastor of the World Harvest Church in Columbus, for instance, maintains that 
Islam is a historical and permanent enemy of the United States.252 In one of his fiery 
sermons, he preaches: 
I can't begin to tell you how important it is that we understand the true nature of Islam. 
That we see it for what it really is. In fact...I do not believe that our nation can truly fulfill 
its divine purpose until we understand our historical conflict with Islam…I know that this 
statement sounds extreme. But I am not shrinking back from its implications. The fact is 
that...America was founded in part with the intention of seeing this false religion destroyed. 
And I believe September 11, 2001, was a generational call to arms that we no longer can 
afford to ignore.253 
  
Thus, the polarizing assessment of the terrorists’ cultural and religious identity as the 
driving force for their extreme acts of violence against civilians in the United States has 
signified an official endorsement of the validity of the clash of civilizations theory in 
describing the prospect of the relationship between the United States and the 
Arab/Muslim worlds with immediate repercussions on the Arab/Muslim American 
communities. The premise of Samir’s classical profile specifies the Arab/Muslim 
American cultural difference as a ground for unassimilability, and locates it within a 
racialized discourse, which Michael Omi and Howard Winant identifies as the more 
viable organizing tool in the structural formations of the American society.254 It is the 
same premise that legitimizes torturing Samir as a homegrown terrorist suspect. 
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This racialized anxiety characterizes the institutionally commissioned and highly 
citied report in terrorism studies and security/intelligence circles, “Radicalization in the 
West: The Homegrown Threat” (2007). In the report, senior intelligence analysts at the 
New York Police Department Division, Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, investigate five 
cases of homegrown terrorism in their attempt to establish a psychological radicalization 
pattern that accounts for the transformation of a citizen into a traitor. It subscribes to an 
approach in the field of terrorism studies committed to psychologizing the terrorist’s 
deviance in terms of personality disorder, political frustration, or failed heterosexuality, 
and emphasizing abnormality as well as monstrosity of the terrorist through racial tropes 
that legitimize the state to quarantine and discipline its citizens.255 The analysts conclude 
that Muslims residing in the West, particularly in the United States, are subject to 
undergo four stages: ‘Pre-Radicalization’, ‘Self-Identification’, ‘Indoctrination’, and 
‘Jihadization’. According to them, the second stage initiates an alarming transition from 
an ordinary lifestyle to another defined by identification with the Salafi 
(ultraconservative) version of Islam and association with “like-minded individuals;” 
hence, confining the multi-layered discursive grounds of ultraconservatism into a 
terrorism-breeding one. They stress that identifying with ultraconservatism serves as a 
precursor towards radicalization, often triggered by four factors: economic (losing a job, 
blocked mobility), social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived), political 
(international conflicts involving Muslims), or personal (death in the close family.) The 
process, which can happen within a short period of three months, could be traced by 
identifying such early symptoms as wearing traditional clothes, growing a beard, or 
giving up cigarettes, drinking, and gambling. 
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The above-highlighted trend of institutional racial profiling has sustained 
prejudice and discrimination against Arabs/Muslims in the United States and subjected 
the communities to the citizen-traitor paradox through erroneous racialized associations 
of religious identity with terrorism. Traitor denounces the identity-based premise of such 
a trend. Samir’s conditions certainly fall within the parameters of the NYPD’s report. He 
experiences the four triggers identified in the report as precursors of radicalization. He 
loses a job because of the post-9/11 social unrest against Muslim-looking signs. When 
questioned about the reasons for firing Samir from work in Chicago, the company’s 
manager states, “When you wear a skullcap and pray to Allah five times a day, people are 
‘gonna’ notice; some of our clients complained.” Samir, therefore, experiences a form of 
social prejudice that results in economic hardship. Politically, he is outraged by the U.S. 
inflammatory policies towards the Arab/Muslim worlds. He is particularly enraged by the 
U.S. military illegitimate war in Iraq. At the personal level, he is afflicted with the horror 
of watching his father assassinated in a car explosion. Experiencing such hardships, 
however, leads Samir to embrace his religion and turn it into a generating source of 
American patriotism rather than a source for treason. Samir’s story stands as a testimony 
against the report’s superficial contention that subscription to an Islamic identity through 
wearing clothes or forsaking certain habits constitutes early symptom of radicalization. 
His open expression of his Islamic identity displays some of the report’s identified 
symptoms of a potential terrorist. He wears the traditional skullcap while praying with 
others in the mosque. He objects to indulgence in a behavior that contradicts Islamic 
teachings. In an encounter with one of al-Nathir’s leaders that justifies drinking alcohol to 
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“blend in,” he responds with a mainstream Islamic reference that Muslims can only do so 
if death is immanent.  
To further critique the racialized undertones in the U.S. war on terror policy, 
Nachmanoff provides Samir with the agency to contest the racial underpinnings of U.S. 
innocence and its legitimacy for resorting to hard power. When interrogated by FBI 
agents on the charge of collaborating with terrorists through selling them explosives, 
Samir, still undercover, proclaims that he sells to whomever can afford it and does not 
hesitate to mention his interest in considering the U.S. government as a possible client. 
When the interrogators stress that the United States does not “kill innocent people,” he 
responds, “Oh yea, they do, genius; people just usually have darker skin” (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11 Interrogating Samir as a potential homegrown 
terrorist – courtesy of Traitor 
Presenting Samir as a former sergeant in the U.S. Army Special Forces once sent to 
Pakistan to train the Afghani Mujahideen serves as a reminder of the paradox underlining 
the U.S. employment of hard power. Additionally, Nachmanoff develops his critique of 
the U.S. racially informed foreign policy by allowing one of al-Nathir’s members to 
pronounce his grievances, in a Hollywood’s Middle Eastern English accent: 
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We train to kill, but it doesn’t mean that we love violence. We use violence only because it 
has been used against us. The crusaders have invade[d] our land, drop[ped] bombs on our 
people, stole our natural resources. We are fighting to end the suffering. We are fighting to 
end the humiliation and murder of our people. The American accuse us of killing innocent 
civilians, yet they have been spilling the blood of innocent Muslims for decades. Does our 
blood not count? 
 
Overall, Nachmanoff’s critique of the post-9/11 racialized reiterations initiates a 
necessary direction in the process of charting the citizen-traitor paradox as detrimental to 
the Arab/Muslim American diasporic public sphere. Samir’s transnational identity, the 
audiences learn, is forced to navigate the implications of racial profiling, both at the 
institutional and public levels, which puts his sense of patriotism, heroism, and faith into 
question. Although Traitor recycles Hollywood’s confinement of the Arab/Muslim image 
within the terrorism narrative, it delineates this imagery by raising inquiry into the rigid 
mapping of Islam and the United States as contradictory sites of identity formations. It 
defies the post-9/11 hyped racial profiling and defines Islam as an inspirational source of 
patriotism in the life of Arab/Muslim Americans. This investment in dramatizing 
ambivalence, to use Bhabha’s sense of the term, projects a prerequisite to unpacking the 
interstitial nature of Samir’s diasporic activism.256 His activism reflects the consciousness 
of an indigenous version of American Islam that interacts with transnational Islamic 
issues while retaining an interest in responding to domestic conditions of political 
activism. Samir, in a way, embodies the African American Muslim emphasis on the 
specificity of the American context for the development of their religious and national 
identity (see Malcom X and Elijah Muhammad).257 
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Parallel to his critique of racialization, Nachmanoff advocates another critical 
dimension of the Arab/Muslim American diasporic activism, i.e. allegiance. He does so 
through the manipulation of the storyline to bewilder the film’s fictional agencies and 
audiences alike in respect of Samir’s citizen-traitor experience, which leads Arabs, 
Africans, Muslims, and Americans to question his own sense of belonging. Throughout 
the film, his loyalty is constantly questioned, not only by the terrorists and the FBI 
agents, but also by the audiences who may identify with him through nationalism 
(American, Sudanese), ethnicity (American, Arab, African), or religion (devout, secular); 
at times, he is considered as a traitor by all. To mystify this sense of allegiance, he 
prefers to use the ambiguous phrase “from all over” in response to questions about his 
identity.  
Portraying Samir in this transnational sense proves empowering and challenging 
at the same time. It allows him to navigate the national contours shaping his identities 
while raising questions about his commitment to a particular identity. When the 
Arab/Muslim European Omar expresses his confusion, i.e., dreaming in English and not 
feeling at home speaking his native language, Samir stresses, “I don’t feel at home 
anywhere.” It is this emphasis on nowhere-ness that forges a space for the citizen-traitor 
paradox to play out throughout the film as a symbolic reference to the disruptive 
possibilities of the Arab/Muslim American transcultural identity. Cheadle illustrates the 
type of challenges that his character is forced to confront: 
It was interesting to me because the character that I play in the movie, Samir Horn, seemed 
to be somebody who encapsulated all those questions within his own journey... “What is 
my allegiance to my faith, what’s my allegiance to my country? I feel like they’re both 
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letting me down in some ways. Who do I believe in? Who do I listen to? Ultimately, who 
takes responsibility for these things?”258 
Accusing Samir as a traitor is a rhythm composed by the multiplicity of his 
identities. He is a man of faith who sincerely believes that Islam refers to an absolute 
submission to Allah. He is in a romantic relationship with a photojournalist; a secular 
lifestyle that traditional Islam does not allow outside of marriage. He is a U.S. military 
expert fighting with the Mujahideen against the atrocities of the Soviets in Afghanistan 
and his other fellow Muslim militants against the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing of Muslims in 
Bosnia. He makes explosives and teaches al-Nathir’s members how to wear them. He 
facilitates their networking, and even blows-up the American Consulate in France 
himself. To justify his actions, he cites Martin Luther King: “If a man hasn’t discovered 
something that he will die for, he isn’t fit to live.” His violence performance is dictated 
by his intelligence mission to undermine the terrorist group. He retains a deep conviction 
that the terrorists are Islam’s worst enemies. This multi-layered biography, reads a 
reviewer, “demands that we entertain the possibility that Samir is a bad guy, and also that 
he retain our sympathy when our doubts about him are most acute.”259 It constitutes a 
viable nationalist ground with the potential for the circulation of the “traitor” label, which 
functions in this film as a floating signifier, to echo Hall’s sense of the term.260 The film 
suggests the futility of understanding Samir’s allegiances through certain clear-cut 
identity categories, i.e., Arab, African, Muslim, or American. His allegiances are rather 
defined through positions shaped in a transnational context, which consolidates the U.S. 
                                                 
258 Douglas, “Don Cheadle Turns Traitor,” AUGUST 27, 2008. 
259 Scott, “In a World of Extremists,” August 26, 2008. 
260 Jhally, Stuart Hall - Race, the Floating Signifier. 1997. 
Mahdi 146 
 
 
nationalist as well as Arab/Muslim postcolonial directives of cultural citizenship that the 
first part of this project highlights.  
Struggling with his personal encounter with his father’s death and believing in the 
Islamic teachings about the sanctity of life, he debates al-Nathir’s members and the U.S. 
government’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies, who both approve killing 
others to achieve a specified goal; be it, shaking a U.S. empire for the terrorists or 
stopping the bad guys for the U.S. security apparatus. He communicates to Omar his 
conviction that the Mujahideens’ tactics in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, which 
constitute the earliest transnational model for contemporary forms of terrorism, are not 
translatable to waging full-scale wars against civilians. He questions the true meaning of 
jihad (struggle) in Islam, i.e. that wars – even if driven by defense impulses – constitute 
the lesser jihad while the greater jihad lies in overcoming worldly temptations and 
leading an upright lifestyle. When branded as a traitor by the terrorist group, he 
emphasizes that the real traitor is the one betraying Islam’s message of love and peace 
through violence.    
Mourning the loss of eight lives claimed by his remotely triggered set-up bombing 
operation in France, Samir tearfully agonizes and prays to God for forgiveness. He 
reproaches the intelligence contractor for not valuing human life, and for sharing the 
premise of legitimating violence that the terrorists propagate. He refuses to acknowledge 
the contractor’s justification of violence through the good versus bad moral equivalence. 
When agent Clayton recognizes his heroism and informs him about his clean record, 
Samir expresses the heavy burden of the lost victims claimed throughout his counter-
terrorism duty: 
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I’m a free man? This doesn’t feel like freedom to me, Clayton. You think because you hit 
“delete” on some computer somewhere that that’s it, it’s over? I made choices about 
people’s lives. And I gotta live with that. 
 
This conscious rejection of violence reiterates Talal Asad’s critique of the moral 
justification of killing rooted in liberal, conservative, and radical logic alike.261  
 
The citizen-traitor paradox, as entertained in Traitor, projects Samir’s 
transnational identity at a crossroad of U.S. imperative patriotism and global Muslim 
morality consciousness. It unveils a necessary dimension of Arab/Muslim American 
interstitial activism that simultaneously contributes to contesting terrorism and maintains 
a critique of violence perpetuation. Samir identifies himself as an American Muslim 
whose faith guides his patriotic duty to protect his fellow Americans. When reminded by 
the intelligence contractor to remember who to answer to, he states, “I answer to God” to 
indicate that his actions are prompted by his religious duty to fighting terrorism. 
Meanwhile, he does not accept viewing the world through the Manichean paradigm of 
binary oppositions. His moral responsibility is rather informed by a religious code that 
stipulates, “If you kill an innocent person, it’s as if you’ve killed all mankind!”262 Even 
when reminded by agent Clayton that Islam similarly stipulates, “If you save a life, it’s 
like you’ve saved all mankind,” he chooses to sustain his mournful stance towards the 
innocent victims of his mission.263 Having seen, as his mother puts it, “enough deaths to 
understand the value of life,” he does not accept an offer to work with the FBI, and 
alternatively retires in a mosque, where he joins fellow worshippers in a remarkable 
blend of the Arab, the African, the Muslim, and the American in him.  
                                                 
261 Asad, On Suicide Bombing, 2007. 
262 Qurʾan, 5:32. 
263 Ibid. 
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Crossroads of Diasporic Agency and Geopolitics 
 
To further unpack the articulations of Arab American interstitial activism in the 
post-9/11 context – rendered possible for visual projection in Hollywood through 
Nachmanoff’s semi-nuanced portrayals of Samir’s diasporic life – this section 
interrogates a similar initiative in Egyptian cinema that foregrounds an interest in 
capturing the Arab American transnational subjectivity. Much like Traitor, the Egyptian 
film Laylat el-Baby Doll is disruptive of the mainstream industry in which it circulates. 
Released in 2008, the two films call for a critical and timely deviation from the polarizing 
frames of reference followed in Hollywood and Egyptian filmmaking. To do so, they 
destabilize the consistent reliance of filmmakers in the two cinemas to subjecting their 
imagery of Arab American cultural Otherness to a repertoire of sensational binaries 
rooted in a U.S.-Arab conflicting history. Directors Nachmanoff and Adeeb propose 
alternative representation strategies, more reflective of the diasporic public sphere within 
which Arab Americans continue to negotiate for a sense of transcultural citizenship. 
Rather than presenting their Arab American characters as a passive embodiment of what 
American and Arab audiences have grown accustomed to consume, they utilize the silver 
screen as a powerful medium to communicate the third space as a site of hybridity in the 
life of such characters, where they demonstrate an active sense of diasporic agency 
detrimental to their identity. The Arab American characters in this transnational 
framework function as interlocutors wrestling with issues of paramount concern to the 
Arab diasporic community in the United States, particularly in the war on terror context. 
As highlighted above, Samir personifies the post-9/11 Arab/Muslim American 
anxiety around the citizen-traitor paradox. This paradox reduces the Arab/Muslim 
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minority status into an exclusionary site of cultural citizenship, and advocates questions 
of belonging through racialized and nationalistic rhetoric. Nachmanoff’s staged 
construction of the paradox, though reflective of a disruptive imagination shaped by 
transcultural and multicultural projections, is still limited by its interaction with 
Hollywood’s one-dimensional depictions of Arabness. The possibility of soliciting appeal 
for Samir’s diasporic agency seems to be contingent on the vilification of the rest of  
Arab, Muslim, and Arab/Muslim American characters in the film. Another limitation in 
Nachmanoff’s transnational framework is its lack of a proper contextualization of the 
U.S.-Arab geopolitics. A nuanced reading of Samir’s diasporic activism necessitates a 
serious consideration of the Arab American transnational engagement with the war on 
terror issue beyond institutionally sanctioned missions to save civility and innocence in 
the United States. It requires a look into the Arab American transcultural negotiation for 
identity in light of U.S. interventions in the geopolitics of the Arab/Muslim worlds under 
the banner of fighting terrorism. 
 To address such limitations, I propose to lay an equal emphasis on the visual 
projections of Arab American interstitial activism in Laylat el-Baby Doll. Adeeb’s 
transnational framework invites postcolonial readings of the Arab American navigation 
of the disjuncture formed by the U.S. imperial presence in the Middle East and the 
subsequently generated resistance narratives.264 My reading is conscious of Naber’s 
critique of the existing impact of U.S. imperialism on Arab Americans, or as she refers to 
                                                 
264 Kaplan dates American imperialism back to the nineteenth century; Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire, 
2002; For a reading of U.S. imperialist presence in the Middle East, read Bacevich, American Empire, 
2002; Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 2005; Zalloum, Oil Crusades, 2007; Gerges, Obama and the Middle 
East, 2012.  
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them, “diasporas of empire.”265 The film presents Layla and Housam as two Arab 
American characters whose engagement with the U.S.-Arab geopolitics constitutes a 
ground for two different transmigrant experiences. This leads them to develop distinct 
forms of diasporic agency, which, unlike Samir’s citizen-traitor paradox, function in the 
broader context of U.S.-Arab geopolitics. Thus, integrating Samir, Layla, and Housam 
into an intertextual frame of analysis proves complementary and instrumental to 
consolidating the contribution of U.S.-Arab emerging subversive filmmaking.  
Laylat el-Baby Doll is a Good News film with the highest production budget in 
the history of Egyptian cinema, i.e., 40 million Egyptian pounds. In addition to this 
unprecedented budget, the film received much publicity because it featured 15 celebrities 
from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Tunisia. It advances a multi-layered narration style that 
promises imagery support for the parallel development of its six leading characters, each 
two characters represent American, Arab, and Arab American conflicting narratives on 
U.S.-Arab geopolitics. The complexity of its plot unravels through the intercutting scenes 
of Housam’s transnational family life and professional career. He has lived in the United 
States for twenty-nine years where he owns a travel agency but his wife resides in Egypt. 
He escorts an American peace delegation to Egypt, where he is responsible for arranging 
their travel logistics and safety. Arriving in Egypt for a one-day visit, i.e., 2007 New 
Year’s Eve, Housam struggles to balance time between his job and his marital life. As the 
plot unfolds, the audiences are walked through Housam’s U.S.-Arab transnational 
encounters while being introduced to the film’s other leading characters. 
                                                 
265 Naber, “Imperial Whiteness and the Diasporas of Empire,” 2014.  
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The visiting delegation includes two characters that represent two distinct 
American perspectives: Sarah Schroder (Layla Olwi) and General Peter (Gameel Rateb). 
Sara, the head of the American Organization for World Peace and Friendship, is a liberal 
democrat on a mission to advocate rejection of terrorism and promotion of peace and 
cooperation as alternatives to enhance understanding between Arabs and Americans. She 
is fluent in Arabic and conversant in the Islamic teachings of Qurʾan, Muslims’ Holy 
Book, Sunna, a collection of Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and practices, and Shariʿa, 
Islam’s set of moral and legal codes. As Egyptian newspaper headlines announce, she 
plans to attend a conference that seeks to improve the relationship between the Egyptian 
civil society and her organization. Her passion to spread peace, however, often takes 
idealized forms, and is a realization of her dream that violence in the Arab/Muslim 
worlds, especially against western entities (United States and Israel in this context), will 
ceases to incur further chaos and destruction.  
A more conservative American reading of the Arab/Muslim worlds is presented 
through the character of General Peter, a retired decorated marine commander whose 
right-wing conservative leanings have informed his primary support for the U.S. 
deployment of hard power in its foreign policy. As a military commander with a recent 
experience in managing the notorious Abou Ghraib prison, he is proud of being a role 
model of discipline and holds the military command “as sacred as the Holy Books”. He 
celebrates the American democratic ideals and constantly reiterates that democracy 
constitutes a monument of distinction between the United States and the Arab world. 
Unlike Sara’s deep commitment to understanding Arabs and Muslims, his mockery of 
Arabs’ customs and traditions renders him unwilling to accept their cultural difference. 
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Ultimately, he is emphatic that Arabs and Muslims hate Americans, but is too bewildered 
to provide an answer to his recurring question, why do they hate us?  
Sara and General Peter differ in respect of the U.S. use of hard power in its 
Mideast foreign policy calculations while share a belief in the role of neoliberal global 
economy to deliver peace. Sara blames the Bush administration’s post-9/11 hawkish 
measures to combatting terrorism for fueling anger among Arabs and Muslims whereas 
General Peter depicts the U.S. exercise of military power as a noble American gesture to 
help liberate them from the tyranny of their own rulers and to eradicate the terrorism of 
their extremists. The image that General Peter utilizes in describing the post-9/11 U.S.-
Arab geopolitics is one in which Arabs and Muslims are considered as “sick” populations 
“in need of cure” while Americans emerge as a sacrificial force healing them. While 
acknowledging the ailing conditions of Arabs and Muslims, Sara maintains that they 
cannot be treated against their will. This difference, though seemingly nuanced, offers a 
stereotypical reading of Americans, regardless of their political affiliations, as incapable 
of transcending their deep-seated cultural bias against the Arab/Muslim populations. 
Driven by their common characterization of Arabs and Muslims as disease-inflected 
people, Sara and General Peter take part in the delegation visit in hopes to provide a 
rescue narrative through trading transactions with Egyptian businesspersons. The 
philosophy of opening markets for multinational corporations, Sara argues, serves as a 
mediatory space for conflict resolution and tension reduction. General Peter, now a CEO 
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of a big unnamed U.S. corporation shares Sara’s philosophy, which underscores a 
critique of Thomas Friedman’s Golden Arches theory of conflict resolution.266  
The two American perspectives are positioned in conversation with two other 
perspectives that range across the Arabist-Islamist spectrum, and entertain overlapping 
critiques of U.S. imperialism.267 The first perspective is symbolized by Housam’s friend, 
Shokry (Syrian actor, Gamal Soliman), a Syrian alumnus of an Egyptian university 
currently working as a taxi cab driver.268 Unable to connect with Egyptian socialists and 
Islamists, Shokry finds himself more drawn to the postcolonial rescue narrative of Arab 
nationalism. When asked about life in Egypt, his response invokes a concern about the 
deteriorating sociopolitical circumstances in the rest of Arab homeland. His criticism of 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its long and firm support of Israel initially draws him close 
to the realm of violent resistance represented through the character of Awadin al-Asyoti 
(Nour el-Sherif) whose radical narrative projects the film’s second perspective. Awadin 
forsakes his electronic engineering career to indulge in a transformation process from an 
Arab hero partaking in the Arab-Israeli war (1973) and parts of the Soviet-Afghan war 
(1979-1989) as well as the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) into a terrorist targeting American 
tourists in Egypt. He now plots along with Shokry to blow up the Plaza Hotel hosting the 
American delegation.  
                                                 
266 The premise of the theory is that economic prosperity is the desired ultimate end towards which a 
nation-state progresses, primarily through its elite, and is that multinational corporations are essential in 
this progression; hence, conflicts or tensions would jeopardize the elite’s stability; Friedman, The Lexus 
and the Olive Tree, 1999. 
267 For a complete analysis of Arab/Muslim public opinion of the United States, read Telhami’s two works, 
The Stakes, 2002; The World Through Arab Eyes, 2013. 
268 Incorporating other Arab actors in the film speaks of a conscious effort to represent a trans-regional pan-
Arab reading of the U.S.-Arab tension. 
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Both Shokry and Awadin share the similar goal of communicating their 
disapproval of the U.S. “superpower syndrome” through terrorism.269 Their resort to 
violence is symbolic of Mitchell’s cloning terror conception, i.e., U.S.-led war on terror 
is bound to invoke more terror.270 Their commitment to violence, however, is contingent 
on the sources informing their grievances. Shokry’s support for radical forms of terrorism 
draws from his conflicting search for a postcolonial identity that aspires for Arab and 
Muslim sovereignty. The failure of mainstream Arabist, Islamist, and state nationalist 
narratives in delivering this sense of agency draws him closer to the charismatic Awadin 
whose devotion to resisting U.S. hegemony seems clear-sighted. Awadin’s radicalization 
is, however, informed by a personal grievance. As a media correspondent arbitrarily 
locked in the Abou Ghraib prison, he undergoes extreme forms of humiliation and torture 
that culminate in his emasculation by an American female soldier (Figure 12). The brutal 
death of his girlfriend, the Arab American Layla, at the hands of Israelis further dictates 
his resolution to seek revenge. As representative of mainstream Arab citizenry, Shokry 
emerges ever more disillusioned in Awadin’s promise of a fight for a just and noble 
cause. The decision costs Shokry his life in a critical reference to the cancerous effects of 
extremism, accelerated through intolerance and brutality. To emphasize the triumph of 
Arab mainstream rejection of this extremism, Awadin is shot dead prior to executing his 
threats. 
                                                 
269 Lifton, Superpower Syndrome. 2003. 
270 The concept can be challenged by arguing that the war on terror and terrorism are not necessarily 
identical measures as suggested by the word clone. Cloning, however, could still bear some validity, given 
that acts of terror do not operate in a vacuum; Mitchell, “Cloning terror,” 2008. 
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Figure 12 Awadin’s humiliation is a source for his acts of 
terrorism – courtesy of Laylat el-Baby Doll 
The last two perspectives presented in the film pertain to Arab American 
subjectivity. They place the characters of Layla and Housam in a transnational context 
that represents a disjuncture materializing out of the polarizing conversation between the 
Arab/Muslim critique of the United States, which Shokry and Awadin mediate through 
overlapping mainstream and extreme resistance narratives, and the American liberal and 
conservative interpretations of the U.S.-Arab tension, carried through Sara and General 
Peter. The multiplicity of such narratives has been criticized by Egyptian critics like 
Tariq el-Shinawi, Adel Abbas, Nader Adli, and Ashraf Bayoumi as disorienting and 
insufficiently developed.271 The film failed to find an audience in Egyptian movie 
theaters, which started withdrawing it by the third week after its release with estimated 
earnings of only five million Egyptian pounds.272 Despite this commercial failure, the 
film’s narrating style succeeds in capturing moments of disjuncture that allow for the 
                                                 
271 Staff, “Laylat el-Baby Doll: Cinematic Chaos between Sex and Politics,” Middle East Online. May 29, 
2008; Hussein, “El-Shinawi: Laylat el-Baby Doll’s scenario is week and not entertaining,” June 6, 2008. 
272 Gomaʿa, “Akthar al-Aflām bi-Tareekh al-Sinima al-Masriyya Yafshal,” June 27, 2008.  
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articulations of Layla’s and Housam’s Arab American transmigrant experience, which I 
argue, are located at the crossroads of diasporic agency and geopolitics. 
Director Adeeb’s portrayal of Layla brings into conversation a diasporic identity 
non-existent in the U.S. popular constructions of Arab Americans and Jewish Americans; 
an identity underexplored in both the Israeli and the Arab popular culture: the Arab-Jew 
American. Born and raised in the Egyptian neighborhoods of Faggala and Shoubra, she 
belongs to a community ranging from 700,000 to 850,000 Jews, who lived across the 
Middle East and North Africa prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, and developed 
a unique sense of Jewish Arabness or Arab Jewishness. Israeli scholar Amnon Raz-
Krakotzkin reads this sense of belonging as a translation of a lived “cultural-linguistic” 
reality in which Arab Jews mostly “identified themselves as Jews, but certainly not in 
opposition to Arab culture, to which they belonged quite organically.”273 As a child, 
Layla is forced to wrestle against the clashing nationalist narratives of Arabism and 
Zionism, increasingly polarized in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war (1967). The 
audiences are provided with a glimpse of this tension through a flashback to the post-war 
growing animosity against Arab Jews in Egypt and the subsequent disruptive 
consequences in her social life. Awadin, the neighborhood Arab Muslim kid, is warned 
not to play with her anymore because his older brother is killed in the war. She is 
eventually forced to leave Egypt as part of wider “population exchange” relocation and 
displacement programs sanctioned by Israeli and Arab governments, and orchestrated by 
western powers since 1948.274 The camera’s blurred projections of her departure suggest 
                                                 
273 Raz-Krakotzkin, “The Zionist Return to the West and the Miazrahi Jewish Perspective; as quoted by 
Levy, “Historicizing the Concept of Arab Jews in the Mashriq,” 2008. 
 
274 Shohat, Taboo Memories, Diasporic Voices, 201-232. 
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the director’s critique of the fuzziness of the community’s experience of uprootedness in 
the Arab collective memory.275     
 Reflecting on the disruptive nature of the Arab Jew displacement, Shohat 
maintains that Arab Jews arriving Israel were positioned in “a new linguistic and 
discursive environment, at once geopolitical (The Israeli-Arab conflict), legal (Israeli 
citizenship), and cultural (East versus West).”276 For Arab Jews opting to migrate to the 
United States like Layla, the film suggests, the disruptive experience, is not dissimilar but 
more complicated. Layla refuses to reject her Arab background, and chooses to sustain a 
romantic relationship with her childhood friend, Awadin, and maintain pro-Arab 
criticisms of Israeli aggressions. When Layla and Awadin reunite in Iraq as media 
correspondents covering the U.S. invasion, they passionately connect with each other and 
discuss their wedding plans upon her return from Gaza Strip. There, she is supposed to 
cover news of a protest organized by the international peace movement against Israel’s 
controversial wall construction project (aka, the Israeli-West Bank Barrier), which 
circumvents Palestinians’ mobility and impedes their ability to declare their independent 
state. Layla dispels Awadin’s blank stare at her pro-Palestinian stance by stressing that he 
should not be surprised that a girl like her (being Jewish) would act this way. She 
reiterates her deep connections to her Egyptian roots, which she does not believe 
contradict her Jewish identity and American citizenship. This constitutes a moment of 
disruption of the meta-associations that Arab-Jew Americans are to identify themselves 
with either, i.e. Arabness and Islam or Jewishness and Westernness. 
                                                 
275 For more about the Arab-Jew image in Egyptian cinema, read al-Harmarnah, “Discovering the Other,” 
2005. A reading of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestinian and Israeli filmmaking is available in Stein and 
Swedenburg, Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture, 2005.  
276 Ibid, 335. 
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The intersection of Layla’s multiple identities (i.e., Egyptian, Arab, Jew, and 
American) sheds lights on the complexity of the Arab American diasporic formations. 
The popular understanding of this category in the United States does not factor the Jewish 
identity into the make-up of the Arab American community. The primary reason that 
accounts for this limited understanding is the prevalence of two common misconceptions. 
First, there is a usual reference to the Middle East in terms of two broad and opposed 
identities, i.e. Arabs and Jews. In “Reflections by an Arab Jew,” Shohat stresses that the 
operating distinction in the Middle East “had always been ‘Muslim,’ ‘Jew,’ and 
‘Christian,’ not Arab versus Jew.” “The assumption is that ‘Arabness’,” she elaborates, 
“referred to a common shared culture and language, albeit with religious differences.” 
Second, there is a common misconceived association of Jewishness with Europeanness. 
Drawing from her personal experience as an Arab-Jew American, Shohat illustrates: 
Americans are often amazed to discover the existentially nauseating or charmingly exotic 
possibilities of such a syncretic identity. I recall a well-established colleague who despite 
my elaborate lessons on the history of Arab Jews, still had trouble understanding that I was 
not a tragic anomaly – for instance, the daughter of an Arab (Palestinian) and Israeli 
(European Jew). Living in North America makes it even more difficult to communicate 
that we are Jews and yet entitled to our Middle Eastern difference. And that we are Arabs 
and yet entitled to our religious difference, like Arab Christians and Arab Muslims…in an 
American context, we face again a hegemony that allows US to narrate a single Jewish 
memory, i.e., a European one. For those of US who don’t hide our Middle Easternness 
under one Jewish “we,” it becomes tougher and tougher to exist in an American context 
hostile to the very notion of Easterness…277 
Similar to Samir’s, Layla’s transmigrant experience raises questions around her 
allegiance and confines her within the citizen-traitor paradox. Transgressing the U.S. 
                                                 
277 Shohat, “Reflections by an Arab Jew,” 2012. 
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nationalist constructions of Arabness and Jewishness presents her as a viable Arab 
American diasporic model that renders the U.S.-Arab-Israeli sensational categorizations 
of identity troublesome and un-representative of her interstitial experience. Shedding 
lights on her experience serves as a critical reminder of the invalidity of western-guided 
mapping of ethnic identity alone nation-state lines. Choosing to embrace her Arab 
background further serves as a timely intervention in contemporary Arab cultural 
productions to illustrate the often conflated conceptions of Zionism and Jewishness. 
 
Figure 13 Layla talks some sense to an Israeli lieutenant 
moments before her death– courtesy of Laylat el-Baby Doll 
Adeeb relies on the disruptive nature of Layla’s diasporic identity to advance his 
critique of U.S.-Israel alliance in discrediting Arab grievances. Layla embodies this 
critique through pro-Palestinian stances in Rafah (Figure 13). She forsakes her role as a 
journalist and decides to stand up against the might of Israeli military. Described as “a 
romantic and idealist who believes in truth, justice, and humanity,” her defiance against 
an Israeli tank bent on demolishing the house of a Palestinian family is met with brutality. 
The tank runs over her body in an incident similar to the story of the American peace 
activist Rachel Corrie [Layla’s last name is Corrie].278 The incident, claimed by Israeli 
                                                 
278 Saliba, “On Rachel Corrie, Palestine, and Feminist Solidarity,” 2011. 
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authorities to be “an accident,” represents a moment of triumph for the Israeli project, 
which considers Layla a causality that deserves no sympathy even in the United States.  
The film draws this picture, perhaps more effectively, by referring to the pro-
Israel milieu in the United States. The ninety-minute-monologue My Name is Layla 
Corrie scheduled for performance in New York City, the audiences learn, is cancelled 
because “it is too sympathetic to the Palestinian point of view, and doesn’t fairly present 
the Israeli side.” “This act of censorship,” a peace activist exclaims, “[occurs] in the very 
nation that claims to be an example of democracy, justice, and freedom!” Throughout the 
film, the U.S.-Israeli alliance, manifested through the U.S. monetary, military, political, 
and cultural support, is projected as a geopolitical front for an imperial project that 
continues to disregard the aspirations and demands of Arabs and Muslims. “Until when 
America will continue to challenge the world in this way?!” wonders a frustrated 
character. The popular song Ya ʿAam ʿArabi Isḥa (Uncle Arab, Wake Up, 2004), is 
played out in the film as a critical reminder of this sentiment: 
Two sides of the coin: America and Israel. 
They turned the world a jungle, 
And lit the fuse! 
America and Israel, 
Are but bullies. 
And, for many years, 
They have become terrorists. 
Two wide hands, 
Grabbing the whole region.  
They’ll slice it up, 
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And pass it out.
279 
Incorporating the song builds on its popular mediation of Arabs’ rejection of this 
geopolitical alliance, which Adeeb attributes to the susceptibility of the U.S. governing 
system to the impact of Israeli lobbying. In this context, the AIPAC is depicted as the 
ultimate lobbying force spearheaded by neoconservatives promoting the vitality of U.S.-
Israeli strategic partnership through influential contributions to the electoral campaigns of 
U.S. presidents and congressional representatives. “The fact that we all know,” a 
journalist notes, “is that in order for any candidate to win the presidential election in the 
United States, he has first to appeal to the AIPAC and secure its approval. To put it 
simply, Israel is the one controlling the American foreign policy, and not vice versa.”  
This is a reductive reading that does not take into consideration that the Israeli 
lobby is rather a cluster of individuals and organizations dedicated to maintaining the 
well-being of Israel through advocacy at the government and public levels.280 Advocacy 
organizations, special interests groups, think tanks, neo-conservatives, Christian Zionists, 
and Jewish Zionists form a coalition, though not unified under a central leadership, tends 
to exert influence across the U.S. political spectrum and cultural sphere.281 Meanwhile, 
the film renders absent the role of cold war and war on terror politics as well as 
Orientalist constructions in sustaining this alliance. Nonetheless, it foregrounds the 
alliance unholy as it has allowed Israel to violate Islamic and Christian religious sites, 
                                                 
279 This is a song by the Egyptian popular singer Shaʿbān Abd el-Raḥim whose style is known for the 
simplicity of lyrics and performance. It is a follow-up song to an earlier, perhaps more popular, song “Ana 
Bakrah Israel” (I Hate Israel, 2000). Both songs are featured in the film; for more about the impact of Abd 
el-Rahim’s popular music, see Gordon, “Singing the Pulse of the Egyptian-Arab Street,” 2003. 
280 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. 112. 
281 The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations (COP), the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy (WINEP), Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs (JINSA), and the Middle East Forum (MEF) are but some to name. 
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deny Palestinians the right to establish their own stable state, and contribute to tension in 
the Middle East through its military deployment, population displacement, and territorial 
expansion.  
This alliance, the film suggests, serves as a geopolitical site of tension that both 
circulates a sentiment of oppression in the Arab world, and generates a sense of urgency 
for activism in the lives of Arabs and their diaspora in the United States. It is in this 
context that diasporic activism for a character like Layla reaches a fatal ending. Her calls 
for peace and co-existence fail the test of transcending the strictly drawn national 
boundaries carved around her own multiple identities. The U.S.-Israeli alliance does not 
permit her Jewishness and Americanness to unfold in ways that accommodate her Arab 
cause. The brutal ending to her life in Israel and the committed rejection of American 
cultural producers to commemorate her heroism juxtapose a sense of exclusion that 
demonstrates the importance of considering geopolitics as a necessary disjuncture in the 
manufacturing of an Arab American interstitial activism.  
Parallel to Layla’s model of martyrdom, Housam represents another model of 
Arab American interstitial activism. Like Layla, he chooses to embrace a tone that calls 
for peace and co-existence with Israel. Mindful of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, he 
advocates ending bloodshed and devastation. When reminded by a journalist about the 
Israeli scale of devastation, he pleads the audiences to “forgive and forget.” “Time is 
surly capable of making us forget our pains and agonies,” he reflects, “just like life: sun 
and rain, thunder and lightning, storms and hurricanes, and then sun again!” Housam’s 
call for peace is not communicated without exhibiting an active awareness of Israeli 
aggressions, particularly in the occupied territories. He still grieves over the death of his 
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girlfriend fallen a victim to an Israeli military invasion of the Nativity Church in 
Bethlehem. He sincerely sympathizes with Sara’s personal account of her family’s 
terrifying Holocaust surviving experience – reenacted in the film – and is reflective of the 
Holocaust-like Palestinian experience. “What the Israeli army does nowadays with the 
Palestinians,” he follows-up, “is a lot worse than what Hitler did with the Jews!” To 
emphasize his message, the camera cuts to a screen shot of a statement by the Israeli 
deputy defense minister, Matan Vilnai: 
Millions of Jews were killed in the Holocaust concentration camp. Millions of Christians, 
Freemasons, Gypsies, and Communists were killed in the Holocaust. Palestinians will 
bring a Holocaust upon themselves by stepping up cross border rocket fire from the Gaza 
Strip.282 
“Do you know,” he further asks rhetorically, “there are millions of mothers in Palestine, 
Iraq, and Lebanon today, in the beginning of the third millennium, who have the same 
feelings of fear that your mother had?” When Sara protests the reference to Hitler, he 
maintains that “oppression, injustice, tyranny, and dictatorship remain despite change of 
names.” Another screenshot displays, “According to UNRWA, the number of Palestinian 
refugees in the Near East registered since 1948 is around 5 million.” 
Housam contests Americans’ expectations of Arabs and Muslims to embrace 
peace as their ultimate salvation without reflecting on the role of U.S. government in 
escalating the tension. Sara’s passionate efforts to convince Arabs and Muslims to end 
their “anti-American boiling state of anger,” as she puts it, exhibit an inherent critique of 
                                                 
282 This is an appropriation of Vilnai’s radio statement: “As the rocket fire grows, and the range increases – 
and they haven't yet said the last word on this – they are bringing upon themselves [Palestinians] a greater 
Shoah [Hebrew word for Holocaust] because we will use all our strength in every way we deem 
appropriate, whether in air strikes or on the ground;” Macintyre, ““Israel's Warning,” March 1, 2008 
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U.S. foreign policy. “How can I talk about equality,” she states, “while I behave in a 
racist way with my black colleague, refuse to talk to a student because he is a Muslim, or 
refuse to participate in a competition just because there is a Jewish student.” Housam 
reiterates the U.S. responsibility in enforcing peace through sponsoring Arab-Israeli 
negotiations, suspending its military operations in Iraq, adopting a more engaging foreign 
policy approach, and loosening its restrictive policies against Arab/Muslim Americans. 
He registers his critique by emphasizing the elements of hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy: 
Like millions of people in the world, I was dreaming of American democracy – America 
that liberated the world from Hitler’s Nazism and Mussolini’s fascism… But 
unfortunately, President Bush went beyond Hitler and Mussolini by expressing his own 
will. He destroyed Afghanistan, bombed Iraq, which allowed terrorism to spread around 
the globe… You spent three trillion dollars. Imagine if this money was spent to develop the 
region, improving health care, education, and creating projects. Surely, this was going to 
be the biggest war against terrorism! 
Housam invites the audiences to learn about his personal experience of the backlash 
against Middle Eastern-looking Americans in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. He 
recounts how someone confronted him in a New York bar about his Muslim identity, and 
in search for revenge, attacked him with a knife. This leads Housam, during his 
conversation with Sara, to demand that the United States adopt laws that ban hatred 
against Arabs and Muslims.  
To account for Housam’s diasporic agency in pronouncing an interstitial sense of 
activism, Adeeb presents him as a mediator of the polarizing narratives across the United 
States and the Arab world. In addition to his engagement with Sara, which already 
reflects an Arab American diasporic consciousness of mutually informing demands of the 
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local (complaints against racial profiling and cultural citizenship exclusion in the United 
States) and the global (U.S.-Arab geopolitics), he continues to communicate a critical 
tone with General Peter, Shokry, and Awadin. His encounter with General Peter reflects 
an Arab diasporic anxiety around the polarizing rhetoric emerging in the U.S. war on 
terror context. In a conversation structured to dismantle stereotypes that have dominated 
U.S.-Arab cultural politics since 9/11, they are set to correct each other’s statements. 
When General Peter protests the Arab sensational readings of George W Bush, Dick 
Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice as the embodiment of a pro-war American society, 
Housam challenges the stereotypical reading of Osama bin Laden as the embodiment of a 
terrorism breathing Arab/Muslim world. In his attempt to justify the U.S. interventionist 
foreign policy, General Peter anguishes at the loss of three thousand and five hundred 
civilians during the 9/11 attacks. Housam, in turn, criticizes the consequences of U.S. 
foreign policy, i.e., death and injury of “one million” Palestinians since the inception of 
the Israeli state. Unable to make sense of Arabs’ grievances against the United States, 
General Peter urges Housam, “You have to try to understand us.” Housam responds that 
the U.S. foreign policy needs to use the “appropriate” language to allow for proper cross-
cultural communication.  
Housam’s engagement with Sara and General Peter is set to denounce the U.S. 
exercise of hard power as a sign of imperialism, which they present as a form of liberal 
internationalism.283 An allegorical reference to his denouncement is illustrated through 
his inability to hand the baby doll nightgown to his Egyptian wife; he purchases the 
                                                 
283 For a reading of debates around U.S. foreign policy between imperial internationalism and liberal 
internationalism, refer to Ikenberry, Knock, et al, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, 2009; Mahdi, 
“Liberal or Imperial?,” 2015; 
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nightgown in New York in order to stimulate his sexual life. The film’s poster shows the 
baby doll laid over a U.S. tank (Figure 14). The nightgown, according to Mohamed, 
symbolizes that “which is American and western and does not belong on the Arab 
body.”284 The director emphasizes this rejection through Awadin’s response to General 
Peter’s reference to the logic of necessity in the U.S. adoption of war in terror measures, 
proposed and sustained by both the Bush and Obama administrations. “Frankly,” Awadin 
says in a reproachable tone, “I am surprised! America, the symbol of the free world, has 
emergency laws, martial courts, preemptive imprisonment policies, and spying on 
peoples’ phone calls tactics, and worse, imposes restrictions on media.” General,” he 
raises his voice in a sarcastic tone, “Welcome to the Third World!” In Arabic, the 
expression connotes an identification of the United States with the third world national 
politics, which assumes emergency status and denies nationals full access to their rights. 
Similar to his critique of his fellow Americans, Housam maintains a critical 
attitude in his encounters with his fellow Arabs and Muslims. He challenges Shokry 
about the legitimacy of targeting innocent civilians, and eventually convinces him to 
denounce it as a heinous act of terror. Responding to Shokry’s initial praise of Awadin as 
a hero, Housam emphasizes that “the one who is trying to blow up a ship of civilian 
tourists is a terrorist.” He categorically rejects any rhetoric justifying violence. He 
denounces Shokry’s plan to blow up the hotel to avenge Awadin’s experience of injustice 
in the Abu Ghraib prison. “I am a tourist not a terrorist expert,” he maintains, “but the 
most hideous crime against humanity is that we try to find excuses for terrorism.” To 
validate his critique, Housam recounts his post-9/11 victimization and cites it as an 
                                                 
284 Eid, Who Defines me?, 176. 
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example of how oppression should not justify violent resistance. Even when being used 
by Awadin as a body-shield against the bullets of the police force, he does not hesitate to 
attempt to convince him [Awadin] to acknowledge the tragic scale of his actions, and to 
hand himself over to authorities. He praises Awadin’s heroic past of fighting for Arab 
and Muslim causes against oppression and injustice, and pleads that he refrains from 
ruining that history by sliding down the scale of public respect.  
 
Figure 14 The Baby Doll laid over a U.S. 
military tank – courtesy of Laylat el-Baby Doll 
Housam’s interaction with each narrative solidifies the film’s multi-layered 
narration style and, more importantly, elucidates the Arab American diasporic public 
sphere within which he operates. This multifaceted interaction suggests the complexity of 
the Arab American transnational experience in negotiating the U.S.-Arab geopolitical 
terrains and their underlying narratives. It forces him to battle the question of allegiance 
implicated in the afore-mentioned citizen-traitor paradox. Like Samir and Layla, his 
loyalty is constantly questioned as he contests U.S.-Arab polarizations. Shokry advises 
him to forsake the U.S. alienating culture and connect more with his Arab/Muslim 
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backgrounds. Awadin accuses him of being “an American agent” who has betrayed his 
people. Sara and General Peter continue to address him as the Arab and do not recognize 
his American cultural identity. This paradox reflects a troubling double-layered process 
of Otherness that Arab American diasporic agency is set to disrupt.  
Housam’s multi-layered interactions with Sara, General Peters, Shokry, and 
Awadin unveil a new way of consciousness surrounding the Arab American transnational 
experience. The film renders his character central to navigating U.S.-Arab and Arab-
Israeli geopolitics without necessarily compromising his entitlement to a distinct 
diasporic agency. Unlike Samir and Layla, Housam chooses not to retreat from fully 
advancing his interstitial activist stances through direct conversations, which serve as a 
reminder to the audiences of the transnational complexity of the Arab American position. 
This is not to denounce the particularities of circumstances defining the interstitial 
experience of Samir and Layla, but to rather illustrate the various possibilities of 
scenarios enveloping the Arab Americans’ diasporic interrogation of U.S.-Arab 
encounters. The totality of the dimensions represented by each character offers an 
example of potential grounds to subvert U.S.-Arab mainstream representation patterns in 
search for full articulations of the Arab American cultural citizenship.  
 
Conclusion 
Laylat el-Baby Doll ends with an emotionally captivating song calling for a re-
evaluation of strictly informed nationalist polarizing politics and advocating for a 
reconciliatory tone with a promising impact on U.S.-Arab geopolitical divide and lived 
realities spanned across it including those of the Arab diaspora: 
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Why? Why can’t I see? 
Though my eyes are open! 
How can I sing, 
If my soul is hurt?! 
How and why 
Do we prey on each other? 
Enough space is there for us! 
 
The three Arab American characters discussed in this chapter exhibit a diasporic public 
sphere that diffuses nationalistic constructions of loyalty and belonging. In this context, a 
new type of cultural citizenship emerges as illustrative of the Arab American interstitial 
activism and diasporic agency. This sense of citizenship calls into consideration Maira’s 
notion of “flexible citizenship,” which she defines as “a manifestation of both 
postnational and denationalized citizenship, for it emerges in response to changes in the 
institution of citizenship within nation-states as well as shifts in power on national and 
global scales.” She illustrates: 
The concept is different from traditional dual citizenship, which imply an actual legal 
status as citizen of two nation-states; in contrast, flexible citizenship leaves open questions 
of national loyalty or strategic uses of citizenship status for legal and economic purposes. It 
is a form of citizenship that responds to the conditions of globalization and U.S. 
domination.285 
Both Traitor and Laylat el-Baby Doll offer serious attempts in the U.S.-Arab 
mainstream cinemas that mediate an alternative way of imagining the Arab American 
community. Samir, Layla, and Housam share a deep commitment to defy the dictations of 
national politics, and embody various responses to the U.S.-Arab polarizing cultural 
politics in the post-9/11 context. Samir challenges racial profiling and fights terrorism in 
                                                 
285 Maira, Missing, 101.  
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ways that do not compromise his religious adherences or sense of patriotism. Layla 
voices an Arab American investment in peaceful activism, and pays her life as the 
ultimate price for standing against the Israeli oppression. Housam demonstrates a concern 
for U.S. national security while maintaining a critique of the U.S. domestic and foreign 
policies. The three characters, in a word, project critical diasporic echoes in the Arab 
American subjectivity as imagined in the emerging disruptive contributions to the U.S.-
Arab cinematic landscape. This disruption is further sustained through a burgeoning Arab 
American film industry to be addressed in the subsequent chapter.  
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Chapter IV Reclaiming Arab American Agency through Self-Representation 
  
 
    
    [It] feels to me this is our time. Other ethnic groups have had their time too. I mean the African 
American filmmakers have certainly emerged. Hispanic filmmakers have emerged…It’s now or 
never really for the Arab American community. It’s time for all of us to…embrace the fact that 
… the time is ripe and we’ll have to become proactive…to billboard the idea that if we … don’t 
initiate it ourselves, it’s not gonna happen.” 
—   Tony Shalhoub, Interview at New York Arab American and South Asian Festival 
    
    I believe that it is in you to be good citizens. 
    And what is it to be a good citizen? 
    It is to acknowledge the other person's rights before asserting your own, but always to be 
conscious of your own. 
    It is to be free in word and deed, but it is also to know that your freedom is subject to the other 
person's freedom… 
    It is to stand before the towers of New York and Washington, Chicago and San Francisco 
saying in your hearts, "I am the descendent of a people that builded Damascus and Byblos, and 
Tyre and Sidon and Antioch, and I am here to build with you, and with a will." 
    It is to be proud of being an American, but it is also to be proud that your fathers and mothers 
came from a land upon which God laid His gracious hand and raised His messengers. 
    Young Americans of Syrian origin, I believe in you 
—   Kahlil Gibran, To Young Americans of Syrian Origin 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Perhaps Moustapha Akkad (1930-2005), known for producing the Halloween film 
series (1978-2002), is the most recognized Arab American to proactively engage with 
Hollywood filmmaking industry in the pre-9/11 context.286 He is best recognized in the 
Arab world for directing two canonical films, which emphasize a de-Orientalized reading 
of Arab/Muslim history. The first film, Mohammad, Messenger of God – released in 
                                                 
286 Akkad was uncredited for Halloween (1978), Halloween II (1981), and Halloween III (1982), see 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0002160/  
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Arabic as al-Risālah (1976) and English as The Message (1977) – captures the biography 
of the prophet of Islam, and delivers an important insight into the birth of the religion. 
The second film, Lion of the Desert (1981), narrates the real life story of the Bedouin, 
Omar Mukhtar (Anthony Quinn) and his role in leading a struggle against the Italian 
colonial presence in Libya. Unfortunately, he passed away in 2005 without completing 
his much anticipated epic work on Saladin.287 Akkad’s filmic contributions reflect an 
Arab American consciousness of his role in mediating the Arab/Muslim history through a 
U.S. cultural industry replete with anti-Arab reductive imagery. As a diasporic 
filmmaker, he has stressed the need for works like his to act as a bridge between the 
Arab/Muslim worlds and the west: 
I did the film [The Message] because it is a personal thing for me. Besides its production 
values as a film, it has its story, its intrigue, its drama. Beside[s] all this I think there was 
something personal, being a Muslim myself who lived in the West I felt that it was my 
obligation, my duty, to tell the truth about Islam. It is a religion that has a 700-million 
following, yet it's so little known about it, which surprised me. I thought I should tell the 
story that will bring this bridge, this gap to the west.288 
 
Akkad’s struggle to secure finance for his projects in Hollywood prompted him to tour 
the Arab world in search for support to his high budget films. His effort to transgress 
Hollywood’s dominant filmmaking topography speaks of a factor accounting for the 
weak presence of Arab/Muslim American filmmakers in the cinema, i.e., financial 
support to works committed to subverting its dismissive history of Islam and Arabness.   
The lack of enthusiasm in Hollywood for supporting Arab/Muslim American 
filmmakers have forced them to follow Akkad’s route and search for alternative means of 
support. An Arab American director like Rafi Girgis has sought the Arab market and 
                                                 
287 Al-Atraqchi, “Halloween Producer's Epic Plan,” September 2, 2007. 
288 IMBD Quotes, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0002160/bio?ref_=nm_dyk_qt_sm#quotes   
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produced a work that caters to Arab audiences, Tayeh fi Amrika (Lost in America, 2002). 
In the film, Girgis is critical of the post-9/11 backlash against Arabs, and explores the 
lives of Egyptian and Lebanese Americans in California in a way that registers their 
interaction with the overwhelming American material life-style. Arab values are put into 
question as they become rudimentary to discerning Americanized Arabs from those who 
choose to cling to their Arab roots, thereby, reproducing binaries central to the Egyptian 
mainstream filmmaking. Despite Girgis’ best efforts to promote a diasporic reading of the 
Arab American transmigrant experience, his interventions remain severely limited by the 
Egyptian cinema’s representation codes. 
The film starts with an airplane scene featuring two Egyptians coming from two 
different economic backgrounds: an aspiring working class Sherif (Khalid el-Nabawi) 
seeking to realize his American Dream with only $200 in his pocket, and a business 
entrepreneur Adel (Mohammed Lotfy) traveling to be introduced to his Egyptian 
American cousin, Nour (Hala Shiha), as part of marriage arrangement plans. They are 
both destined to experience the blessings and curses of materialism, and California seems 
to be a good spatial fit. At the airport arrivals, Nour and her mother, Nahla (Eman), are 
waiting for Adel, who is now being held by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBC) 
officers that mistake his dried mulukhiyya (a type of mallow leaves used in Arabic 
cuisine) for marijuana, and is being forced to stay the night waiting for a translator. 
Unable to afford taxi and lodging costs, Sherif decides to spend the night at the airport, 
but overhears that Nour and Nahla do not know what Adel looks like. Immediately, he 
impersonates Adel’s character and is welcomed accordingly.  
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The acting-like-Adel Sherif enjoys the ride and spends the night at their spacious 
villa. Later that night, he overhears a conversation between Nour and Nahla in which they 
reveal the materialist nature of the marriage arrangement. In the conversation, Nahla 
emerges as an embodiment of Americanized Arabs whose obsession with material 
possessions and desire to maintain a wealthy life-style preclude any sense of care to one’s 
own children. Sherif decides to stay and enjoy a temporary wealthy status. He is served 
by an English butler, and has easy access to fancy food, brand clothing, and nice cars. He 
also dates the beautiful Nour and falls in love with her. The temporal nature of the status 
haunts him and reminds him of sea waves, which start big and promising but collapse and 
vanish at the shore. Such is the promise of materialism embodied by Nahla who is now 
plotting to convince the acting-like-Adel Sherif to sell his properties and business in 
Egypt and settle down in the United States. During the wedding, she is dedicated to 
secure her material well-being by inviting a close friend to discuss business proposals 
with Sherif. She stresses that her actions grow out of an interest in guaranteeing her 
daughter’s well-being; her friend nods sarcastically.  
Contrary to this image of Arab Americans as searchers of wealth and status, a 
Lebanese American nurse named Eman (Rajia Baroudi) tends to the real Adel, who is 
hospitalized after being gang shot. Eman’s character offers the audience a break from the 
suffocating images of materialism saturating the lives of Nahla, Nour, and Sherif. Her 
first means of connecting with Adel is communicating in Arabic, and she does not 
hesitate to show her excitement in doing so. Then, she connects with him a bit further by 
referencing classic Arabic music and films. Knowing that Adel is lost and is unable to 
contact his family in California, she proves hospitable by inviting him to stay at her 
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decent apartment. Eman further demonstrates her awlad al-balad code of honor by 
orienting him to life in the States. In addition to sharing his sorrows, she tries to bring 
happiness to his life by purchasing airlines tickets to allow him return to Egypt. Her 
Lebanese background underscores an Arab nationalist message, i.e., regardless of 
differences in national cultures, Arabs still share common cultural codes and heritage, 
ought to be maintained in the United States. 
Parallel to the Egyptian cinema’s limited engagement with Arab American 
filmmakers to the post-9/11 Arab American subjectivity, Bollywood has provided its own 
accounts of the South Asian diasporic experience in the United States, particularly in the 
context of terrorism. The popular Indian star Shah Rukh Khan, for instance, has played 
the role of Rizvan Khan, an Indian Muslim with Asperger's syndrome, who struggles in 
the United States to maintain an active diasporic identity in an environment that 
constantly projects him as the cultural Other. The film My Name is Khan and I am not a 
Terrorist (2010) has made it possible for the South Asian diaspora to register a valid 
critique of the impact of racial profiling on issues of citizenship and allegiance. It gained 
marketable recognition, especially when the lead actor himself was subjected to TSA’s 
racially informed scrutiny of Arabs, Muslims, and look-a-likes at Newark airport.289 The 
visions offered in this film along with others like Cavite (2005) and Kurbaan (2009) vary 
in their readings of terrorism and limit their construction of South Asian subjectivity to 
Bollywood’s recycled portrayals of the Hindu-Muslim religious tension in India. They 
promote interfaith harmony in a context that does not necessarily address the American 
sociocultural complexity.  
                                                 
289 Bhatnagar, “Commentary,” August 31, 2009. 
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Perhaps, Mira Nair’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist (2012), an adaption of the 
novel bearing the same title by U.S. educated and British Pakistani author Mohsin Hamid 
(2007), represents the first serious diasporic attempt to emphasize the post-9/11 identity 
conflation of Middle Easterners, South Asians, and look-a-likes. With production support 
from the Doha Film Institute, the New York-based Indian filmmaker invites the British 
Pakistani actor Riz Ahmed to personify the role of a Pakistani American’s exploration of 
the transnational contours of a diasporic consciousness that articulates a common 
postcolonial search for identification against the disruptive force of U.S. hegemony. The 
film, therefore, reflects critical South Asian diasporic voices, and examines their role in 
communicating issues of concern to the Arab American community.290  
Addressing the Arab American subjectivity, which operates within a unique 
identity paradox subjecting Arab Americans to embattle an institutional assignment of 
persons from the MENA region to the White/Caucasian race and a post-9/11 citizen-
terrorist racialized anxiety, has necessitated the rise of Arab American voices to reclaim 
their sense of agency through self-representation. This has been possible with the 
proliferation of Middle Eastern American efforts in the popular culture realm to mediate 
representations that account for their visibility. Comedians like Ahmed Ahmed, Maz 
Jobrani, Aron Kader, Dean Obeidallah, Azhar Usman, Aasif Mandvi, Aziz Ansari, and 
Maysoon Zayid have contributed to a momentum that adds a personal critique against the 
rising sense of Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism.291 The arrival of Aljazeera America 
has ushered an era of welcomed disruptions to mainstream media and offered the space 
                                                 
290 Maira and Shihade, “Meeting Asian/Arab American Studies,” 2006; Nair, The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist, 2013. 
291 Jalil, Allah Made Me Funny, 2004; Jobrani, The Axis of Evil Comedy Tour, 2007; Ahmed, Just Like Us 
2010; Farsad, The Muslims are Coming, 2013. 
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for the Arab/Muslim American communities to circulate their often silenced perspectives. 
Arab American literary figures such as Suheir Hammad, Mohja Kahf, Kathy Haddad, and 
Alaa al-Aswany have produced works that capture the nuances of diasporic identity in the 
post-9/11 context.292 Realty TV shows like All American Muslims (2011-2012) and Shahs 
of Sunset (2012-present) project the Middle Eastern American participants as individuals 
with various concerns and priorities in life.293  
Independent filmmaking has forged a space for Arab/Muslim Americans to 
reclaim their agency through circulating their own representations. This has been 
facilitated through the growth of Arab and Arab American film festivals, particularly in 
the United States, e.g., the Arab American Film Festival (Arab American National 
Museum), the Arab Film Festivals (California and Minnesota), the Palestine Film 
Festivals (Boston, Houston, and Chicago), and the Arab American and South Asian 
Festival as well as the Middle Eastern Film Festival (New York City). Arab/Muslim 
American directors like Hany Abu-Assad, Omar Majeed, and Qasim Basir, to name a 
few, have experimented with a number of films like Paradise Now (2005), Taqwacore 
(2009), and Mooz-lum (2010) in their investigation of the ambivalence of religion and its 
sociopolitical complexity. It is in this context that the Arab American agency spells out 
more urgently, I argue, through a burgeoning Arab American filmic trend, which seeks to 
challenge, if not depart from, the dominant forms of representation in Hollywood and 
Egyptian cinema. 
                                                 
292 For a reading of Arab American literature, see Majaj, “Arab-American Literature,” 2008; Fadda-Conrey, 
Contemporary Arab-American Literature, 2014. 
293 TLC’s All American Muslims generated a number of controversies among Muslims and Islamophobes 
alike; see, Ali, “The Reality of the 'All-American Muslim' Reality TV Show,” November 17, 2011; 
Poniewozik, “Was All-American Muslim Too Controversial, Too Boring, or Too Good to Survive?” March 
08, 2012. 
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To unpack this trend, this chapter presents a reading of three Arab American films 
that have attracted limited attention of U.S. distributors, i.e., Hesham Issawi’s 
AmericanEast (2008), Cherien Dabis’ Amreeka (2009), and Rola Nashef’s Detroit 
Unleaded (2013). The primary purpose of this reading is to examine how the burgeoning 
Arab American filmmaking direction, not only constitutes a counter-narrative to the 
discursive formations of Hollywood and Egyptian cinema, but also demonstrates an 
urgency to imagine a sense of diasporic agency rooted in self-representation. Films 
produced in this direction exhibit certain “accented” elements, to borrow Hamid Naficy’s 
description of exilic and diasporic filmmaking, with their distinct images and “peculiar 
spectatorial environment.”294 The reading unfolds in three main dimensions. It identifies 
AmericanEast as the first serious attempt to re-imagine acting career possibilities for 
Arab American performers beyond absence in Egyptian cinema and terrorism in 
Hollywood. It underscores an Arab American filmmaking emphasis in Amreeka on the 
Arab American negotiation process for an identity riddled with such particularities as 
nationality, religion, and generation. It also reads Detroit Unleaded as a reiteration of my 
critique of the Arab American image in the U.S.-Arab mainstream industries as one 
confining the community to storylines informed by terrorism and geopolitics. These three 
dimensions, I contend, constitute critical interventions in filmmaking that re-draw 
boundaries around Arab American subjectivity, which –  in addition to the element of 
interstitial activism presented in chapter III – foreground self-representation as another 
critical component to full articulations of the Arab American diasporic agency.  
 
                                                 
294 Naficy, An Accented Cinema, 4-9. 
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Reenacting Arab American Visibility 
 
As illustrated above, Girgis’ Tayeh fi Amrika represents an Arab American 
filmmaking attempt to mediate Arab American subjectivity. The significance of this film 
lies in the director’s choice of the Nabawy and Baroudi, to embody a positive Arab 
American role. They are the first Arab diasporic actors to play an Arab American role in 
a film marketed to the audiences of the Egyptian cinema. Nowhere in the cinema’s 
history has there been an interest in featuring Arab diasporic actors in roles dedicated to 
mediating Arab American subjectivity. In casting, Arab American foreignness has rather 
prioritized the proximity of appearance and accent to stereotypical America. 
Alternatively, Hollywood has been the primary medium through which the Arab/Muslim 
diasporic performers have pursued their acting career.  
Historically, casting Arab/Muslim lead roles has not necessarily demanded 
authenticity. As early as The Sheikh (1921) and as late as The TV drama Tyrant (2014-
present) non-Arab actors like Rudolph Valentino and Adam Rayner have dominated 
Hollywood’s casting for Arab lead roles.295 Meanwhile, the abundance of works 
advancing one-dimensional portrayals of Arabs and Arab Americans has been an 
attractive option to Middle Eastern looking actors. Israeli diasporic filmmakers, as 
demonstrated in chapter I, have relied on Israeli and Israeli American actors. Mizrahim 
actors, for instance, play “dubious Middle Eastern roles of either fanatic terrorists or of 
noble savages” in films like Rambo III (1988), Steal the sky (1988), Not Without My 
Daughter (1991), and True Lies (1998).296 Hollywood’s dependency on actors willing to 
                                                 
295 Fienberg, “Why it Matters that FX’s ‘Tyrant’ Didn't Cast a Middle Eastern Actor in its Lead Role,” June 
24, 2014. Also, see Nance, How the Arabian Nights Inspired the American Dream, 2009. 
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play superficial caricature of Arabness and Arab American subjectivity, which Alsultany 
reads as a token of racialization, has forced the majority of the Arab/Arab American 
actors to struggle against its casting practices.297 While some mixed-race actors of Arab 
descent like Zoe Saldana, Vince Vaughn, F. Murray Abraham, Paula Abdul, Jerry 
Seinfeld, Shannon Elizabeth, Salma Hayek, Catherine Keener, and Wentworth Miller 
have been fortunate to receive recognition without playing recycled Arab roles, the 
success of Arab American actors like Omar Sharif, Jay Abdo, Tony Shalhoub, Michael 
Nouri, and Omar Metwally is in part a response to their ability to outperform the negative 
roles specified for their ethnicity.  
The majority of Arab and Arab American actors are still struggling against a 
performance dilemma that conditions their visibility in the entertainment realm to playing 
most readily available roles, which are usually subsidiary and deeply entrenched in a 
racial hierarchy that does not reflect the consumer demands for more diversity in lead 
roles.298 Arab/Muslim American actors like Rami Malek, Haaz Sleiman, Nasser Faris, 
and Kamal Marayati are weary of the marginality of the Arab American acting 
experience. This marginality even risks lack of appropriate acknowledgement in the 
credits of a film like Executive Decision (1996). Shaheen illustrates: 
Though the credits state that Nagi Hassan is portrayed by David Suchet, the credits do not 
offer names for Nagi’s cohorts; they are simply billed as “Terrorists.” Two American 
Muslim actors, Sayed Badreya and Majed Ibrahim, portray two of these terrorists.299 
                                                 
297 Alsultany, “Representations of Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 Television Dramas,”2014. 
298 See Bunche Center for African American Studies, 2014 Hollywood Diversity Report and 2015 
Hollywood Diversity Report.  
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Figure 15 Pakistani-English actor Art Malik plays the role of a 
crazed Arab terrorist – courtesy of True Lies 
 
In addition to their search for recognition, the actors have also grown weary of 
impersonating characters that do not simply represent their own cultural backgrounds. 
Egyptian American comedian Ahmed takes a conscious decision to stop playing the 
“terrorist” role, a decision that hurts his acting career but eventually pushes him to 
explore the comedy venue.300 This rejection is too luxurious for the rising generation of 
Arab/Muslim actors like Ghassan Massoud, Kosai Khauli, Khaled Nabawi, Saïd 
Taghmaoui, Khaled Abol Naga, Sammy Sheik, and Amr Waked, who find Hollywood a 
gateway to their career success. The Pakistani English actor Art Malik, for instance, 
attributes his recognition as an actor to playing the terrorist role in True Lies (1994).  
“True Lies reinvented me,” he stresses, “in the eyes of a new generation and got me 
offers” (Figure 15).301 Other actors believe in the necessity of their existence as 
Hollywood insiders to engage their cultural backgrounds in the image formation process. 
                                                 
300 Ahmed. “Riz Khan’s One on One,” June 28, 2011. 
301 Rampton, “The Artful dodger Interview,” January 24, 1998. 
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"If I don't do it,” says Iraqi American actress Yasmin Hanani, “someone who knows less 
about my language and culture will.”302 
Perhaps Sayed Badreya is the most recognized Arab American actor with a 
twenty-year acting experience most of which is devoted to playing the terrorist role, 
particularly in popular films like True lies (1994), Executive Decision (1996), The Insider 
(1999), Three Kings (1999), Iron Man (2008), and You Don't Mess With the Zohan 
(2008). He once expressed a sense of frustration with Hollywood’s casting practices, 
most appropriately conveyed through his own kids, when they asked him about the time 
he would play the “nice guy.”303 “For fourteen years,” he stresses, “I have one line ‘in the 
name of Allah I will kill you;’ that’s it! Every movie I go in and somehow I end up with 
that line.”304 He offers a valuable critique of the racially defined nature of the selection 
process in his short film T for Terrorist (2003) in which he plays the role of an Arab 
American actor being pushed by a director to compose an image of a threatening/hateful 
Arab. Badreya sincerely believes in the possibility of producing conditions for change in 
Hollywood. “You don’t fight the system in Hollywood,” he argues, “You become part of 
the system so you can change it from the inside.”305 He decides to join hands with Issawi 
along with Arab American actor Shalhoub and a number of Middle Eastern American 
actors in filming AmericanEast. Despite lack of interest from U.S. movie theaters in 
embracing the film, it eventually gained support for production in a DVD format.306  
                                                 
302 Khalil, “But Can You Play a Terrorist?,” October 04, 2007. 
303 Cardillo and Potter, Casting Calls, 2004.  
304 Sanchez, Out in the Open, November 19, 2007. 
305 Cardillo and Potter, Casting Calls, 2004. 
306 Hanania, “Film Review,” February 3, 2009. 
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The film presents a timely critique of Hollywood’s casting practices in two ways. 
It first allows Badreya to play a lead role in the film, and, for the first time, exhibits an 
Arab American agency he has been denied in mainstream filmmaking.307  He plays the 
role of an Arab American single parent, named Mustafa, struggling to maintain a balance 
between the various dictations of his Arab cultural background and the daily demands of 
life in Los Angeles. Mustafa navigates a post-9/11 environment with a terror alert level 
set to “red” while FBI agents become increasingly invested in interrogating ties between 
his Islamic identity and terrorism. He finds himself consumed by obligations to raise a 
family observing his Egyptian traditions and to realize his own dream of becoming a 
successful businessperson. He struggles with his teen son, Mohamed (Richard 
Chagoury), in order to help him come to terms with his own identity as an American 
Muslim. He is also dedicated to persuading his sister, Salwah (Sarah Shahi), to accepting 
an arranged marriage, and dissuade her from pursuing a relationship with an American 
fellow in her workplace.  
Meanwhile, Mustafa is pressured against establishing partnership with a Jewish 
American, Sam (Shalhoub), in a business they name Habib Café. The partnership invites 
more criticism from his Middle Eastern American customers, who already engage in 
overwhelming discussions about U.S.-Arab politics in the café. The criticism transcended 
the film and spurred heated responses in the aftermath of its screening at the Egyptian 
film festival. Speaking of the news conference following the screening, Issawi reflects, 
“It was hell. I was getting attacked by everybody. ‘How dare you try to make 
                                                 
307 This recognition allows Badreya to play a lead role in the subsequent Swiss independent film, Cargo 
(2009). 
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normalization with Israel.’ And this was coming from journalists and critics.”308 Despite 
Mustafa’s emphasis that his café is not a social forum for political and religious 
discussions, two regular customers, Murad (Anthony Azizi) and Fikry (Erick Avari), 
cannot help but stir intense conversations about such sensational topics as the conflation 
of Jewish identity with Zionism and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  
The film also features a three-minute animated sequence historicizing the Middle 
East in light of European and American imperial presence in an attempt to deliver a 
response to America’s post-9/11 most asked question “why do they hate us?” Mustafa’s 
decision to kick Murad out of his café towards the end of the film speaks to an Arab 
American site of anxiety around identity politics, an act that Murad counts as 
symptomatic of forsaking one’s heritage. Overall, a number of perspectives circulate the 
film in hopes to produce a sophisticated reading of Arab American concerns and 
priorities, often rendered absent in both Hollywood and Egyptian polarizing works. It 
exposes, in the words of a reviewer, “the prejudice that exists on all sides, including the 
Arab American community.”309 
Mustafa’s character unveils a post-9/11 sense of Arab American resilience in 
rising above challenges and maintaining the American Dream. It also projects the need to 
cast Arab American actors in lead roles that offer a sense of agency to the community. 
Issawi is conscious of the message encoded in the work, i.e., the increasing demand in 
Hollywood for Arab roles requires a simultaneous increase in the quality of the 
associated imagery. Speaking of this mismatch, he stresses, “The roles are bigger, the 
                                                 
308 As quoted in Hanania, “Film Review,” February 3, 2009. 
309 Ibid. 
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scenes are bigger, the money is better. But it's still a terrorist role."310 To emphasize this 
message, he advances a sub-story of Mustafa’s employee, Omar (Kais Nashef), which 
dramatizes to large extent Badreya’s grievances against Hollywood’s casting agendas 
(Figure 16). Omar works as a taxicab for Mustafa to help support himself while pursuing 
an acting career in Hollywood. After so many stereotypical “terrorist” roles, Omar is 
excited to learn that he is going to play a doctor role in a television show styled after 
Fox’s 24 (2001-2010); criticized as one of many post-9/11 TV dramas that “cashed in on 
the salacious possibilities of Arab or Muslim terrorist threats and assured viewers with 
depictions of the U.S. government’s heroic efforts to combat this new, pulse-quickening 
terrorism.”311 Minutes before shooting, Omar learns that his role is cancelled and he 
would rather play the usual role with a heavy Arab accent and a scarier look. His 
American Dream, like Mustafa’s, is challenged by forces beyond his control. It almost 
collapses as he reluctantly enacts his lines: “Everyone on your knees. You’re being taken 
hostage. We are the soldiers of Allah!” Choosing Omar to continue with the same role in 
this film is emphatic of the dilemma that many Arab American performers are 
encountering, i.e., re-enacting their post-9/11 visibility while remaining visually invisible. 
AmericanEast registers the first Arab American attempt to communicate the 
complexity of the Arab American story to a wider audience. In a CNN interview with 
Shalhoub, he urges the Arab American community of actors, writers, and directors to be 
proactive in initiating the conversation in some of their own work. The film, he stresses, 
offers a “slice of life story” that captures different emotional experiences that add more 
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meaning to portrayals of terrorism.312 In another interview at the New York Arab 
American and South Asian Festival, Shalhoub articulates the agenda behind 
AmericanEast and stipulates the need for Arab American filmmakers to reclaim their 
voice: 
We wanted [to] inspire other young filmmakers in the Arab American community to begin 
to see it’s possible that there might be an appetite in the market for these kind of stories. So 
many times, we see Arab Americans and Muslims portrayed [with] negative stereotypes in 
the news, in television, and mainstream movies. This is an attempt to offset those images 
and to demonstrate it’s possible to get these other stories told.313 
 
 
Figure 16 Badreya (Mustafa) to the left and Nashef (Omar) – 
courtesy of AmericanEast 
 
Independent filmmaking has already been responsive to such demands.314 Unlike 
the shadowy representation of the Arab American image in Civic Duty (2006) in which 
the Egyptian actor Khaled Abol Naga shares a lead role that both humanizes and vilifies 
the next door Arab neighbor (see chapter I), a film like The Visitor (2007) offers Arab 
diasporic actors Haaz Sleiman and Hiam Abbass the chance to share lead roles of Arab 
American characters, Tarek and Mouna with a more invigorating depth into issues of 
                                                 
312 Sanchez, Out in the Open, November 19, 2007. 
313 Shalhoub, “Interview at New York Arab American and South Asian Festival,” 2008, 
314 Hollywood has shown signs of flexibility in casting Arab and Arab American actors in noticeable 
positive roles; see, Jaafar, “Mideast Actors Shed H'wood Stereotypes,” September 3-9, 2007. 
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identity, immigration, and cross-cultural communication. Such roles propose a new 
victimization narrative in which a white American Walter (Richard Jenkins) emerges as 
an observer rather than the savior. The film, which won the Independent Spirit award for 
best director (2008) and a nomination for best actor in academy Awards (2008), narrates 
the story of an economics professor whose solitary life suddenly changes when he visits 
his old Manhattan apartment. He initially startles to find an undocumented immigrant 
couple living in his apartment, i.e., a Syrian drummer Tarek and his Senegalese wife 
Zainab (Danai Gurira). Walter allows them to stay and develops an appreciation for 
Tarek’s music. Mouna, Tarek’s mother, reaches Walter, and expresses her concern about 
her inability to communicate with her son. They both learn that Tarek is being held at a 
detention center and is eventually deported back to Syria. Before departing the United 
States to re-connect with her son, Mouna develops an intimate relationship with Walter. 
The tone set in the film is critical of the immigration system and its failure to address the 
specificity of the human experience. 
Omar Metwally’s role in Rendition (2007) is equally empowering. Playing the 
role of Anwar el-Ibrahimi, a Chicago-based Egyptian American chemical engineer and a 
family man subjected to a CIA-sanctioned rendition program, Metwally emerges as a 
powerful actor mediating to the American audiences a blind spot in the U.S. war on 
terror. Upon returning from a conference trip to South Africa, Anwar is detained by U.S. 
officials and renditioned to an undisclosed location in North Africa. Anwar’s family 
move heaven and earth to locate him in a system classifying the case as confidential. The 
story somehow resembles that of the Syrian Canadian Maher Arar, a telecommunication 
engineer fallen victim to “extraordinary rendition” in 2002. Held in JFK airport for 
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questioning on charges linking him with Al Qaeda, Maher was eventually sent back to 
Syria, where he was immediately arrested and subjected to torture. Insisting that the case 
is one of deportation, the U.S. government refused to send him back to his passport 
country, Canada, where he resided for more than two decades.315 The film is critical of 
the effectiveness of torture in soliciting viable information. Unlike the unsubstantiated 
claim made in Zero Dark Thirty (2012), which misleads the audiences to believing that 
torture has been effective in leading the CIA to Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts, 
Anwar’s forced confessions do not withstand verification. The names he provides of 
alleged conspirators are not more than those of his favorite Egyptian team! 
The release of The Citizen in 2012 marked a very important addition to the Arab 
American independent filmmaking, furthering the promise of an Arab American 
generation of directors and actors to introduce their post-9/11 visibility in disruptive 
ways. Written and directed by Syrian American Sam Kadi, the film interrogates the life 
of its lead character Ibrahim, played by the Egyptian actor Nabawy. Ibrahim is a 
Lebanese immigrant, who wins the green card lottery and lands in the United States on 
September 10 2001. His compassion for helping others earns him the status of a hero in 
New York. Ibrahim is set to defend his American Dream while contesting the 
government for his right to citizenship in the court of law; the most critical scene that 
illustrates an Arab American commitment to reclaiming their Americanness. The 
prosecutor challenges Ibrahim’s right to U.S. citizenship on grounds of fear that he bears 
threats to the United States. The government’s concerns are rebutted throughout the film; 
particularly when the government clears him from terrorism-related charges after 
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detaining him for six months with no access to legal representation in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11.  
In the court, the prosecutor asks Ibrahim whether he attended an anti-government 
rally on the morning of his arrival to the country; an action that Ibrahim cherishes for 
promising him freedom of speech. “Considering your nationality and the fact that you 
were shouting anti-American rhetoric on the streets of New York the day before 
September 11,” the prosecutor continues, “why should God-fearing Americans believe 
that someone like you wishes no harm to their country?” Ibrahim responds with a set of 
rhetorical questions: 
Would you please clarify? When you say “anti-American,” do you mean that criticizing the 
president means that someone doesn’t care about this country? And when you say 
“someone like me,” do you mean someone from a part of the world that you fear because 
simply you do not wish to understand. And when you say “God-fearing Americans,” do 
you meant that I worship an inferior God to yours? And when you say “the day before 
9/11,” do you mean that I’m somehow connected with this event?  
Ibrahim’s response constitutes a very Arab American attempt to re-claim the values 
afforded to him by the U.S. constitution. The film foregrounds an active sense of agency 
that denounces U.S. hyper nationalism itself as a source of anti-Americanism. When 
Ibrahim follows his reflections with a firm statement, “I cannot answer such an un-
American question because I am here in the United States of American where the bill of 
rights must be respected,” he reminds the audiences of the existing discrepancy in the 
U.S. nationalist rhetoric that defines Americanness through strictly drawn boundaries. It 
this is pronouncement of Americanness that reflects the rising demands in the Arab 
American community for visual projects that seek to redefine what it means to be an 
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American. The Citizen, therefore, carries an important conversation initiated by 
AmericanEast, which demands a growing commitment from Arab American directors 
and actors in producing works that necessarily subvert their narrowly projected image in 
mainstream cultural circles. 
An Ode to Arab American Heterogeneity 
 
A risky element in Hollywood’s articulations of the Arab American image is the 
lack of interest in projecting the community’s heterogeneity. Meanwhile, the Egyptian 
cinema’s articulations of Arab Americans, though present a semi-nuanced reference to 
the particularity of the Arab American national, religious, and generational identities, are 
still reduced to abstractions that deny serious constructions of the community’s 
diversity.316 This results in images of heterogeneous Arab Americans subsumed under the 
polarizing categories of Arabness or Americanness. The two cinemas’ engagements with 
the Arab American community, even in their most complicated forms, remain superficial 
and do not reflect the multi-layeredness of the Arab transmigrant experience.  
The very term “Arab American” implies dispersed communities across the 
Americas with notable presence in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Brazil 
Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico.317 Narrowing the focus on the development of Arab 
American cultural identity to the U.S. context – which defines this project – raises a set of 
challenges that resist the codification of such an identity in purely homogenous terms. 
The field of Arab American studies in the United States has produced works that speak of 
various migration experiences, which, though popularly captured in three prominent 
waves, elucidate migrating populations with different priorities and concerns. Edited 
                                                 
316 For a reading of the community’s diverse ways of identifications, refer to Witteborn, “The Situated 
Expression of Arab Collective Identities in the United States,” 2007. 
317 See Alsultany and Shohat, Between the Middle East and the Americas, 2013. 
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collections like Baha Abu-Laban’s and Faith Zeadey’s Arabs in America, Nabeel 
Abraham’s and Andrew Shyrock’s Arab Detroit, Michael Suleiman’s Arabs in America, 
Sameer Abraham’s and Nabeel Abraham’s Arabs in the New World, Ernest McCarus’s 
The Development of Arab-American Identity as well as monographs like Beverlee 
Mehdi’s The Arabs in America 1492-1977, Naff’s The Arab Americans, Sarah Gualtieri’s 
Between Arab and White, Hani Bawardi’s The Making of Arab Americans, Loukia 
Sarroub’s All American Yemeni Girls, and Elizabeth Boosahda’s Arab-American in Faces 
and Voices illustrate attempts to make sense of the heterogeneity of migrant communities 
from the Arab-speaking world, solidified under the Arab American identity.318 Scholars 
in the field of Arab American studies, particularly since 9/11, have attempted to engage 
with the label “Arab American” in a sociopolitical context that calls into consideration 
Muslim and South Asian subjectivities. The Arab American Studies Association’s annual 
conferences since its inception in 2012 have devoted a greater space for intellectual 
conversations to interpret the levels of disrupture and conjuncture (domestic and 
transnational) that continue to redefine the Arab American identity as a token of a 
dynamic subjectivity in need of constant interrogation.319  
It is in light of this juncture in Arab American history that an Arab American film 
like Amreeka gains resonance for its ability to depart from U.S.-Arab traditional linear 
narration of Arab American subjectivity as a product of polarizations, and calls for an 
alternative way of imagination. In the film, Arab American director Dabis uses a 
framework with the potential to serve as a model for both Hollywood and Egyptian 
                                                 
318 Also, see public works like Naff, The Arab Americans, 1988; Marschner, California’s Arab Americans, 
2003; Schur’s The Arab Americans, 2004; Dahmash-Jarrah and Dressler, Arab Voices, 2005.  
319 The association holds annual conferences as part of the Middle East Studies Association convention. It 
also holds independent conferences, e.g. “Beyond the Label: Arab American Faces, Places, and Traces” 
(2014); http://arabamericanstudies.org/  
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filmmakers in dealing with issues of relevance to Arab diasporic multi-layeredness in the 
United States. Characteristic of a diasporic Palestinian cinema, which Nurith Gertz and 
George Khleifi characterize as “heterogeneous” and interactive with “a mosaic of classes, 
generations, genders, regions, and nations,” Amreeka, I argue, suggests three layers that 
underscore the issue of heterogeneity in the Arab American community, i.e., national 
background, religious identity, and migration generation.320 
The film dissects the issue of nationalism as a critical identity marker of the Arab 
American community, which is informed by the complicated history of the Arab identity 
formation (see chapter II). It highlights the importance of recognizing nationalism as a 
prerequisite for a deeper projection of the Arab American transmigrant experience. To 
emphasize this particularity, the camera follows the story of a migrating single parent, 
Muna (Nisreen Faour), and her teenage son, Fadi (Melkar Muallem), as they leave their 
home in the Palestinian territories and join their relatives in a Chicago suburb. The 
camera traces their life prior to their departure into diaspora. Muna works in a bank and 
Fadi goes to school. Their life is constantly consumed by a struggle against the 
socioeconomic challenges and political realities of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.321 
Israeli checkpoints interrupt their commuting experience to Bethlehem on a daily basis. 
Their identity is continually cheeked as they undergo intensive inspection procedures. 
Muna is hesitant to travel and leave her mother behind. She fears nostalgia and 
disconnecting from her home. Fadi, however, is resolute in convincing her otherwise. 
Leaving their homeland, he stresses, is a sweet-bitter option. Living as a prisoner in one’s 
own country is not after all worth the sacrifice. The lack of prospect for her kid and the 
                                                 
320 Gertz and Khleifi, Palestinian Cinema, 8. 
321 Sienkiewicz, “Amreeka and the Challenge of Bringing Palestine to American Audiences.” 
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increasing intimidation of the Israeli soldiers are two reasons that prompt her to embrace 
the urgency to migrate.  
The totality of Muna’s experience, which draws from Dabis’ personal migration 
experience back in 1990, emphasizes the importance of nationality in defining the 
specificity of the Arab American image.322 Choosing to display Muna’s and Fadi’s 
struggle as Palestinians prior to capturing their experience in the United States is a 
welcomed intervention in the film’s subversion of Hollywood’s decontextualized 
representations of Arab migration. It reminds viewers of the transnational space that Arab 
migrants occupy; an interactive space that renders them un-detached from, but rather 
informed by, the circumstances enveloping their countries of origin. To register this sense 
of diasporic consciousness, Dabis injects a twisted line of humor when Muna responds to 
a question posed by a U.S. border officer about her occupation with the affirmative tone 
“Yes, it is occupied” in reference to the Occupied Territories. Muna’s confusion of a 
question about her employment with her anxiety about the formally unrecognized status 
of her homeland illustrates the need for transnational projections of migrants’ national 
identity.  
Meanwhile, such projections play an instrumental role in reifying the director’s 
critique of the double-layered discrimination that a migrant family like Muna and her son 
are bound to experience both in their country of origin and in the United States.323 
Depicting Fadi, for instance, as a victim of an Israeli soldier’s abusive power – he forces 
the kid in a degrading tone to step out of the vehicle and lift his shirt – serves as a 
                                                 
322 Archer, “Coming to Amreeka, Michael Archer interviews Cherien Dabis,” September 15, 2009, 
323 For a detailed account of this double-layeredness, refer to Armstrong’s reading of Said’s Out of Place 
memoire (1999), “Being ‘Out of Place,” 2003.  
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necessary background to learning the impact of the anti-Arab harassment that Fadi is 
soon to experience in his new home on his character development (Figure 17). It does 
reify Said’s reflections on the unique hardships that Palestinian Americans experience: 
The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There 
exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when it is 
allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural 
stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the 
Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel 
as his uniquely punishing destiny.324 
This mutual process of discrimination in Fadi’s transmigrant life is not possible to 
highlight without specifying the national identity of the Palestinian American 
community; a characteristic rendered absent in the simplified portrayals of the Arab 
American image in both Hollywood and Egyptian cinema.  
 
Figure 17 Fadi undergoes humiliation at an Israeli checkpoint – 
courtesy of Amreeka 
 
Amreeka’s second contribution to diversifying the Arab American image is the 
light its sheds on the Christian background of Muna’s family. Like any other community, 
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Arab Americans subscribe to a mosaic of religious (including secular) identities. This 
constitutes a necessary intervention against Hollywood’s long-standing conflation of the 
Arab and Muslim identities into one homogenous category, often profiled according to 
names, facial features, and dress codes, let alone a distinct heavy English accent (see 
chapter I). This conflation projects the Muslim and the Arab identities as interchangeable 
at a time Arabs make up less than twenty percent of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims 
while the majority of Muslims live in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
China, Iran, and Turkey – none of them is an Arab country. Contributors to the Gallup-
based survey Who Speaks for Islam and the study of Muslim cultural politics Being 
Young and Muslim navigate the multitude of global Muslim voices and demonstrate how 
Islam is simply a religion that transcends the boundaries of color, language, and 
ethnicity.325 Works like Muqtedar Khan’s American Muslims, Yvonne Haddad’s and 
John Esposito’s Muslims on the Americanization Path?, Haddad’s Muslims in the West, 
Paul Barrett’s American Islam, Zahid Bukhari’s Muslims’ Place in the American Public 
Square, Karen Leonard’s Muslims in the United States, Richard Wormser’s American 
Islam, and Asma Hasan’s American Muslims offer a comprehensive history of American 
Muslims as ”a community of communities,” to echo Khan’s description, informed by 
Muslims of other backgrounds like South Asians, East Asians, and African Americans as 
well as converts from other backgrounds including Natives, Latinos, and Whites.326 This 
is not to dismiss the intersectionality of the Muslim and the Arab subjectivities, which 
have been explored in works like Haddad’s Not Quite American?, Ron Geave’s Islam 
and the West Post 9/11, Geneive Abdo’s Mecca and Main Street, Michael Wolfe’s 
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Taking Back Islam, Carl Ernst’s Islamophobia in America, and Anny Bakalian’s 
Backlash 9/11. 
In fact, the film foregrounds this intersectionality through the hardship that Muna 
and her sister’s family undergo as part of the post-9/11 backlash. Her brother-in-law, 
Nabeel (Yussuf Abu-Warda), the family’s patriarch, suddenly finds himself experiencing 
a crisis in his career as a physician. His patients, unable to recognize his Christian 
background, decide to boycott him in a frenzy of polarized “you are with us or against 
us” calculations. His wife (Muna’s sister), Raghda (Hiam Abbass), refuses to hang the 
American flag in their yard in protest against the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003). This 
further hinders Nabeel’s ability to communicate his patriotism to his grief-stricken 
neighbors – wrapped in commodification process that has transformed 9/11 into a brand 
and the American flag as a signifier of allegiance.327 This causes the family financial 
troubles. They now struggle to pay off their mortgage and retain their credit cards. Worse 
still, the family continue to receive anonymous death threat mails. Their children are also 
subjected to harassment in their schools. Thus, the film presents racial profiling as a 
solidifying site of the Arab/Muslim subjectivities. Specifying the family’s Christian 
background suggests the need to transcend this intersectionality in search for an Arab 
subjectivity informed by the uniqueness of national identity and the rich history of Arab 
multiple interactions across existing political, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious 
spectrums in the Middle East and North Africa. This, of course, includes interactions with 
other ethnicities (e.g. Persians, Turks, Kurds, and Berbers), and Arab communities 
                                                 
327 Walmart sold 116,000 flags on September 11, 2001. The total flag sale in 2001 reached $51.7 million. 
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subscribing to other religions (be they Christians in Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Jordan, Sudan, and Iraq, or Jews in Bahrain, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen).328  
The third area of distinction in Amreeka’s pitch for Arab American heterogeneity 
is its portrayal of generational difference within the same migrant household. Nabeel and 
Raghda are consumed by their various priorities. Nabeel is overwhelmed by the impact of 
racial profiling on realizing his American Dream. He is also haunted by the unraveling 
politics of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and obsessively follows the news. He emerges 
critical of the U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world, and expresses his resentment at the 
government’s use of his tax dollars to finance its military adventures in the region. 
Raghda experiences a bitter sense of nostalgia to her Palestinian homeland. She 
reproaches Muna for deciding to give up on her roots, and insists that no justification 
could ever account for her departure. Having failed to go back, Raghda strictly observes 
her Palestinian traditions and forces her kids to abide by them. When her adolescent 
daughter refuses to acknowledge her Arab parenting style and reminds her that they live 
in America, she angrily warns her, “This is Palestine;” in reference to their house. As a 
result of their own struggles, Nabeel and Raghda have hard time communicating with 
each other, adding more strains on their relationship. 
As a fresh migrant, Muna is preoccupied with her desire to secure financial 
independence. Having lost her lifetime savings in the airport, she is anxious about 
generating a source of income in order to help her host family with their living expenses. 
Her search for a job in lieu of her education credential and banking experience reaches a 
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dead end; no one is interested in hiring a person with her background. She eventually 
lands a job in a White Castle that allows her to develop her own identity. In order to mask 
her embarrassment for this type of work, she informs her family that she is hired in a 
bank close to her real work. Later on, she is targeted by some of Fadi’s high school 
classmates who have already posed trouble for him. She also develops a relationship with 
Fadi’s school principle who grows attractive to her story. As the plot unfolds, Muna 
emerges resilient and successful in restoring peace for her family. 
While Nabeel, Raghda, and Muna invest their time and energy in responding to 
their own pressures, the kids wrestle with other issues of immediate concern to their age 
and personality. Fadi has to patiently follow the directions of his cousins who are 
conscious about his image in high school lest he looks “fresh of the boat.” His cousin 
Salma (Alia Shawkat), who attends Fadi’s classes and constantly defends him, is 
preoccupied with her teenage rebellion, i.e. smoking marijuana, maintaining a 
relationship with a boyfriend, and challenges her mother’s strict observations of 
traditions. Fadi sustains abuse and harassment that culminates in his arrest. At the police 
station, he is subjected to extraordinary measures in response to security concerns about 
his Arab background. At home, Fadi’s much younger cousins, Lamis (Selena Haddad) 
and Rana (Jenna Kawar) are fighting over who gets to have the bigger side of the room 
they share. The film’s multiple storylines advance simultaneously, orienting the 
audiences into the multi-generational difference that defines this Arab migrant household 
(Figure 18). 
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Figure 18 A family united for dinner – courtesy of Amreeka 
 
In reclaiming an imagined sense of a heterogeneous Arab American identity, 
Amreeka sends a serious Arab American message to screenwriters and directors in both 
Hollywood and Egyptian cinema urging them to transcend their homogenous 
constructions of Arab Americans, and re-envision the various factors that continue to 
render the Arab American image ever more complicated. As a work dedicated to 
capturing the Arab diasporic agency, the film utilizes a narration style that locates its 
temporal and spatial dimensions in a context that caters to both national and transnational 
frames and pays close attention to nationality, religion, and generation to enable more 
nuanced projections of the underexplored Arab American image. Dabis’ message, to 
conclude, complements Issawi’s calls through underscoring the timeliness of similar 
initiatives by other Arab American filmmakers and the array of possible storylines and 
perspectives emerging from self-representation narratives.  
Moving Beyond Geopolitics and Terrorism 
  
In “Beyond US and Them: Identity and Terror from an Arab American’s 
Perspective,” John Michael entertains a pitfall in works dealing with identity politics: 
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It is remarkably difficult to specify in general terms what the relationship between 
individual and group identity is. On the one hand, attempts to reduce the former to the 
latter, to see individuals as primarily members of groups, tend to lapse into racist or 
essentialist errors and violence like Orientalism and the practices it continues to legitimate. 
On the other hand, attempts to call the salient existence of group identities or allegiances 
into question…fail to describe a crucial part of our lives together. Many, perhaps all of us, 
experience ourselves as individuals and our place in the world through our complex, 
conflicted, and compelling sense of our identification with or belonging to various and 
heterogeneous groups.329  
Narrating Arab American subjectivity in the history of Hollywood and Egyptian cinema 
has blurred the distinction between the individual and the collective through imagery 
defined by the collective imagination of Self and Other, further denying the possibility of 
projecting Michael’s reference to the identity complexity of the community. The 
dominant voice in the burgeoning Arab American filmmaking is one informed by the 
urgency to respond to such master narratives. Despite the disruptive nature of films like 
AmericanEast and Amreeka – e.g. empowerment of Arab American actors and focus on 
the issue of Arab American heterogeneity – their main storylines are mostly confined 
within geopolitical issues that dominate Egyptian filmmaking and Hollywood’s terrorism 
narrative. They particularly emerge as responsive to narratives most forcefully 
entertained through the cultural contestations of U.S.-Arab popular culture realms.  
It is in this context – in which most of the Egyptian renderings of the Arab 
American image invest in circulating a critique of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East and 
Hollywood’s productions, even in their most sincere sympathetic portrayals of Arab 
Americans, are still dictated by the unraveling politics of terrorism (domestic and 
homegrown) – that an Arab American filmmaker like Nashef calls for a necessary 
                                                 
329 Michael, “Beyond US and Them,” 709. 
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intervention in Arab American filmmaking and voices a commitment to initiating a 
storyline that introduces the audiences to the Arab American subjectivity beyond the 
saturated imagery of geopolitics and terrorism. Her film Detroit Unleaded represents a 
timely Arab American intervention in filmmaking that recognizes the importance of the 
individual in wrestling against the dictations of other underexplored identity 
particularities (i.e., gender in the context of this work). It constitutes a very important step 
in producing films that introduce the audiences to a different image of Arab Americans; 
an image that delves deep into the lives of Arab Americans through a romantic comedy 
storyline bearing no interest in recycling the prevalent focus on politics. 
 
Figure 19 Sami and Najlah in love behind the bulletproof 
cage – courtesy of Detroit Unleaded 
 
Detroit Unleaded features the story of an Arab American named Sami (EJ Assi), 
who is forced to forsake his dreams of departing Detroit, the Arab capital in the United 
States, in search for his own future. He runs a family business (gas station) with his 
cousin Mike (Mike Batayeh). To further protect himself from armed robbery that once 
claimed his father’s life, Sami installs a glass shield that provides him with a sense of 
security. He alternates shifts with Mike and conducts a struggling business to make ends 
meet. The camera introduces the audiences to their daily encounters with different types 
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of customers, and captures various casual and entertaining conversations. Sami falls in 
love with a beautiful Arab American girl, Najlah (Nada Shouhayib), who works in a 
family cell phone business. Najlah pays him frequent visits, and they spend sweet time 
behind the bulletproof cage. (Figure 19). 
The film advances a multi-layered critique of gendered formations in the Arab 
American community.330 It first sheds lights on “the dissonance between American 
hookup culture and home-country traditions,” to borrow a reviewer’s words.331 Najlah’s 
relationship with Sami is filled with references to a gendered pattern in the Arab 
American community, which presupposes family interventions and dictations. She is 
being over-protected by her brother Fadi (Steven Soro), who draws strict boundaries 
around her social life. In one scene, Najlah flees a nightclub in fear of being spotted by 
her brother, who is himself over-indulged with casual encounter type of relationships. In 
order to retain the secrecy of her relationship with Sami, she opts to weave a web of lies 
to make sense of her absence from work and home. She particularly suffers a moment of 
humiliation, in an emotionally charged scene, when Fadi comes across her in the gas 
station. He strips her of any sense of individuality, and does not recognize her 
commitment to preserving the Arab code prohibiting premarital sexual conduct. She is, 
therefore, forced to embattle her family’s gendered imposed restrictions, and emerges 
triumphant in claiming her own Arab American feminine agency. She challenges her 
brother’s fierce reproach and his issued threats against Sami by deciding to elope with her 
lover in search for a life marked by her own sensibilities.  
                                                 
330 For works about Arab American gender, see, Shakir, Bint Arab, 1997; Abdulhadi, Arab and Arab 
American Feminisms, 2011.  
331 Genzlinger, “Love Among the Gas Pumps,” November 21, 2013. 
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The other gendered formation unfolds through the character of Sami’s mother, 
Mariam (Mary Assel), who has spent a life of dependency on the men in her life. Mariam 
lives a life of solitude as she grieves over the loss of her husband. She is unable to 
socialize with her neighbors. She constantly demands help from her son to run errands for 
her, and is hesitant to obtain a driver license as the first step towards securing a sense of 
independence for herself. She struggles to retain her role as a mother and seems less 
inclined to reconcile her femininity and individuality. It was only when Sami informs her 
of his decision to leave the state when she comes to terms with her feminine identity. 
Only then she emerges as a newborn woman full of confidence and command over her 
own destiny. After years of passive interaction with life, which the camera captures 
through shots of a laidback lifestyle in her dimly lighted house, she concludes her search 
for rescuing her femininity in a token for restoring happiness to her life. Her triumph is 
revealed through close-up shots showing her drive around in a symbolic reference to her 
ability to transgress the limitations imposed by her Arab-structured gendered role as a 
mother (Figure 20). The newly emancipated Mariam no longer hesitates to introduce 
herself to her neighbors and finds a meaning in initiating communication with others in 
her community.332 
Nashef’s critique of gendered formations in the Arab American community does 
not exclude Sami whose gendered role prescribes an obligation that demands him to 
accept his destined work at the family business. His “cage” experience at the gas station, 
which hinders his ability to both lead a romantic lifestyle and pursue a career of his own, 
is enforced through his compliance to perform his role in earning income and supporting 
                                                 
332 For a glimpse into Arab American women’s gendered role from an Arab perspective, see al-Fadhel, 
“Threading Absences,” 2001.  
Mahdi 204 
 
 
his mother. Nashef’s development of this  role draws from a personal observation of the 
Arab American community: 
Through close observations within my own family and circle of friends, it always seemed 
that men were under a great deal of pressure to make money and support their families. 
And this economic responsibility seemed to trap them in a life they did not dream of or 
want…333 
The “cage” in Sami’s case represents the intertwinement of economic necessity and the 
gendered constructions around it. It was not until he decides to redefine his own destiny 
that he manages to break away from his monotonous lifestyle. In order to realize his 
ambitions, he first needs to confront his mother and informs her of his decision to leave 
the state abruptly, thereby, demonstrating the interconnectedness of work responsibility 
and family obligation that underwrite the lives of many Arab immigrants and Arab 
Americans. Once capable to unsettle the nuances of his gendered role, Sami successfully 
gains his sense of individuality and independence. 
 
Figure 20 Mariam’s driving symbolizes her ability to break away 
from the shackles of her gendered role as an Arab American 
mother – courtesy of Detroit Unleaded 
 
The emphasis on the “cage” image in Detroit Unleaded becomes a necessary 
metaphor of entrapment for Arab American women like Najlah and Mariam, and men 
                                                 
333 Staff. “Through The Looking Glass,” The Visibility Project, May 19, 2014. 
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like Sami. Breaking away from their cages represents a statement in favor for gender 
empowerment that transcends the transnational impact on their gendered roles (read, 
Arab traditions) and addresses their ability to master their own reality. The possibility of 
this disruption is contingent on their willingness to reconcile the dictations of their Arab 
culture with the alluring promise of the American Dream. Najlah, Mariam, and Sami 
present three various articulations of this reconciliation, which exhibit different ways of 
learning about the Arab American subjectivity. Nashef’s critique reflects an important 
dimension in Arab American filmmaking that displays the necessity of self-representation 
in enunciating the Arab American agency, particularly through narratives that are not 
limited to questions of geopolitics and terrorism. The multi-layeredness of the critique 
itself speaks of a rich subjectivity in need of full exploration in Arab American films.  
The urgency for this exploration emerges ever more critical in light of the current 
superficial treatment of gender as part of Arab American subjectivity in Hollywood.334 In 
Marcos Siega’s Pretty Persuasion (2004), for example, the Palestinian-in-America Randa 
(Adi Schnall), a student in a Beverley hills private high school, is projected as a 
stereotypical submissive Middle Easterner whose gender identity is subsumed under 
pressures from her dismissive parents and monopolizing classmate, Kimberly (Wood). 
The film’s renders Randa’s character under-developed as she becomes an auxiliary for 
Kimberly’s plots, which include convincing Randa to file a false charge of rape against 
her English teacher. As illustrative of Randa’s ridiculed gender identity, Kimberly 
dismisses Randa’s femininity in a high racialized tone:  
                                                 
334 Jarmakani, Imagining Arab Womanhood, 2008. 
Mahdi 206 
 
 
I have respect for all races but I’m very glad that I was born white. As a woman, it’s the 
best race to be…If I wasn’t white, then the next thing I’d want to be is Asian….My third 
choice would be African-American… except I definitely want light skin and Caucasian 
features. And finally, you know, Randa, no offense or anything, but my very last choice 
would be an Arab. Truth be told, you’re not in a very enviable position. There’s a lot of 
resentment in this country towards the Middle East and a lot of stereotypes floating around, 
which I don’t really think are true because in the short time I’ve known you, you haven’t 
tried to bomb anybody and you currently smell okay to me. But people will laugh at you 
and probably make fun of that thing you wear on your head. 
Once the lie is discovered, Randa’s mother is silent while her father shames her. This 
prompts her to commit suicide with a gun after writing in her classroom board, “we are 
all in sinners.” “Instead of portraying Randa as a victim,” Shaheen suggests, “the 
producers present her as a shallow, dense Muslim teenager not deserving of our sympathy 
– a reel stereotypical suicidal Palestinian Muslim.”335 
Critiquing Arab American gender formations in films conforming to U.S.-Arab 
mainstream representation patterns, even if exhibited by Arab American directors and 
contributors, does not sufficiently address the nuance implicit in Nashef’s work. A film 
like Tayeh fi Amrika for instance, though carries the signature of an Arab American 
director, fails to deviate from defining gender through U.S.-Arab identity formations. The 
Arab American characters of Nour and Nahla rigidly represent an Arab critique of 
American materialism. The marriage-for-business deal that Nahla attempts to construct 
with the acting-like-Adel Sherif projects a limited critique of America’s corrupting 
materialism. A conversation between Nahla and her daughter illustrates this limitation:  
                                                 
335 Shaheen, Guilty, 151-152. 
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      NAHLA. I want you to think of the 250 feddans, the money in the banks, and the rice 
hulling facilities. All these things will be only yours!336 
NOUR. This is marriage, mom. It is not business! 
NAHLA. What is marriage but a business! [Sigh] 
NOUR. What’s wrong? 
      NAHLA. Nothing. I am fine. I just want you to understand one thing. Don’t be fooled 
by the big house we live in, the cars, or the money we spend. When your dad 
passed away, he left us more debt than money! 
NOUR. What? 
     NAHLA. Exactly! This is why Adel is our only chance to pay off our debts and live the 
same standard we have now. 
     NOUR. I don’t know! Ok. But, I have to get to know him well.  
 
Similarly, a film like Alan Ball’s Towelhead (2007), which results out of a series of 
communications with the Arab/Muslim American communities, does not necessarily 
translate into a work reflective of the nuanced Arab American gendered formations. The 
film tells the story of a thirteen-year-old Lebanese American Jasira (Summer Bishil) who 
struggles to come to terms with her sexuality while growing up in a disconnected Arab 
American family. She first lives with her mother in New York but her life soon disrupts 
after her mother’s boyfriend fails to recognize his limited role in teaching her about her 
body private parts. Unwilling to educate her daughter about sexuality, the mother sends 
Jasira to live with her conservative father in Texas, who is more interested in appeasing 
his girlfriend than orienting his daughter through her sexual awakening critical time. The 
lack of parental guidance leads Jasira to explore her sexuality with an adult neighbor and 
an African American classmate. In its attempt to explore Jasira’s growing up experience, 
the film reduces the Arab American parents to a Hollywood’s caricature of intolerance 
and ignorance whose Arab cultural identity becomes a source of trouble for their 
                                                 
336 A feddan is an Egyptian unit of area equal to 1.038 acres. 
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daughter. They both fail to perform their gendered roles, and are the primary factor for 
their daughter’s personal struggle.  
The reductionist treatment of gender in Towelhead and Tayeh fi Amrika, works 
conforming to in U.S.-Arab mainstream filmmaking standards, seriously attempt to 
navigate the Arab American subjectivity beyond geopolitics and terrorism, but are 
illustrative of the need for works like Detroit Unleaded. Redefining agency through self-
representations, therefore, proves a necessary route through which Arab American 
filmmaking could forge a space to capture the Arab American intersectionality of the 
personal and the collective. 
 
Conclusion 
Arab American directors like Issawi, Dabis, and Nashef have gained recognition 
in initiating a necessary medium for Arab Americans to reclaim their sense of agency, 
and offer nuanced narrations of their transmigrant experience. Their works contribute to a 
momentum that circulates a counter-narrative promoting conscious projections of images 
heavily invested in the mosaic composite of the Arab American community. They forge a 
critical diasporic space informed by a post-9/11 emerging Arab American consciousness 
of a subjectivity that defies sensational projections. The articulations of this subjectivity 
are multifold but – as demonstrated in this chapter and the previous chapter – unfold 
through an Arab American agency defined in a diasporic public sphere that emphasizes 
the community’s interstitial activism and self-representation as its two prominent 
dimensions.  
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In an unprecedented challenge of the nationalist/postcolonial projections of the 
Arab American image in Hollywood and Egyptian cinema, which have reduced the 
complexity of the Arab American community into a site of U.S.-Arab mutual vilification, 
Arab American filmmakers have emerged in the past decade to play a critical role in 
reclaiming their hijacked identity. AmericanEast is one the earliest attempts in the 
burgeoning Arab American filmmaking that necessitates an active pronouncement of the 
role of Arab American actors in engendering lead roles often suppressed under the 
restricting casting practices of Hollywood and Egyptian filmmaking. Amreeka recognizes 
the importance of self-representation in highlighting the Arab American heterogeneity in 
terms of national background, religious identity, and migration generation. Detroit 
Unleaded offers a critique of Arab Americans’ gendered formations in ways that 
transcend commercial filmic productions around geopolitics and terrorism in the U.S.-
Arab cinematic terrains. The three films have gained limited recognition for distribution 
in the United States and reified a rising interest in capturing Arab American narratives 
reflective of the intersectionality of the individual and the collective in the community. 
This recognition underscores the reception possibility of works that engage with diverse 
narratives of relevance to the community, which include but not limited to issues of 
nationality, race, class, gender, sexuality, and education. Parallel to the growth of the 
Arab American voice in the independent filmmaking industry, Arab American 
entertainment insiders in Hollywood and Arab diasporic actors in Egyptian cinema have 
also a role to register monumental changes in casting and projections. Self-representation, 
after all, is the most practical way to make a difference in imagining an autonomous and 
dynamic Arab American subjectivity interactive with today’s global reality.  
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Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this dissertation has been an effort to capture the multi-
layered articulations of Arab American subjectivity across the U.S.-Arab cultural 
productions with a particular emphasis on relevant cinematic terrains. The first part of the 
project has investigated the visual image of the Arab American in Hollywood and 
Egyptian mainstream filmmaking, and concluded with a clear-cut statement about the 
role of U.S.-Arab cultural politics in mediating certain polarized projections informed by 
prominent discourses corresponding with overarching Orientalist-Occidentalist references 
deeply connected in the U.S.-Arab collective memory. On the one hand, Hollywood’s 
filmmakers, particularly since the 1970s, have operated within a hyped nationalist 
framework, which constantly dismisses the cultural citizenship of the Arab American 
community. Despite the industry’s evolution from straightforward portrayals of Arab 
Americans as aliens committed to undermining the U.S. national security to post-9/11 
semi-nuanced representations of Arab Americans as either homegrown terrorists or 
victims of racial profiling, the guiding premise of its renderings of Arab Americans 
subjectivity remains largely illustrative of a momentum that insists in questioning their 
allegiance and belonging. Even in their most positive forms, Hollywood’s products fail to 
capture the nuance surrounding the Arab American transmigrant experience. On the other 
hand, Egyptian filmmakers, though exhibiting a transnational framework that 
consolidates an Arabist, Islamist, and state nationalist consciousness of the Arab 
American subjectivity, have advanced sensational imagery since the 1990s that locate 
Arab Americans within the Manichean paradigm of binary oppositions, which registers a 
restricted postcolonial critique of the community as either Arab or American. While the 
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industry has succeeded in subverting Hollywood’s hegemonic portrayals of Arabness and 
emerged as a powerful medium in voicing an alternative narrative of empowered 
Arabness, it has failed to navigate away from Hollywood’s alienation of the Arab 
American community. The two industries, I have concluded, vary in their projections but 
share the premise of constraining Arab Americans in a space that does not recognize their 
uniquely charted transnational boundaries (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21 Arab Americans at the intersection of U.S.-Arab dominant imagery 
 
Thus, the comparative surveying of Hollywood and Egyptian cultural productions 
has been instrumental in recognizing the multitude of clashing narratives with relevance 
to the issue of Arab American belonging. This comparison reifies the necessity of 
unsettling the “national” when interrogating the Arab American diasporic subjectivity. 
This framework is in need of full development in the field of Arab American studies, 
which currently lacks an emphasis on the simultaneous articulations of the Arab 
American identity in U.S.-Arab cultural works. In light of the recent Arab American 
scholarship, which expresses an increasing commitment to transnationalizing the 
community’s ethnic composite, there emerges a demand mediated through this work for a 
Mahdi 212 
 
 
scholarly equal engagement with the Arab world as a critical site of inquiry of Arab 
American identity formations. This work initiates this inquiry with a limited focus on the 
dimensions of the Arab American cultural citizenship in filmmaking, i.e., belonging, 
alienation, and exclusion. A study of American Muslims’ struggle against Islamophobia 
in the United States, for instance, cannot be complete without exploring the grounds 
generating both radicalization and anti-Islamism in the Arab world. Future projects could 
possibly engage with a range of other issues that include, but are not limited to, 
conducting topic-specific comparative readings of nation, family, class, gender, sexuality, 
race, and disability. Comparisons need not be limited to cultural studies, area studies, 
ethnic studies, or other interdisciplinary fields, but could potentially emerge in works 
rooted in traditional fields such as political science, history, anthropology, social science, 
and religious studies.  
The second part of this project has primarily advocated the need for a 
transnational context that both reflects and informs the post-9/11 rising consciousness of 
cross-cultural disruptions in the manufacturing of Arab American subjectivity. The third 
chapter foregrounds interstitial activism as a critical site that generates appropriate 
considerations of the Arab American diasporic agency and transcends the traditionally 
policed boundaries in U.S.-Arab films. It does so by introducing an intertextual analysis 
model of two films that promote Arab American lead characters as active rather than 
passive players in defining their subjectivity. Although the two films are somehow 
responsive to filmmaking dictations of Hollywood and Egyptian cinema, they elucidate 
serious efforts to re-mapping Arab Americans as transnational citizens wrestling with 
geopolitical issues of their concern without compromising their right to contest the 
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stereotypically allocated grounds of their allegiance in the two cinemas. The fourth 
chapter sustains this emphasis on Arab American diasporic agency through a reference to 
the disruptive role of self-representation in enunciating the community’s complexity. It 
offers a reading of burgeoning Arab American filmmaking efforts to re-claim their 
identity and re-define mainstream representation strategies of their image. This trend 
highlights the Arab American investment in echoing the diversity of Arab American 
concerns and priorities and the heterogeneity of their consciousness while projecting their 
narratives at crossroads of the individual and the collective, the local and the national, 
and the national and the transnational. Interstitial activism and self-representation, I have 
concluded, constitute two critical articulations of an ever-dynamic subjectivity with its 
own contestations of the mutual process of Otherness in the U.S.-Arab popular culture 
(Figure 22).  
Figure 22 Arab American diasporic subjectivity 
 
This simultaneous reading of the attempts to re-define the Arab American 
subjectivity in U.S., Arab, and Arab American films demands full elaboration in future 
works invested in analyses of other forms of popular culture. While a work like Fadda-
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Conrey’s Contemporary Arab-American Literature is a welcomed intervention, 
particularly in its emphasis on the importance of self-representation in communicating an 
Arab American transnational sense of belonging, there remains the need to conduct cross-
cultural investigations of American, Arab, and Arabic American literature and their 
coalescence in charting the identity’s diasporic boundaries. Paying close attention to this 
methodology in the field of Arab American studies is timely and critical for a full 
pronouncement of the Arab American transmigrant experience. It bears the promise of 
uncovering inquires often understressed in works exclusively restricted to the Arab 
American cultural production. The possibility of fully unpacking the issue of interstitial 
activism in this dissertation, for example, draws from its conscious effort to recognize the 
role of other sites of cultural productions, i.e., national, postcolonial, and diasporic. Thus, 
I very much hope for this project to initiate a call for scholarly interventions in the field 
that translates into works bearing a similar methodological emphasis in other cultural 
forms, including television (news, shows, programs), music (hip hop, pop, blues), 
performance (theater, dance, gaming, sport), design (fashion, décor), visual art (painting, 
cartoon, graffiti), and alternative media (twitter, facebook, youtube) – to name but a few. 
Maintaining inquires in this respect will result in contributions that fully elaborate, if not 
re-define, the parameters of Arab American diasporic identity.  
A thorough investigation of the Arab American subjectivity still requires other 
temporal and spatial considerations not addressed in this dissertation. The focus on Arab 
Americans in this project is constrained within the post-1965 cold war and war on terror 
politics, with a particular emphasis on the post-9/11 context. This limitation is partly 
enforced by the lack of interest in earlier cinematic projections in Hollywood, Egyptian, 
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and Arab American filmmaking in imagery entertaining the Arab American story. The 
contours of earlier transnational encounters with Arab Americans in other cultural forms, 
however, remain severely under-explored. Jacob Berman’s American Arabesque 
investigates the transnational context within which Arab Americans operated during the 
nineteenth century. More works are yet to capture nuances of such a context in various 
historical periods. Similarly, the term “Arab American” itself implies Arab diasporic 
communities residing beyond the national boundaries of the United States. Arab 
Americans living in North America and South America are diverse. Each community 
retains a transnational consciousness, which overlaps with Arab Americans in the United 
States but certainly develops in line of other sociocultural and geopolitical circumstances 
worth exploring. Contributions to the Alsultany’s and Shohat’s Between the Middle East 
and the Americas are significant in stressing the spatial magnitude of the Arab diasporic 
experience; more works engaging with this aspect are yet to emerge.  
In essence, this case study of the U.S.-Arab filmmaking industries recognizes the 
impact of U.S.-Arab cultural politics in defining Arab Americans’ belonging and 
allegiance. It prescribes the need for simultaneous interrogations of the relevant 
national/postcolonial collective memory while proactively capturing cross-cultural 
disruptive filmic efforts to re-define the cultural citizenship of the Arab American 
community in a transnational context. The study’s significance lies in its contribution to a 
scholarly paradigmatic shift in favor of transcending the “national” in return for intricate 
examinations of the interlocutors shaping Arab American subjectivity.  
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